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ABSTRACT 
The concept of political connection and its related determinants have received significant 
attention in academic discussion due to political heterogeneities across countries. 
Furthermore, although the appointment of current or former politicians to corporate boards 
is a highly prevalent corporate political strategy, empirical evidence is inconclusive as to 
whether and how such appointments create or destroy value for firms and their 
shareholders. To mitigate these challenges and ambiguities, a deeper understanding of the 
variances in the implication of political connection from different certain features of firm-
, industry- and country-specific factors has been accentuated in this research area. 
Moreover, such implications might be contingent upon varying institutional environments. 
This results in a research call for fuller examination of considering institutional factors in 
the investigation of dynamic role of political connection. Drawing from different 
theoretical lens in the field of political connection, the thesis conducts two related empirical 
studies to analyse the impact of political connection on firm performance and what 
determinants influence this impact. In particular, the first goal seeks to investigate the 
relationship between political connection and firm performance. It also assesses the 
moderating effect of ownership structure (namely SOE1) on the relationship between 
political connection and firm performance. The second goal examines the joint effect of 
political connection and institutional indicators on firm performance. To achieve the 
purposes of research, the thesis applied main method of two-way fixed effects controlling 
for unobservable company and time characteristics and two-step system GMM controlling 
for endogeneity issue to a panel of 172 manufacturing companies during the period from 
2007 to 2016.   
For the first goal, the research develops the hypotheses based on existing theories on 
political connection, namely helping-hand and resource-dependency against grabbing-
hand and agency theory. Additionally, the study disentangles political connection into its 
types and calculates its strength based on political administrative rankings, and its ratio via 
 
1 State-owned enterprises  
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number of politically conencted directors relative to board size, thus suggesting the 
different roles played by different types, strength and ratio of political connection. This 
analysis helps to extend existing literature of political connection on emerging countries 
and generalise its findings to Vietnamese context. It challenges much of the current 
literature only focusing on the benefits of acquiring political capital on the board by 
showing the dark side of political connection in Vietnamese listed companies in 
manufacturing sector.  
Furthermore, the thesis concentrates on the factors receiving the limited attention in current 
literature by investigating the moderating effect of ownership structure on the relationship 
between political connection and firm performance. The findings show that the effects of 
political connection on the performance of state-controlled enterprises remain negative. 
These findings support the integrated viewpoint of grabbing-hand and agency theory to 
explain these negative effects. Through the analysis of margin, there is evidence that 
political connection has no benefit on the performance of non-state-controlled enterprises. 
The findings stay the same with those obtained by two-step system GMM technique. The 
further analysis is also done by examining the effect of different types, strength and ratio 
of political connection on the performance of state-controlled enterprises. The additional 
findings inform the different impacts of types, strength and ratio of political connection on 
the performance of state-controlled enterprises and non-state-controlled enterprises. As a 
result, the study contributes to existing literature on reconciling inconclusive findings of 
previous studies on the importance of taking into account the identity of controlling 
shareholders, which tends to be underexplored in previous literature, to investigate the net 
performance effect of political connection.  
For second study, the study scrutinises the contingent value of political connection on firm 
performance during the development of regional institutional development. There are the 
limited studies carried out regarding the effect of interactions of political connection and 
institutional indicators on firm performance. A few studies have put a major emphasis on 
Chinese context due probably to the influence of state over economy and data availability 
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of regional institutional indicators as NERI index. In order to develop this line of literature, 
the study is thus to utilise data availability of provincial competitiveness index in Vietnam 
to capture the contingent role of political connection during regional institutional 
development. This chapter uses four different institutional indicators, such as legal system, 
corruption, entry costs and business support service. Through the results from the analysis 
of fixed-effect estimation, it shows the positive role of political connection in the face of 
the development of legal system, the high degree of local anti-corruption effort, but no its 
contingent role when the entry costs are diminished and the institution of business support 
service is developed. These results from fixed-effect estimations remain the same with 
those from two-step system GMM approach, excluding the interaction of entry costs and 
political connection. As a result, such finding of joint effect between political connection 
and entry costs should be interpreted with careful caution. Generally, the contribution of 
the chapter is to enrich our understanding on the contingent role of political connection in 
emerging countries with different institutional conditions.       
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY:  
Vietnam has undergone rapid economic development since the initiation of the Doi Moi 
program in 1992. In this time, remarkable economic achievements have been made, aided 
by Vietnam’s greater participation in world economic associations, namely WTO. In 
parallel with this, many types of enterprises have been introduced into the economy with 
more business freedom for private enterprises and partially and full FIEs (Foreign 
Investment Enterprises). Nevertheless, despite radical economic reforms, there have been 
the challenges to economic governance and regulations (Kim et al., 2010). Specifically, 
private companies are still lagging behind the state-owned enterprises and foreign 
investment enterprises (FIEs) in terms of access to state resources, such as tax exemptions, 
government subsidies and contracts and so forth. Therefore, it is essential that private 
companies establish the relationships with government officials in order to relax the 
regulatory constraints and to acquire the developmental resources more readily (Nguyen, 
2009). From this point of view, a comparison between Vietnam and other research contexts 
will be made in Chapter 2.  
1.2. MOTIVATION AND NEED FOR THE STUDY:  
This study has been motivated by the following issues. The first is related to the corporate 
scandals in state-owned enterprises in Vietnam. Such recent cases of corruption have raised 
a major question regarding the efficiency of corporate governance in state-owned 
enterprises or state-owned business groups (OECD, 2013). In recent years, it has emerged 
that the politically connected directors have exploited their preferential access to the state 
resources of state-owned enterprises and commited fraud to gratify their own interests 
rather than those of their enterprises (Nguyen, 2016). From such a preliminary situation, 
an empirical investigation is needed to examine the role of politically connected directors 
in the Vietnamese companies in general, and to make a comparison between state-
controlled and privately-controlled enterprises in particular. Furthermore, notwithstanding 
the radical institutional reforms in recent years in Vietnam, there remain specific empirical 
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questions over the potency of the legal system and anti-corruption efforts across 
Vietnamese provinces in deterring the self-interest practices of politically connected 
directors. Moreover, inconclusive findings have been obtained in previous empirical 
investigations of the moderating effect of entry costs and business support service on the 
link between political connection and firm performance (Boubakri et al., 2008; Zhao and 
Lu, 2016). In order to develop these past studies, this study conducts further examination 
of whether political connection matters for firm performance in the regions with varying 
levels of entry costs and business support service.  
1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY; KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS:  
1.3.1. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH: 
The main purpose of the study is to examine the relationship between political connection 
and firm performance, as well as to investigate the effect of such connection on the 
performance of state-controlled enterprises and non-state-controlled enterprises. Another 
motivation for the study is the wish to determine whether the institutional development, 
namely the legal system, regional anti-corruption campaigns, entry costs and business 
support service, has any moderating influence on the relationship between political 
connection and firm performance. The main aim will be achieved by focusing on the 
following individual objectives:  
1. To evaluate whether the political connection drives or hinders firm performance and 
the effect of its different forms, strength and ratio on such performance.  
2. To make a detailed examination of the extent to which the role of political connection 
differs greatly between the state-controlled enterprises and non-state-controlled 
enterprises.  
3. To assess dynamic role of political connection during regional institutional 
development.  
16 
 
1.3.2. THE KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS:  
Through the objectives and aims of the study, an attempt is made to answer the following 
questions:  
1. Does political connection impede or enhance firm performance? (Chapter 5) 
2. what role does political connections play in the operational performance of state-
controlled and non-state-controlled enterprises? (Chapter 5) 
3. What is the contingent role of political connection in the process of regional 
institutional development? (Chapter 6) 
1.4. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:  
The study adopted one dependent variable to capture corporate financial performance, 
namely market-based performance in the form of Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is a widely used 
measure of the efficiency of a firm’s operations; unlike accounting-based measurements of 
firm performance, it is evaluated as a forward-looking measure of firm performance as it 
captures the market value of a firm’s assets and is less subject to the biased measurements 
(Phung and Mishra, 2016). As for independent variables, the research follows previous 
studies (El Nayal et al., 2019; Hung et al., 2017) by employing information on the directors’ 
working background as a proxy for the presence of political connections. Other variables 
that could also impact financial performance which have been controlled in the study are 
firm size, the natural logarithm of board size, the natural logarithm of firm age, CEO 
duality, ownership concentration, the tangibility ratio and financial leverage. The method 
of analysis used in the study is that of panel data to control for individual heterogeneity 
(Hsiao, 2003), while the Hausman test is employed to help to select the most appropriate 
panel estimations, namely fixed-effect and random-effect panel ones. The panel data 
analysis is often prone to the endogeneity issue, namely reverse causality, which the static 
panel data analysis cannot resolve. Hence, the two-step system GMM dynamic model will 
be utilised to examine whether or not the results obtained by the fixed-effect and random 
effect models are subject to the issues of endogeneity.  
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1.5. MAIN FINDINGS:  
The findings of the study achieved the three main objectives of the study. Regarding the 
first objective, it is shown that there is a negative relationship between political connection 
and Tobin’s Q. Such a negative effect of political connection on firm performance is 
consistent with previous studies (Fan et al., 2007; Shi et al., 2018), which suggests that the 
grabbing-hand theoretical perspective may be exploited to explain the role of political 
connection in the ongoing business of the enterprises. As a consequence, adversities 
stemming from the self-interested pursuit of politically connected directors are likely to 
bring about the agency-related problems at the expenses of firm performance and the 
shareholder interests. Such empirical results are confirmed in the further analysis by 
partitioning the concept of political connection into its first type and employing the strength 
of political connection.   
With respect to the second objective, the study shows that while political connection 
hinders the performance of state-controlled enterprises, it has no influences on the 
performance of non-state-controlled ones. These empirical results partly support the 
arguments of Wang (2015) and Wu et al. (2012) that the political connection may pursue 
goals different to those of maximising the performance maximization of state-controlled 
enterprises. On the other hand, it is empirically apparent that there is an absence of an 
impact of political connection on the performance of non-state-controlled enterprises. This 
conclusion may contradict previous studies (Wang, 2015; Wu et al., 2012). These empirical 
results remain consistent when further analyses are made based on the separation of the 
definition of political connection and establishing its strength. Moreover, there is little 
knowledge of the determinants affecting the influence of political connection on firm 
performance (Brown, 2016; Sun et al., 2016).  
Regarding the third objective, it is found that the institutional development plays a role in 
the relationship between political connection and firm performance. This study provides 
new empirical evidences for the diminishment of the grabbing-hand role or the agency-
related problems generated by politically connected directors, when a better quality of legal 
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system and the more intense implementation of local anti-corruption efforts act as the 
efficient strategies for suppressing the self-interest incentives of previous or current 
politicians on the board. Furthermore, the remaining institutional indicators in the study, 
namely entry costs and business support service, does not contribute to adjusting the 
negative impact of political connection on firm performance found in empirical Chapter 6. 
The empirical results remained unchanged with the exploitation of type I and the strength 
of political connection, and the application of the two-step system GMM approach. 
Nevertheless, the joint effects of political connection and entry costs in the two-step system 
GMM approach are different from those in the fixed-effect approach. Consequently, 
caution should be exercised over the interpretation of the findings on the interactive effect 
of political connection and entry costs on firm performance.  
1.6. CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
STUDY:  
This thesis complements other studies and contributes to the existing literature on the 
impact of political connection on firm performance. The first contribution is the major 
focus on evaluating the role of political connection in the emerging countries. Using a 
sample of manufacturing companies quoted on two Vietnamese stock exchanges covering 
a fixed period from 2007 to 2016, the study found the negative side of political connection 
in the operation of listed Vietnamese companies in the manufacturing sector. The second 
contribution is consideration of the ownership structure in the assessment of the effect of 
political connection on firm performance. In particular, the study offers new insightful 
discoveries on the difference in the effect of political connection on the performance of 
state-controlled and non-state-controlled enterprises. The third contribution relates to the 
discovery of the contingent value of political connection in the process of the regional 
institutional development. Unlike previous studies, this study places emphasis on the fact 
that the harmful role of political connection is likely to be constrained by the regional legal 
system and local anti-corruption efforts.  
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The following policies are recommended: (a) investors on the market should expect 
policies from the government to curb the corrupt behaviour of politically connected board 
directors or supervisory board member which damage their interests, (b) the government 
should be more committed to direct the business climate towards the market-based rules, 
with more stringent legal enforcement and greater investor protection, and to create an 
equitable business environment between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, 
(c) the privatization process should be further promoted to reduce the administrative 
burdens for state-owned enterprises. Subsequently, their corporate governance efficiency 
will be enhanced with greater participations of well-qualified shareholders and investors. 
More details and explanations about the policy recommendations are given in Chapter 7.  
1.7. THESIS STRUCTURE:  
The thesis comprises seven chapters including the introduction, which are arranged in 
accordance with the conceptual and theoretical frameworks and arguments. This chapter 
provides a synopsis of the research, essentially giving the introduction, background and 
justification of the study. It also includes the three research goals around which the study 
is developed. Furthermore, the most notable and transcendent contributions to the existing 
literature and policy advancement are introduced in the chapter. The content of Chapter 2 
centres on the background of the research, with information about the overall economy, 
stock market, and corporate governance structure in Vietnam. In addition, the history of 
devlopment of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises is discussed in more details, 
and the key challenges confronting them are stated. The final part of this chapter is to 
highlight the key economic and institutional areas between Vietnam and other emerging 
and advanced countries, and provides the raionales of why Vietnam’s case provides the 
promising findings to that current strand of literature.  
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical roots on which the current literature has investigated 
the impact of political connection on firm performance. In addition, a review of the 
empirical literature is also made in order to indicate the research gaps which this thesis 
aims at filling. Subsequently, the methodology chapter, Chapter 4, examines the selection 
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of the data sample and the techniques employed to answer the research questions. 
Empirical Chapter 5 answers the question of how political connection influences firm 
performance, while empirical Chapter 6 explores the question of how the effect of political 
connection on the performance of state-controlled and non-state-controlled enterprises 
differs. The last empirical chapter 6 focuses on the empirical question of how the role of 
political connection has varied during regional institutional development.  
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH CONTEXT 
2.1. INTRODUCTION:  
The objective of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of the socio-economic 
and institutional development in Vietnam by summarising Vietnamese economic history, 
the features of corporate governance, the development of state-owned enterprises and 
private enterprises, and how the regional instititional differences are important for business. 
Furthermore, the study also compares and contrasts the socio-economic and institutional 
environment of Vietnam relative to that of other emerging and advanced countries, thus 
showing the unique challenges in the business environment faced by the entrepreneurial 
firms. Therefore, this overview focuses on investigating and understanding the research 
background.  
2.2. HISTORY OF THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY: 
In 1954, the country was splited into two regions, the North and South, with the 17th 
parallel being the common border. As a result of this split, a centrally-planned economy 
was adopted in the North, with state-owned organizations and cooperatives coming into 
existence, but without private business entities. On the other hand, South of Vietnam 
adopted a market economy, in which corporate organisations such as partnerships, limited 
liability associations and joint-stock companies were developed. In 1975, the country was 
reunified and the centrally-planned command economy was adopted in both regions of 
Vietnam, but with the absence of private business entities (Tran et al., 2017). Although 
South of Vietnam, with US financial backing, had a better pace of economic development 
than other South-East Asian countries, and even Asian countries, the imposition of a central 
planning economic system in the whole country after the war ended has slowed down the 
economic development of Vietnam (Fforde, 1994). This resulted in the systematic 
problems within Vietnamese society, which threatened the survival of the Communist 
Party political regime (Brezis and Schnytzer, 2003). In response to its potential collapse, 
the Vietnamese government started to adopt an economic reform program in 1986, known 
as Doi Moi, aimed at gradually abandoning the Soviet-type centrally-planned economy in 
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favour of developing a market-based mixed economy was developed with the goal of 
boosting economic growth in the whole country (Fforde, 2019). The purpose of this 
economic system was to advance the productive forces of the economy, developing a 
steady technical-material base for moving forwards the socialist economy market, and to 
allow Vietnam to better join the world economy (Fforde, 2019). Unlike other emerging and 
advanced countries, Vietnam has therefore had a much shorter market economy history, as 
it had a central planning system until the early 1990s.  
On the other hand, the model of economic development in Vietnam is a socialist-oriented 
market economy2, which differs from the true market economy model in other emerging 
and advanced countries (Vu et al., 2015). In particular, the model is a market-based multi-
sectoral commodity economy, including the various productive forms and means of 
private, collective and state ownership. However, the state sector and collectively owned 
enterprises play a decisive role in the economy, thereby indicating that although the private 
sector has been allowed to join the market, the state economic sector still remains a leading 
force and controlls the resources in the economy. In addition, some vestiges of the central 
planning mechanism continue to exist in some aspects of economy, as well as the strong 
government intervention in the economic activities (Vu et al., 2015). Vietnam’s socialist-
oriented market economy has some features similar to the Chinese socialist market 
economy, such as the predominance of state-owned enterprises, the co-existence of a 
private sector, a single-Communist party political system, and the implementation of five-
year economic plans (Khuong, 2015). However, in contrast to the Chinese model, the 
Vietnamese system is more precisely characterised as a transitional economy towards 
socialism, not as a form of socialism or even market socialism which builds socialism as a 
long-term process. In line with Marxist theory, socialism will only have been recognised 
to have emerged once Vietnam’s productive forces have adapted to meeting the 
preconditions of a socialist market economy. In other words, Vietnam had a fragile 
 
2 The socialist-oriented market economy is line with the classical Marxist view of economic development and historical materialism, in which 
socialism can only emerge once material conditions have been sufficiently developed to enable socialist relations.   
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industrial and productive foundation to thrive towards a socialist market economy (Fforde, 
2019). This is because following decades of war, US bombing and destruction on a massive 
scale, the division of the country, the Chinese invasion, the decade-long Cambodian war 
and international embargoes,  the Vietnamese economic base was in ruins, whilst China 
conducted economic reforms following 30 years of bureaucratic-socialist development in 
conditions of peace, accumulating a surplus and a sufficiently strong industrial foundation 
for developing a socialist market economy (Khuong, 2015).  
In terms of the economic development, like most of the emerging Asian countries, Vietnam 
has adopted an export-driven growth, backed by a massive inflow of foreign direct 
investment, which particularly contribute to the majority of Vietnamese exports. This has 
spurred the country’s rapid integration into the world economy despite an American 
embargo on the country being in place until 1994. Therefore, one of Vietnam’s greatest 
achievements has been its successful entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2007, an opportunity which has allowed the country to increase its export-driven industries 
(OECD, 2013). This international integration is the outcome of a combination of economic 
liberalism, improved market access to industrialised countries, and pro-active public 
policies (World Bank, 2011). However, the domestic exporting forces undoubtedly 
continue to contribute to the total value of exports, which include traditional manufactured 
products encompassing garments, fishery, rice, and coffee. With the substantial efforts 
made to boost its economy, Vietnam is now among the highest GDP growth economies in 
the world and has been one of the fastest-growing countries in Asia in recent years (VCCI 
et al., 2017). Compared to other emerging countries in the region, Vietnam’s industrial 
infrastructure (i.e, its supporting industries) still remains weak, which makes it difficult to 
attract the FDI investments based on the highly developed technologies. Therefore, the 
contribution of domestic enterprises to the global supply value chain seems to only 
constitute a relatively modest share (Wirjo and Cheok, 2017).  
With regard to the history of the Vietnamese capital market, during the times of the central 
planning system and up until the 1990s, Vietnam virtually lacked a complete capital 
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market, and the distribution of capital in the market was largely susceptible to the 
government discretion. In particular, loans or capital were mainly distributed to the state-
owned enterprises via the state-owned banks or the Vietnam Developmental Bank (Tran et 
al., 2008). Along with the economic reform, the authorities also determined to upgrade the 
capital market in Vietnam in their roadmap for integration into the international market. 
For instance, the capital market needed to be upgraded to become more liberal and market-
oriented, and to enable all the domestic companies to have equal and easy access to capital 
flows, especially from the foreign investors and institutions. More importantly, the 
government also expected that an effective capital market would expedite the equitisation 
process of state-owned enterprises (Nguyen et al., 2016). As a result, the Vietnamese stock 
market, known formally as the Securities Trading Center (STC), was founded in Ho Chi 
Minh City on 28 July 2000. In July 2007, the STC was officially transformed into a stock 
exchange, the HOSE. Previously in March 2005, the HNX had also been established. While 
the HOSE is seen as the official stock exchange, mainly the trading equities and bonds of 
listed firms, the HNX is seen as the trading floor for government bonds. Additionally, the 
companies trading on the HNX are mostly those that do not meet the requirements for being 
listed on the HOSE. In comparison with the capital markets of other emerging and 
advanced countries, Vietnam has therefore a much shorter history of market economy-
oriented capital market sector development. However, the size and quality of the capital 
market in Vietnam are relatively small and under-developed respectively compared to other 
economies, with the market being charaterised as pre-emerging. The products on the 
exchanges are undiversified, consisting of stocks and government bonds, with few 
investment fund units being listed. Furthermore, there is a lack of professional long-term 
investors, such as investment funds, retirement funds and insurance companies, with the 
majority of participants in the market continuing to be individual investors with the short-
term investment tastes and the herd behaviour, resulting in the market volatility. Finally, 
understanding of shareholder rights in the corporate governance issues in listed companies 
seems to be limited (Nguyen et al., 2016). 
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2.3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN VIETNAM:  
Along with the development of its capital markets, Vietnam had no specific sets of 
corporate governance until 2005s. In general, the Enterprise Law of 2005 and the Securities 
Law of 2006 are the two key laws which form the governance structure of Vietnamese 
corporations. In March 2007, the Ministry of Finance also released the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies (hereafter the “Code”). According to Le Minh and 
Walker (2008), this Code is based on OECD corporate governance principles, and is 
mandatory, and so not a voluntary code of corporate governance as in developed 
economies. However, they are highly fractional, overlap, and not unified, which results in 
ambiguities when applying them (Lien and Holloway, 2014). Compared to the corporate 
governance practices in other emerging and advanced countries, Vietnam’s corporate 
governance generally remains in its infancy. The governance system is being converted 
from the law-based system of Continental Europe (i.e, the Germanic model) to the Anglo-
Saxon model. The adoption of this Anglo-Saxon model in Vietnam means that the existing 
governance structure remains, but some governance initiatives adopted from the OECD 
codes of best practices are incorporated into the structure (Lien and Holloway, 2014).  
In general, the governance structure in Vietnamese listed firms comprises the Board of 
Management (BoM), the Supervisory Board (SB) and the many sub-committees under the 
BoM. The BoM and the SB members are appointed by, and report to, shareholders at their 
annual and extra general meetings. This unique structure is also called as the ‘modified 
two-tier/dual board’ or the ‘unitary board with supervisory board’. In short, the existing 
governance arrangement in Vietnam is a mixture of the Germanic and the Anglo-Saxon 
models (Tam and Thi, 2018). Whilst the BoM has characteristics common with boards in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, including a mix of executive director and independent/non-
executive directors, the SB consists exclusively of non-executive members with the task of 
monitoring the BoM. This unitary board with a supervisory board structure is similar to the 
standard two-tier board in Germany and the Netherlands in terms of the separation between 
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supervision and management. In short, the BoM performs the strategic role, while the SB 
performs the governing role.  
However, the SB in Vietnamese listed companies differs from that in the German setting 
in several ways (Tam and Thi, 2018). First, while a German SB is responsible for 
consulting and supporting the BoM in strategic decision making processes, that in Vietnam 
is not obliged to make or approve the strategic decisions. Second, the SB in Vietnam is not 
considered to be as important as that in the German system. The German SB is entitled to 
appoint and dismiss the members of the BoM and even accuse them in court of harming 
the company’s interests in the court. Nevertheless, such important SB rights are not 
explicitly stated in Vietnamese corporate laws and regulations. Although the SB in 
Vietnamese public firms may make a request, either directly to the State Securities 
Commission (SSC) of Vietnam or other state authorities, if any of the members of the BoM 
breach the law or company Charter, it has inadequate power to prevent the BoM from 
conducting wrongdoings and risking the interests of company shareholders and other 
stakeholders. This is a major obstacle for the SB in respect of monitoring management. 
Third, while employees in Vietnamese public companies are not legally allowed to have a 
seat on the SB, shareholders and employees have the equal number of seats on the German 
equivalent.   
In Vietnam’s effort to apply the international standard of corporate governance practices, 
the Code, as stipulated by the Revised Law on Enterprise 2014, is aimed at promoting the 
separation between the positions of CEO and Chairman in listed companies in the 
regulations on Board of Management. This was not stipulated in the first Law on Enterprise 
2005, which stated that a company could have a dual CEO-Chair if its general meeting of 
shareholders decided on this (Minh and Walker, 2008). In fact, the Code requires at least 
one-third of the BoMs of listed companies to be independent, although there remain 
ambiguities in interpreting the board independence. In addition, the re-appointment of 
independent directors is not limited to a defined number of years. The Code also does not 
stipulate the responsibilities and obligations of the independent directors.  
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Despite the progresses in corporate governance practices in Vietnam, the code for corporate 
governance in Vietnamese listed companies continues to have a low-quality mechanism 
for minority investor protection, compared to the corporate governance codes in other 
emerging and advanced countries (Tran et al., 2017). In particular, little opportunity is 
given to minority shareholders to nominate a member of the board to supervise insiders, to 
vote or to decide on key company matters of the company in the shareholders’ meetings or 
to request an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders (GMS). Because of the 
application of cumulative voting rules, controlling or powerful blockholders are able to 
proactively devote or distribute their voting rights to the preselected candidates on the 
board. Therefore, these nominated directors may no longer be independent from the 
controlling shareholder(s). Moreover, the authorities also impose few regulations on unfair 
related-party transactions at the expenses of minority shareholders. In other words, in the 
case of unfair related-party transactions undertaken by controlling blockholders, the 
interests of minority shareholders are less likely to be protected by the existing regulations 
(Lien and Holloway, 2014).  
2.5. THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN VIETNAM:    
Unlike the other emerging and advanced countries, state-owned enterprises are playing a 
vitally important role in the economic reform in Vietnam during the transition period from 
a centrally-planned to a socialist-oriented market economy. Due to the ideological and 
political reasons, state-owned enterprises are still deemed to be the main driving force in 
the economy and the government exercises tight control over the allocation of resources in 
favour of them (O’Toole et al., 2016). However, one of the central tenets of economic 
reform was the equitisation process with the purpose of commercialising state-owned 
enterprises and improving their operational efficiency (Hakkala and Kokko, 2006). In 
contrast to the rapid privatisation process of Eastern Europe and the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), Vietnam has adopted a gradualist approach, which leaves the 
state sector to remain unchanged, but allows other societal members to participate in the 
economy (Brezis and Schnytzer, 2003; Khuong, 2015). In other words, the adoption of 
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such an approach in Vietnam will prevent state assets from lying in the hands of the interest 
groups, thereby resulting in the systematic collapse of the political regime. State-owned 
enterprises consist of independent state-owned enterprises and state-owned general 
corporations operating under the SOE Law of 2003 and the Enterprises Law of 2005. While 
independent state-owned companies are small-and medium-sized SOEs under the 
administration of various line ministries or provincial governments, state-owned general 
corporations are large-sized SOEs specialising in strategically important sectors either 
under the administration of the Prime Minister or other line ministries or provincial 
governments3. In general, Vietnamese state-owned enterprises differ from Korean chaebols 
in that their main intra-group ownership structure is based upon the mother-subsidiary 
relationship, also known as the pyramidal ownership structure (Kim et al., 2010).   
In the roadmap for integration into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and application 
of the international principles of OECD into the corporate governance practices, Vietnam 
faces the pressure of splitting both state roles as the owner of the state-owned enterprises 
and regulator of the economy (OECD, 2014). In 2005, Vietnam therefore established the 
State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) in order to transform the shares of ownership 
in many state-owned enterprises from the various types of line ministries and provincial 
governments to SCIC4. In its mission statement, SCIC is considered to be an active 
shareholder that maximises the value of its portfolio companies. Vietnam has also 
embraced the operational models of state capital supervision agencies of other countries, 
namely Singapore’s Temasek and Malaysia’s Khazanah, into the model of SCIC. Unlike 
these agencies, the majority of the SCIC companies consist of small-and medium-sized 
state-owned enterprises (Kim et al., 2010).  
 
3 Strategically important industries consist of (i) post and telecommunications, and information technology; (ii) ship building and maintenance; 
(iii) generation,, transmission and distribution of electricity; (iv) exploration, processing, and distribution of gas and oil; (v) surveying, exploration, 
and processing of coal and other minerals, (vi) clothing and textiles, (vii) rubber planting and processing; (viii) fertilisers and other chemical 
manufacturing; (ix) real estate investment; (x) construction and mechanics; (xi) finance, banking and insurance, and (xii) other industries factors 
according to the decision of the Prime Minister.  
4 SCIC itself can also be identified as a general corporation under the Prime Minister.  
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Both Vietnam and China have put much effort into initiating SOE reforms and carrying 
out industrial policy. Although China is still confronting significant challenges in these 
areas, its initiatives have been more successful than those of Vietnam (Khuong, 2015). In 
particular, China’s SOE reforms entail more commitments and strategic efforts to 
strengthen market forces, modernise corporate governance and promote global 
competitiveness (Perkins and Anh, 2001). In other words, China has been more committed 
to supporting domestic business in becoming a leading global players. The China’s SOE 
managers thus focused mainly on making profits rather than on pleasing their government 
and party superiors (Perkins and Anh, 2001). As a result, the privatisation process in China 
was characterised by certain features of similar processes in market economies, in spite of 
the large stake held by the government.  
In contrast, the pace of actual privatisation (also known as equitization) in Vietnam is 
considered to be slow. First, over the twenty years since the equitisation process started in 
1992, less than 15 percent of state ownership has been transferred from the government to 
other shareholders (Khuong, 2015). Second, SOE reforms in Vietnam have not resulted in 
less favouritism being shown towards them. SOEs generally have easy access to credit 
supplied by state-owned banks, with 20 or 25 percent of SOE debts directly or indirectly 
backed by the government (Malesky and Taussig, 2009). Third, the governance of SOEs 
has not been adequately modernised, thus facilitating their expansion into non-core 
business areas via speculative and rent-seeking motives (Nguyen, 2016). The inefficiency 
of Vietnam’s SOE reforms has arguably resulted in the stagnation of economic growth. 
The collapse of SOEs such as Vinashin5 and Vinalines6 led to the arrest of their entire 
management teams for mismanagement and corrupt practices, which became to be seen as 
a typical example of the inefficiency of SOEs (OECD, 2014). In particular, the government 
was willing to make major interventions in order to rescue Vinashin after it went bankrupt 
with massive debts. It is therefore worth noticing that state-owned enterprises have been 
 
5 Vinashin (Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Corporation) is Vietnam’s sole state-owned enterprise in the shipbuilding industry.  
6 Vinalines (Vietnam National Shipping Lines) was established as the sole state-owned enterprise specializing in shipping, ports, ship repairment, 
marine services and logistics.  
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practically exempt from the disciplinary influence of the capital market, or from the threat 
of bankruptcy, because the government was committed to rescuing them from the state 
budget. Furthermore, SOEs have less autonomy over their operations as a result of being 
required to pursue political or social goals, thus compromising their profit-seeking goals 
(Khuong, 2015).  
2.6. THE NON-STATE ENTERPRISES:  
The private sector was officially recognised as an economic force in 1986 when, at its Sixth 
National Congress, the Communist Party of Viet Nam declared that “ From now on, private 
sectors are allowed to utilise capital, technical and managerial knowledge for conducting 
business in some industries”. Since then, a legal framework and institutions have been 
designed to enable the development of private companies. In 1990, the Private Enterprises 
Law offered a legal basis for the sole proprietorship, whereas the 1991 Company Law 
mainly applies to limited liability and joint-stock companies. Nevertheless, private 
ownership, the fundamental pre-condition for a private sector to thrive, was only officially 
acknowledged in the constitution of 1992 and not incorporated into the 1995 Civil Code. 
In other words, private ownership was only acknowledged once the sector was playing an 
increasingly important role in the economy. A major breakthrough for private enterprises 
in Vietnam was the proclamation of the Enterprises Law in 2000 (Tran et al., 2008), which 
significantly simplified the establishment of private firms by abandoning administrative 
difficulties. This resulted in an immediate marked increase in registered private firms. 
Despite the legitimate recognition of the private sector in the economy since the initiation 
of the “Doi Moi” programme of economic reform, the sector has still received less attention 
from the government as a whole because of the socialism legacy in Vietnam (OECD, 
2013). To be more specific, the Vietnamese state’s connections with the private sector have 
been shown to be weak and fragile. Therefore, the domestic private sector has been subject 
to discrimination, despite being the most important contributor to employment and growth 
(Tran et al., 2008). This may be in contrast to the successful models of other Asian 
emerging and advanced countries, namely Taiwan, Singapore and South Korean, who 
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consider the development of private enterprises as a major force in their economic 
development. As a consequence, it is generally accepted that, unlike other emerging 
countries, the Vietnamese state did not have specific government programmes to 
deliberately develop its domestic private sector during the different phases of the economic 
reform. With a Confucian-based cultural heritage, a mix of Communist political and 
economic ideology, and a high level of collectivism, relationships or connections serve as 
a critical element in the success of business in Vietnam (Mai et al., 2009). It is thus argued 
that such a perspective is increasingly reinforced in the circumstances, in which the private 
sector confronts state discrimination. Studies on Vietnam by Nguyen et al. (2009) and 
Malesky and Taussig (2009) have shown that enduring relationships with government 
officials may enable private enterprises to reduce such discrimination and increase their 
legitimacy in Vietnam’s business climate. Such connections may be conducive to their 
access to the sources of credit, mostly in the control of the state-owned commercial banks, 
and to remove the regulatory hurdles faced by them (Le Ngoc and Nguyen, 2009).  
In parallel with economic reform towards a socialist-oriented market economy, the 
Vietnamese central government was also urged to undertake a decentralisation process. It 
should be noted that the Vietnamese central reformers were willing to transfer the 
government authority from central to provincial and local levels in the 1990s in order to 
encourage the government officials at these levels to foster the provincial economic 
development (Anh, 2016). After the decentralisation reform, provincial and local 
governments have been able to act as regulators of their regional economies. They have 
also been able to release business licenses, encourage regional business development, 
resolve business disputes, and enact tax policies (Jandl, 2013). As a result, the 
decentralisation process has granted the provincial governments more autonomy and 
privileges in enacting provincial or local pro-economic policies in the favour of the regional 
business climate. After Vietnam’s rush to open up its economy to the outside world and 
after receiving a massive inflow of foreign direct investments, the process has been 
increasingly promoted (Vo, 2009). In general, the provinces located in the southeast and 
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southern regions of Vietnam have a more liberal business environment and pro-market 
institutions than other Vietnamese regions (Perkins and Anh, 2009). A few reasons have 
been offered to account for the hetereogeneity in the business environment between 
regions. First, the historical capitalist legacies of the former Republic of Vietnam may be 
a critical basis for establishing a post-war market economy in those provinces (Sanders, 
2014). By virtue of its former market economy fundamentals, a liberal business 
envrionment was created for the market, which promptly began to grow after the 
government initiated the economic reform, whilst there was a lack of such a mechanism in 
Northern provinces due to the former existence of a centrally-planned economy (Sanders, 
2014). It is worth noting that in the early stages of their development between 1990 and 
2000, the majority of non-state-owned enterprises in Vietnam were family-owned small or 
micro enterprises, mainly focused in the southern region of the country and specialised in 
the basic goods, such as food, clothing, detergents and other staples (Kim et al., 2010). It 
has thus been argued that there existed a group of unrecognised private enterprises in the 
South during the period of central planning which began to emerge after the state allowed 
the market participation of this sector.  
Secondly, under the decentralisation mechanism, local governments may be more dynamic 
in local institutional arrangements, thus further facilitating local economic development 
and formulating a regional market economy (Thanh and Canh, 2020). According to 
Malesky (2004), the provincial leaders in the southeastern regions were generally the 
fence-breakers7 because they were willing to experiment with the unprecedented policies 
in order to level the business playing field, develop the infrastructure, and attract FDI 
inflow. As a result of this successful experimentation, the southeastern provinces had a 
highest economic growth and contributed three-quarters of GDP to the economy (Turner 
et al., 2019). Furthermore, despite being exposed to the discrimination of the central 
government in the country as a whole, the private sector may have been more developed 
and had more equal treatment relative to state-owned enterprises within these provinces 
 
7 Fence-breaker is defined as provincial leader that pioneer institutional reforms.  
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(Anh, 2016). According to the complied figures on the website of the Provincial 
Competitiveness Index, which operationalises the quality of economic governance by 
provincial authorities across sixty-four provinces, the southeast and southern regions also 
have higher average PCI scores than other parts of Vietnam8 (Sanders, 2014). High PCI-
scoring regions often have a low level of challenges from red tape, corruption, or other 
contraints because of their strong and effective legal and administrative institutions (Huong 
and Cuong, 2019). This also discourages private enterprises from pursuing rent-seeking 
practices by bribing or forming the alliances with provincial government officials (Rand, 
2017). In contrast, some provinces located in the northest and central parts of Vietnam have 
the lowest PCI scores, which implies less efficient economic governance (Usaid et al., 
2016). In these regions, it is argued that the bureaucrats display a low degree of public 
administration, and even become more corrupt, thereby suggesting that the formal and 
informal relationships with provincial government officials are necessary for private 
enterprises to remove the constraints on them. However, some exceptional cases in the 
Northern and Middle provinces, such as Vinh Phuc, Bac Ninh, and Da Nang, also 
performed very well in the economic governance rankings, becoming the lighting hotspots 
in the overall picture of Vietnam’s business environment (Anh, 2016). Taken together, the 
development of the private sector might be hetereogenous across Vietnamese provinces. In 
particular, the effective policy experimentation in certain provinces has enabled their 
development and built a leveling playing field for all sectors. On the other hand, the 
inefficient and rigid adoption of policy experimentation and the poor determination of 
leaders in other provinces has slowed down their economic performance and created the 
hurdles for private enterprises. This has resulted in the holes in the regulatory system and 
given rise to the self-interested conduct of bureaucrats to the detriment of social welfare. 
In order to survive in those regions with weak economic governance, development of 
robust political connections may be essential for the private enterprises.  
 
8 According to the newspapers from Asia Pulse Pty Ltd. (2006) and Athena Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (2019) 
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Both Vietnam and China have undertaken a decentralisation process in the transition from 
a centrally planned economy to a market-based one. However, the outcome of the process 
in Vietnam has fallen short of the government’s expectations and has been deemed to be 
less successful than that of China (Painter, 2008). This is due to the fact that Vietnam’s 
decentralisation process is limited to the political, rather than fiscal and administrative, 
decentralisation, so preventing some provinces from achieving breakthroughs in socio-
economic development (Anh, 2016). Secondly, the lack of connection and regional 
coordiation across provinces has induced unhealthy competition between provinces, 
thereby rendering the decentralisation process inefficient. On the other hand, China has 
fewer provinces and province-level cities/regions, each of which is typically fifteen to 
twenty times larger than the average Vietnamese province, which has led to healthier 
national coordination and stronger inter-correlation between them (Khuong, 2015). 
Furthermore, the Chinese provincial leaders were those who conducted the fence-breaking 
activities before the economic reform more proactively, and subsequently continued to 
sustain the reformative spirit afterwards (Malesky, 2004). Despite the disparity in the 
outcomes of economic and institutional reform, Vietnam and China have somewhat similar 
characteristics regarding their political and economic paths. The dominance of state-owned 
enterprises in the economy, the legacy of socialism and the influence of Confucian-based 
culture are common characteristics in both countries which is conducive to the existence 
of political relationships (Fan et al., 2007; Malesky and Taussig, 2009). Whilst political 
networks in China are deemed to be a type of Guanxi-based culture, they are key to the 
success of any business transaction in Vietnam (Dinh and Calabrò, 2019). Through the 
decentralisation process, certain provinces in both countries have developed successful 
fence-breaking policies in economic and political areas, and created a level playing field 
for both SOEs and non-SOEs. As a result, non-SOEs in those regions with a more liberal 
market economy may have fewer capabilities to build political relationships with provincial 
bureaucrats and otherwise (Nguyen et al., 2020; Zhou, 2014).  
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2.8. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER:  
This chapter has outlined the history of the Vietnamese economy, and the development of 
the capital market and corporate governance. Moreover, the current state of private 
enterprises and state-owned enterprises has been referred to. The Institutional Difference 
Hypothesis (IDH) has been efficiently adopted by the literature to compare institutional 
disparities in advanced and emerging countries (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). The 
hypothesis suggests that institutions supporting the efficient functioning of product, capital 
and labour markets are lagging behind in emerging economies compared to those in 
advanced countries (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Additionally, the IDH proposes that 
institutional differences lead to unique conditions that have a significant effect upon 
desirable business activities and strategies (Guillén, 2000). Given the significantly varying 
conditions in emerging countries, it is reasonable to apply this hypothesis to differentiate 
Vietnam from other emerging and advanced countries. The focus on Vietnam is motivated 
by the specific group of conditions in the country’s context which is not present in other 
emerging and advanced markets. Therefore, the results obtained in previous studies on the 
regulation-efficiency link may not be appropriate for Vietnam’s transitional route to a 
market economy. Consistent with Dinh and Calabrò (2019); Peng (2003); and Rajwani and 
Liedong (2015), the firms may behave differently in different institutional contexts and 
therefore a study focusing upon firm efficiency in Vietnam will be able to provide new 
insights into this relationship. Table 2.1 summarises the important characteristics of 
Vietnam that have been mentioned in this chapter. The table also compares and contrasts 
the Vietnamese context with other emerging and advanced countries.  
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TABLE 2. 1: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF VIETNAM 
 Vietnam  Emerging and advanced 
economies 
1. Political regime During the period of the 
Vietnam war, the country 
was split into two parts, 
with two different political 
regimes. The north adopted 
the socialism, whilst the 
south embraced the 
capitalism. After the two 
regions were unified, 
Vietnam was one of the two 
countries in the world to 
adopt the unitary system of 
Communism in the whole 
country.   
Multi-party political 
regimes.   
2. History of the market 
economy 
Vietnam has a much shorter 
market economy history as 
it had a central planning 
system until the late 1986s 
and early 1990s. However, 
it incorporates the classical 
Marxist view of economic 
development, leading to 
economic reform in moving 
towards a socialist-oriented 
market economy. This 
They have much longer and 
better established true 
market economies which 
allow for equal multi-sector 
market participation.  
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model is a key step in 
achieving the necessary 
economic growth and 
modernisation, while being 
able to co-exist in the 
contemporary global 
market economy and to 
benefit from global trade. 
The dominance of the state 
economic sector in the 
economy stems from 
ideological and political 
grounds rather than the 
obeying of market force.  
3. History of capital 
market sector 
development 
Until the late 1990s, 
Vietnam did not have an 
autonomous capital market 
and all the capital 
distribution-related 
decisions were made 
centrally on ideological and 
political grounds. With the 
establishment of two stock 
exchanges based in Ho Chi 
Minh and Hanoi in 2000 
and 2005 respectively, 
Vietnam adopted OECD 
principles into its 
They have a relatively long 
history of market-economy 
oriented and developed 
capital market sectors, and  
better established corporate 
governance codes.   
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institutional framework for 
corporate governance. In 
general, the CG code in 
Vietnam is still in transition 
to the western code and the 
size of the capital market is 
relatively small and 
undiversified.  
4. History of private 
economic sector 
development  
The private economic 
sector did not enjoy 
legitimate recognition in the 
economy until the 1990s, 
when the economic reform 
occured. However, 
subsequently the sector has 
received unequal treatment 
relative to state-owned 
enterprises. The private 
sector still therefore 
remains underdeveloped.  
The economic private 
sector is relatively more 
developed with a longer 
history of its development.  
5. Integration Into The 
World Economy  
Vietnam started the process 
of joining the world 
economy after the U.S 
removed the embargo on it 
in 1995. The country has 
been a member of the World 
Trade Organisation since 
2007. Vietnam has 
The majority have a much 
longer history of 
membership of the world 
economy and of being the 
members of the World 
Trade Organisation.  
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therefore had a short period 
of access to the world 
economy.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION:  
The aim of this chapter is to build the conceptual framework of the phenomenon of 
corporate political connections, and thereafter to show the antecedents, the underpinning 
theories and consequences of such connections. Therefore, the chapter discusses the 
theoretical and empirical studies conducted to date, with the aim of investigating the 
relationship between corporate political connections and firm performance. More 
specifically, the first part of the chapter is relevant to the various definitions and dimensions 
of political connections. It has long been acknowledged that the countries’ political 
heterogeneity might play a crucial role in forming the definitions of political connection. 
The development of such definitions of political connection is especially important for 
scholars and policy makers due to the benefits of various channels of political connection 
for companies. This helps to construct the backbone of the definitions and the 
measurements of political connection used in the empirical chapters of this study. The 
following section of the chapter explains the antecedents of political connections, and also 
outlines the mixed consequences of political connection for business activities, and the 
channels through which such connections matter for firm performance. The final part of 
the chapter comprises the main review of the empirical literature, and shows the limitations 
and research gaps of previous research, which this study aims to fill in.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 gives the definitions and meanings 
of political connections; Section 3.3 explains the antecedents of corporate political activity, 
which are divided in accordance with industry, and institutional level; Section 3.4 discusses 
the underpinning theories; Section 3.5 presents a summary and limitations of the literature.  
3.2. THE DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENTS OF CORPORATE POLITICAL 
CONNECTIONS: 
Ideally, the first step in the development of a construct is its definition and the common 
language that helps locate it across relevant disciplines. Numerous definitions of political 
connection can be constructed from both academic and practitioner-based research. 
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However, there appears to be a lack of a universal definition of the construct, resulting in 
chaotic approaches to its understanding and development in the academic world.  
3.2.1. THE DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION:  
On a basis of the resource-based viewpoint of the firm, its competitive market advantage 
in its markets stems from its valuable resources that are not easily captured by competitors 
(Jay Barney, 1991). Some of these resources may be intangible in nature and idiosyncratic 
to the firm, and may have been developed over a long period of time. Many of a firm’s 
resources are relationship-based, as the earning potential of these assets relies on the 
relationships a firm has with its stakeholders (Barney, 1991; Wood and Jones, 1995). 
Similarly, the political connection of a firm(s) is one type of its intangible relational assets, 
which shows personal connections with government officials, and which has a dual impact 
on the availability of resources, as well as on firm performance. From the economic 
literature, the definition of political connection can be surmised to be a personal 
relationship between a politician and a particular firm, either via cronyism or shareholding 
or directors (Fisman, 2001; Johnson et al., 2003). Desai & Olofsgård (2011) develop this 
phenomenon as the arrangements through which the firms or groups have close 
relationships with incumbent political authorities, thus obtaining economic favours.  
In the field of political science, political connections are recognised as rent-seeking 
activities in which individuals or firms seek preferential treatment from states by using 
their resources to lobby or to bribe government officials. In this way, Khan & Jomo (2000) 
pinpoint the circumstances in which these activities can be categorised. One typical 
examples is when a firm attempts to influence the state (which enforces rights and 
contracts) by lobbying, bribing, or through other types of political influence, with the gain 
from such rent-seeking activity directly depending upon the spending power of the firm. In 
this scenario, rent-seeking activity is initiated and created by the state, which no longer 
passively plays an influencing role, but rather a rent-seeking role (a typical example is the 
role of state-owned firms in Russia and China).  
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3.2.2. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLITICAL CONNECTION:  
It has been observed that some existing studies employ the different categories of political 
connection to gauge its effect on firm performance. This section is based on the study of 
Wong et al. (2018) in discussing the various types of political connection because of the 
author’s comprehensive inclusion of definitions of political connection made in previous 
studies. The first category of political connection is via the government-linked companies 
or government-owned enterprises (Cao et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2016). For clarification, 
Okhmatovskiy (2010) documents that government-linked or government-owned 
enterprises directly oversee and administer state resources rather than the ties to 
government, and that companies keen on having access to state resources may benefit from 
establishing ties to organisations responsible for managing state property. The second 
category of political connection is mainly linked to the board of directors, which means 
that a politically connected board director is defined as companies which have former 
government servants or politicians serving on its board of directors (PCON_BOARD). The 
majority of previous studies have employed this type of political connection when focusing 
on the effectiveness of appointing the politically connected directors to the board (Faccio, 
2005; Wu et al., 2012; Bi et al., 2018). The third category of political connection is through 
business owners (PCON_BUS). In some studies, the political connection between business 
leaders and politicians (PCON_BUS) remains after the politicians have left their position 
in government (Malesky & Taussig, 2009; Bao et al., 2015; Carboni, 2017). The rationales 
of the business leaders for establishing political connections are to diminish the political 
risk/uncertainty and to acquire the government resources. The fourth category of political 
connection is mainly pertinent to the family members of government leaders 
(PCON_FAM). In accordance with Wong et al. (2018), a firm is defined to be politically 
connected via family members of a government leader if the immediate family members 
of the government serve on the board of directors or act as the shareholders of the company. 
This network is different from PCON_BOARD because the connection is characterised as 
a family relationship.  
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TABLE 3- 1: THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLITICAL CONNECTION: 
Author (Year) The Types of Political Connections 
Faccio (2005) Board of Directors 
Fan et al. (2007) Board of Directors 
Khwaja & Mian (2005) Board of Directors 
Fan et al. (2007) Board of Directors 
Jackowicz et al. (2014) Board of Directors 
Wang (2015) Board of Directors 
Domadenik et al. (2015) Board of Directors 
Haveman et al. (2017) Board of Directors 
Li et al. (2017) Board of Directors 
Shi et al. (2018) Board of Directors 
Wu et al. (2018) Board of Directors 
Xu et al. (2015) Family Political Connections 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) Family Political Connections  
Fisman (2001) Family Political Connections 
Malesky and Taussig (2009) Family Political Connections 
Berkman et al. (2010) Government-Linked Companies  
Okhmatovskiy (2010) Government-Linked Companies 
Cao et al. (2016) Government-Linked Companies 
Sojli and Tham (2017) Foreign Government-Linked 
Companies 
Coulomb and Sangnier (2014) Political Connection through 
Business Owner 
Boubakri et al. (2012) Political Connection through 
Business Owner 
Li et al. (2008) Political Connection through 
Business Owner 
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Faccio (2010) Political Connection through 
Business Owner 
Claessens et al. (2008) Political Connection through 
Business Owner  
Johnson and Mitton (2003) Political Connection through 
Business Owner 
 
3.2.3. MEASUREMENTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION:  
3.2.3.1. EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT MEASUREMENTS OF POLITICAL 
CONNECTION:  
In terms of the measurements of political connection, the question may arise as to what 
measurements of political connection can be applied to existing studies. Such measures are 
still being developed and each study contributes to the different aspects of definitions of 
political connection. However, Carboni (2017) divides the different definitions of political 
connection into two main categories, namely implicit and explicit measures. The term 
“explicit measure” would relate to the case of a current politician operating in a firm and/or 
a current businessman entering politics. For instance, Faccio (2005) defines a politically 
connected company as one whose large shareholders or top officers include: (a) a member 
of parliament; (b) a minister or head of state; or (c) someone closely related to a top official. 
Based on the definition of Faccio et al. (2005), Boubakri et al. (2008) cover the definition 
of political connection by taking into account the fact that at least one member of the firm’s 
board of directors, supervisory board or largest shareholder is a politician, namely a 
member of parliament, a minister or any other top appointed-bureaucrat. Brockman et al. 
(2013) develop this definition of political connection as follows: (1) at least one of the 
company’s top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman of the board, or 
secretary) or large shareholders (any person directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% 
of the company’s voting shares) is a member of parliament; (2) at least one of its top 
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officers, large shareholders, or their relatives is closely related to a top politician or party; 
and (3) the company is closely associated with a top politician.  
In contrast, the term “implicit measure” generally refers to the following cases: (i) 
affiliations/documented friendships/family networks between firms and politics; (ii) the 
political background of businessmen; (iii) firms’ degree of political connections or 
proximity to politics; (iv) firms’ campaign contributions to politics, (v) the association 
between ownership and contribution; and (vi) lobbying activity (Carboni, 2017). For 
instance, Coulomb and Sangnier (2014) document the friendship connections of the 
winning French candidate – Nicholas Sarkozy as a type of political connection because 
their political decisions may be driven by many determinants, including promises tied to 
campaign events, or personal connections.   
Ferris et al. (2016) examine how the appointment of former politicians and regulators to 
boards of directors or management teams affects corporate acquisition activity and 
performance. Using the US context, where the two primary agencies supervising merger 
activity are the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice, Ferris et al. (2016) argue that firms can avoid regulatory delays or 
denial risks in corporate acquisition activity by hiring former officials with whom current 
government officials continue to maintain relationships. Therefore, they use the political 
background of directors on the boards of firms taking part in mergers and acquisitions in 
the United States to measure the political connection of the firms as follows: Their first 
measure, POL1, indicates whether the bidder has a former politician or industry regulator 
on its board or management team. Their second measure of political connectivity (POL2), 
shows whether a bidder employs a former politician, regulator, general, or admiral. In their 
last measure of political connectivity, (POL3), they define a bidder as connected if the firm 
has a former politician, regulator, general/admiral, or non-counsel lawyer on the board or 
management team. They include lawyers in this final measure of political connections 
because of their numerous interactions with Department of Justice officials.  
46 
 
In addition, Shin et al. (2017) established a much broader measurement of political 
connection based on the resource dependency viewpoint. Resource dependence theory is 
specifically relevant to how organisations’ external resources influence its behaviour; the 
acquisition of external resources is an important aspect of both the strategic and tactical 
management decisions of any company (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Therefore, Shin et al. 
(2017) suggest that since the government is one of the major external forces that exerts a 
significant impact on firms’ operations and survival, firms would naturally try to forge 
relationships with the government by having board members with such resources. As a 
consequence, Shin et al. (2017) employed the resource dependence viewpoint in order to 
broaden other measurements of political connection by including judges, prosecutors, 
journalists, or social activists, as they play an increasingly important role in Korean 
economic and social contexts (Shin et al., 2017).    
In many countries where institutional constraints are weak, politicians’ intervention in 
business activities is more pronounced (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Based on this 
standpoint, Fan et al. (2007) examined the role of government intervention in China’s 
newly partially privatised firms, as property rights in China remain weak and the product 
and capital markets are far from liberalised, grabbing-hand theory predicts a strong 
negative relationship between government intervention and the performance and 
governance quality of firms. To proxy for government intervention, Fan et al. (2007) used 
the CEO’s political connections, defined as those serving as current or former government 
bureaucrats, or in other words current or former officers of the central or local governments 
or the military, as a proxy for government intervention in the firm. Likewise, for a country 
with a single ruling-party such as Vietnam, Malesky & Taussig (2009) define a politically 
connected owner of an entrepreneurial firm as someone who is, or used to be, (1) a 
Communist Party membership, government official, or military officer; (2) an SOE 
manager; or (3) an SOE employee. Hung et al. (2017) examined the effect of banks’ 
political connections on bank performance and risk in China. Using the definitions of 
political connection of previous studies in their study, they hand-collected information on 
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CEOs’ professional background to clarify their political affiliations, and defined a CEO as 
having political connection if they were ex-governmental officials.  
Li et al. (2008) examined the value of political connections for private entrepreneurs in 
China. They specifically aimed to analyse the role of affiliation with the Chinese 
Communist (the Party) in helping to improve the performance of private firms, and to delve 
into the specific mechanisms through which this political affiliation works. From their 
perspective, a distinct characteristic of China, which separates it from other transitional 
countries, is the continuing rule of the Communist Party and persistent ideological 
discrimination against private ownership, despite the dramatic reform of the economy. 
Party membership in China implies a measure of political status, and first and foremost, 
demonstrates an important connection with the only party in the country. In an environment 
marked by scepticism, mistrust, and discrimination towards private enterprises, being 
affiliated with the ruling party indicates congruence and trustworthiness. As Party members 
interact with government officials, bank managers, and managers of state-owned 
enterprises, they build up connections with key political and economic characters. 
Moreover, membership of Communist Party and acquaintance with other Party members 
and government officials pave the way for the achievement of a higher political status, such 
as becoming a member of the People’s Congress (Li et al., 2008). Therefore Party 
membership is considered to be an indicator of human capital or the ability of an 
entrepreneur to establish political connection with the ruling Party, because of the 
legitimate favours towards Communist Party Membership in the Chinese political system 
in eliminating the discrimination against private ownership. Similarly, Vietnam has a 
political system similar to that of China, with a ruling Communist Party. Malesky and 
Taussig (2009) define an owner or entrepreneur as being politically connected if he or she 
is a Communist party member.  
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3.2.3.2. INTENSITY OF POLITICAL CONNECTION:  
Regarding the advanced measurement of political connection, it has been developed into a 
continuous index in many previous studies. For example, based on the benefits and costs 
of political connections in China, Chen et al. (2017) argue that business people should not 
be too distant from the government; but also should not get too close. In particular, they 
propose that the relation between political connections and firm value is more complicated 
than has been previously reported. They speculate that some connections are good for firm 
value, but that too many will have the opposite effect, with the co-existence of both positive 
and negative effects of political connections. To prove their hypotheses, they created a 
political connection index based on the administrative rankings of the political 
backgrounds of CEO, chairman and other directors on the board, on which a high political 
connection score demonstrated a strong political connection, and vice versa. Similarly, You 
et al. (2012) built an index to evaluate the political connections of CEOs on the basis of the 
two aspects of political experience and political identity in Chinese listed firms. There are 
three elements of CEOs’ political experience: Whether they were from a government 
branch, whether they had worked for a state-owned bank; and whether they had leadership 
experience in a government-regulated business association. CEOs’ political identity was 
assessed on two aspects: whether they were a deputy on the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) or the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC); and whether they had received the title of “model worker” or any 
other government reward. For each of the above five elements, a value of 1 was assigned 
if this is the case, and 0 otherwise, and an unweighted sum political connection index 
computed by aggregating these aspects.   
Related to other emerging contexts, Fisman (2001) considered Indonesia as a unique 
institutional setting because of its highly centralised and stable political structure under the 
long-lasting reign of President Suharto. It was therefore possible to build a credible index 
of political connectedness. Fisman (2001) utilised a political connection index based on the 
Suharto Dependency Index (1995) developed by the Castle Group. This includes a 
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numerical rating of the degree to which each of the 25 largest industrial groups in Indonesia 
depends upon political connections for its profitability, with the ratings ranging from 1 
(least dependent) to 5 (most dependent).  
With reference to developed economies such as the United States, Kim et al. (2012) used 
a political alignment index (PAI) of each state’s key politicians’ links with the ruling 
(presidential) party to represent local firms’ proximity to political power. This proximity 
represents the degree to which the federal and state governments are linked to firms located 
in a particular state. Beyond the direct effect of political connections9, the proximity of 
political power will result in “indirect” political connectedness, which firms passively seek 
to establish, because those located in a state with high political power proximity may be in 
a better position to receive the benefits of access to powerful political channels.  
Additionally, even contributions either from business people or firms to political parties 
and committees should be defined as implicit connections (Ferguson and Voth, 2008). 
Claessens et al. (2008) improved upon the relatively crude measures of political 
connections often exploited in the non-US political connections literature by studying those 
that individual firms had made by contributing to election candidates’ campaigns and the 
possible channels politicians employ to repay these contributions. Their data have three 
advantages. First, they are more objective compared with the data typically used in the 
literature in ascertaining whether there exists a connection between politicians and firms. 
Second, they allow the intensity of a connection to be measured instead of simply utilising 
an indication of its presence. Third, they permit analysis of whether connections matter for 
firm performance and access to finance, and how contributions are distributed across 
different types of candidates. Goldman and Rocholl (2006) also explored whether political 
connections were important in the United States, where there exists a well-developed 
financial market, as well as a strong legal system. By using data from the Center of 
Responsive Politics (CRP), Goldman and Rocholl (2006) took into account all the financial 
 
9 Direct political connections imply that a firm aims to establish active relationships with politicians through different corporate political strategies, 
such as personal ties, political contributions or lobbying expenditures.  
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donations made by companies to the Republican and Democratic Parties prior to the 2000 
election, alongside the political background of directors, in order to define political 
connections.  
Tahoun (2014) deployed a new measure of political connectedness, namely the year-
specific association between the politicians’ share ownership in a firm and the firm’s 
contribution to the politicians’ election campaigns. More specifically, this measure 
includes the level of ownership by politicians and outperforms all the previous measures 
by disclosing the award of private benefits to a firm. Previous measures of political 
connection (namely political spending) only showed one side of the politician-firm 
relationship and might not necessarily have included the investment made to access 
politicians, but simply the ideology of the company. Broadly speaking, unlike the previous 
political connection measures, Tahoun’s measurement of the ownership-contribution link 
captures the extent to which politicians and companies show mutual concern for each other.    
Specifically, such a measure indicates an association between share ownership by 
politicians or the state, and the contributions that companies make to election campaigns. 
From the viewpoint of Tahoun (2014), the ownership-contribution link constitutes a novel 
measure, as it details the extent to which politicians and companies mutually interact with 
each other. Tahoun (2014) examines whether a politician’s stock ownership in a firm acts 
as a mechanism to utilise their quid pro quo relationship with it, and ensures that the 
politician will act in the firm’s best interest. A further way in which a firm attempts to 
affect government decisions is through lobbying activities. More specifically, such activity 
is linked to companies’ campaign contributions, suggesting that they do so to establish 
political networks (Akey, 2014). The table 3.2 summarises the measures of political 
connections developed in previous studies discussed in this chapter.  
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TABLE 3- 2: MEASURES OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN PAST PAPERS 
Author/s and Year Types of Measure 
Akey (2014) Implicit measure 
Amore and Bennedsen (2013) Explicit measure + Implicit measure 
Faccio (2005) Explicit measure + Implicit measure 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) Explicit measure 
Fan et al. (2007) Explicit measure + Implicit measure 
Boubakri et al. (2008) Implicit measure + Explicit measure 
Tahoun (2014) Implicit measure 
Claessens et al. (2008) Implicit measure 
Hung et al. (2017) Implicit measure 
Shin et al. (2017) Implicit measure + Explicit measure 
Kim et al. (2012) Implicit measure 
Fisman (2001) Implicit measure 
You and Du (2012) Implicit measure 
Ferguson and Voth (2008) Implicit measure 
Cheng and Leung (2016) Implicit measure  
Wang (2015) Implicit measure 
Malesky and Taussig (2009) Implicit measure 
Haveman et al. (2017) Implicit measure + Explicit measure 
Ferris et al. (2016) Implicit measure 
Zhou (2014) Implicit measure  
Wu et al. (2012) Implicit measure 
Chen et al. (2017) Implicit measure 
Habib et al. (2017) Implicit measure 
F. Liu et al. (2016) Implicit measure 
Wu et al. (2012) Implicit measure 
Markussen and Tarp (2014) Implicit measure + Explicit measure 
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Ridge et al. (2016) Implicit measure 
Li et al. (2008) Explicit measure 
Sojli and Tham (2017) Implicit measure + Explicit measure 
Tu et al. (2013) Implicit measure 
Zhao and Lu (2016) Implicit measure 
 
3.3. ANTECEDENTS OF CORPORATE POLITICAL CONNECTIONS:  
The interdependence of political and economic power strengthens the importance of 
political connections for businesses around the world. Firms attempt to develop such 
political connections, which subsequently increases their chances of success (Boubakri et 
al., 2008). In principle, both parties benefit from political connection: Politicians or the 
government grant rewards in the form of policies and privileges to firms based on their 
cooperation, while firms utilise these connections to obtain government favours or rewards 
to help boost firm performance (Yu et al., 2016). Previous studies have pinpointed various 
reasons for the establishment of firms’ political connections, which can be categorised at 
the industry and institutional levels (Saeed, 2013).  
At an industry level, industry structure, namely its concentration, the degree of competition 
and industry regulation are commonly identified determinants which have a profound 
effect on firm strategy in establishing political connection (Carboni, 2017; Haveman et al., 
2017). For industries with a high level of competition and regulation, associated firms 
which face intense competitive pressure highly appreciate political connections when 
attempting to obtain protection and favoured treatment from the government (Haveman et 
al., 2017). Firms in highly regulated industries are often involved in matters of national 
interest (Cheng et al., 2016). Hence, competitive advantages emerging from political 
connections are greatest amongst regulated and state-dominated industries (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1998; Carboni, 2017). Carboni (2017) found empirical support for this conjecture, 
and provides evidence that in administrative and regulated industries, politically connected 
firms are most common in highly regulated ones, and benefit from many competitive 
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advantages which increase firm performance. Firms in concentrated industries have more 
incentives to establish political connections since they enjoy higher political rewards. This 
view is also similar to that of Haveman et al. (2017). During the economic transitions in 
China, the advantage of being politically affiliated has helped listed firms in more 
competitive industries to avoid economic uncertainty and boost firm performance.  
At an institutional level, political connections may influence firm performance in both 
developed and developing markets. In an effective legal system, for instance, political 
connections complement formal contracts to help transaction work run smoothly. Where 
law enforcement is weak, informal relationships can act as a substitute to allow deals to be 
made (Cao et al., 2016). Fundamentally, dependence upon political connections is derived 
from the underdevelopment of formal institutions, which accordingly shows arm’s length 
contracting to be untrustworthy. If regulatory governance is inadequate, informal systems, 
such as the embedding of economic and financial transactions in a network of social 
relationships, may be viewed as an endogenous response (Charumilind et al., 2006).    
The extent and nature of political connections vary greatly across countries in accordance 
with their institutional development (Desai & Olofsgård, 2011). In advanced markets, for 
example, firms may utilise campaign finance, political action committees, and the 
‘revolving door’ between lobbying firms and congressional staff offices to build political 
connections. In contrast, in less advanced countries, political influence is obtained 
generally via a combination of kinship ties, political alliances, or direct financial dealings 
between the owners and the politicians (Desai & Olofsgård, 2011).  
In many developing countries, administrative restrictions upon economic activity are 
pervasive facts of life. Such restrictions facilitate the power of politicians to extend 
preferential treatment in terms of resource distribution and policy enforcement to firms 
with strong political connections (Hongbin Li et al., 2008). As a result, the political 
connections with politicians and government officials in such an environment help firms 
to overcome major obstacles regarding the conducting of their business efficiently.  
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3.4. UNDERPINNING THEORIES EMPLOYED IN THE LITERATURE ON 
POLITICAL CONNECTION: 
This section discusses the positive and negative effects of political connection on firm 
performance, which are attributed to the helping-hand and grabbing-hand roles of 
government respectively. An explicit antecedent and theoretical framework for helping-
hand and grabbing-hand governments is suggested, which will be the foundation for 
developing previous political connection studies in the following chapter.    
FIGURE 3- 1: CATEGORISATION OF THE MULTI-THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Construction  
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massive government intervention are necessary for effective functioning of the market 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Andolfatto (2004) summarises the helping-hand perspective of 
Shleifer & Vishny (1998), stating that the view is adopted by those who believe that 
markets may not be functioning very well. The view came into effect on the basis of the 
experience of the Great Depression, which was widely seen as a clear example of market 
failure. The helping-hand view argues for massive state intervention to ‘help’ markets work 
better in achieving the ‘social good’. This help is typically illustrated in the form of taxing 
those activities that are perceived to be ‘oversupplied’ and subsidising those that are 
‘undersupplied’. Implicitly, the view is that government officials should have the 
willingness to intervene on behalf of the ‘social good’. The helping-hand model contradicts 
that of invisible-hand, in that the supporting-market mechanism is weak, and faith in the 
market is replaced by faith in bureaucrats, in the belief that government intervention will 
help the market to function well (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998).  
As previously discussed, a high degree of uncertainty in the business environment and 
underdeveloped legal and market institutions are the antecedents of the helping-hand 
government model (Berkman et al., 2010; Zhou, 2013). Institutions can be either informal 
or formal. The rules of informal ones are based on implicit understandings and are not 
accessible through written documents, nor necessarily specified through formal positions; 
on the other hand, formal institutions have written rules which are determined and executed 
through formal positions, namely authority or ownership (Zenger et al., 2002). In informal 
institutions, political connection is considered to be one of their characteristics, as state 
intervention has become common in many countries (Cao et al., 2016). In such cases, 
building relationships with government officials may compensate for the lack of sound 
formal institutions. Theoretically, political connections are able to facilitate economic 
activities and performance in less developed formal institutions because they help many 
firms to obtain key resources and enjoy private protection of property rights (Zhou 2013). 
Therefore, the “helping hand” perspective in political connection is that firms may use their 
political networks to gain more legitimacy in the environment with low-quality institution 
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and acquire favourable resources from government in order to facilitate their operations 
(Nguyen et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2016). Resources dependence theory explains that political 
connections help a firm to obtain key valuable resources and to resolve external 
uncertainties (Pfeffer et al. 1978; Wu et al. 2012). Therefore, the helping-hand role is more 
pronounced in emerging/transition countries than developed ones because the institutional 
and market development of the former remains underdeveloped and lags behind that of 
developed countries (La Porta et al., 1998; Faccio et al., 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008). In 
addition, enforcement of the rule of law and contracts and property rights are not 
adequately guaranteed, which results in a risky legal environment for enterprises. For this 
reason, the relationship between enterprises and government through managerial ties 
becomes more important, as political ties may create competitive advantages for firms if 
they receive more favourable treatments than competitors. Therefore, building political 
networks in management is a prerequisite in the weak institutional and market settings of 
developing countries (Cao et al., 2016).  
3.4.2. GRABBING-HAND GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE:  
The invisible-hand viewpoint claims that government should play a minimal role in society 
whereas that of the helping hand provides evidence of why governments should intervene 
in the market place (Andolfatto, 2004). However, governments may pursue goals that are 
different from the maximisation of social welfare and individuals working in the 
government may pursue their own goals instead of overall social goals. Dictators utilise 
their political strength to maintain their position in the office, provide resources to political 
supporters, harm political challengers, and to enhance their own assets to the detriment of 
public welfare or government aims in pursuing political goals that harm firm performance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).  
On a basis of the perspective of Frye & Shleifer (1997), grabbing-hand government is an 
interventionist one, but less organised than from the helping-hand perspective. The 
government encompasses a large number of essentially independent government officials 
following their own agendas, which include corruption. Such officials are largely 
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independent of the judicial system and are able to enforce their rulings in commercial 
disputes and freely promulgate predatory regulations amongst businesses. In some severe 
circumstances, government becomes chaotic, and is incapable of enforcing law and order 
and ensuring fundamental legal enforcement. As a result, contracts are freely implemented 
without following the rule of law. In general, grabbing-hand governments stand above the 
law and aims to abuse their power to extract rents. Moreover, the judicial system becomes 
ineffective and the mafia takes over the state as an enforcer. In the grabbing-hand 
government model, predatory regulations exist and corruption prevails in society. Such a 
model focuses on politics as the determinant of government behaviour. This political 
behaviour includes the government’s pursuit of political goals or politicians’ pursuit of 
their self-interest objectives. Boubakri et al. (2008) describe the two main grabbing-hand 
perspectives in terms of political connection helping the government and related politicians 
to extract political benefits at the costs of profit maximisation for the benefit of other 
stakeholders in the firm.  
The political view is that a high level of government intervention in the decision-making 
process of the firms ignores managers’ goals for profit maximisation and encourages firms 
to pursue political goals instead (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Politically connected managers 
in the firm have the major objectives of maximising employment and wages; stimulating 
regional development by establishing manufacturing industries in politically attractive, 
rather than economically advantageous regions; providing goods and services at low prices; 
and supplying unnecessary products. These goals generally focus on ensuring the 
continuous implementation of political objectives (Boubakri et al., 2008). In addition to 
the political view of the grabbing-hand perspective, Boubakri et al. (2008) discuss the 
managerial view of the grabbing-hand approach. Shleifer & Vishny (1998) theoretically 
and empirically argue that a society whose talents are engaged in government or private 
rent-seeking is likely to stagnate, and that a higher level of rent-seeking behaviours of 
individuals working in the public sector is detrimental to economic development. 
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According to this perspective, politically connected managers have the tendency to extract 
rents for their own individual benefits at the expense of the firm (Fan et al., 2007).  
3.4.3. AGENCY THEORY:  
Based on Jensen & Meckling (1976), agency relationship refers to a contract established 
when one party, known as the principal, appoints an agent to conduct certain services on 
his/her principal’s behalf. Therefore, decision-making authority is given to the agent to 
conduct the pirncipal’s assignments. A fundamental problem related to the separation of 
control and ownership is known as the agency problem. This problem mainly arises from 
the different interests of the owners (shareholders) and agents (managers) of businesses 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The main goal of a firm is to maximise its performance, but 
an agency problem can arise because agents fail to maximise the wealth of the shareholders 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Since the principal (owner) is unable to fully observe the actions 
of the agent (manager) because of information asymmetry, and considering the fact that 
such monitoring is costly, managers may act opportunistically to run the firm based on 
their own interests as opposed to those of the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Kirkbride et al. (2009) noticed that managers tend to only operate towards corporate goals 
when those goals also serve their own interests. As a result, managers lose the trusts of the 
owners and are thus motivated to achieve their individual goals, which in turn intensifies 
the agency problem and increases agency costs. According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), 
agency costs can be categorised into three types: monitoring, bonding and residual costs.  
Monitoring costs include those borne by the principal for observing, controlling and 
evaluating the actions of an agent. They are incurred to ensure that managers act in 
alignment with shareholders’ interests. According to McColgan (2001), monitoring costs 
include audit expenses, the costs of signing compensation contracts for executives, or the 
cost of firing managers. These expenses then have been paid by the agents through 
adjustment of their compensation. As a result, the board of directors usually plays a 
monitoring role in the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Monitoring benefits both the owners 
and the business itself in many ways. It is believed that it contributes to reducing the risk 
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of moral hazard, which can be alleviated and uncovered by an effective monitoring system. 
The second type of agency cost are bonding costs, which are incurred by managers when 
they improve structures and strategies to act in the best interest of shareholders. These costs 
are typically related to the disclosure of additional information.  
According to McColgan (2001), a marginal decrease in monitoring is equal to a minimum 
increase in bonding costs. Denis (2001) also suggests that through an optimal bonding 
contract, managers can make decisions that satisfy the interest of shareholders in the best 
way. However, a harmonised contract between shareholders and managers will encourage 
managers to pursue their own goals to a great extent. The third type of agency cost is 
residual loss. Although agency costs can be controlled by monitoring and bonding costs, 
managers’ interests are still unlikely to be fully aligned with those of shareholders. 
Therefore, other losses arises from their relationship, known as residual loss (McColgan, 
2001). In particular, residual losses incur when the cost incurred by the enforcement of a 
full principal-agent contract is greater than the benefits of that contract for managers and 
shareholders. Moreover, the issue of a time horizon conflict in agency contracts is likely to 
occurs between managers and shareholders when shareholders are concerned with cash 
flows for the foreseeable future, while managers aim to focus on those during their term of 
employment. Based on Dechow & Sloan (1991), this starts to become more of an issue 
when top directors reach the retirement age. In such a situation, directors decide to cut 
down on the company’s research and development expenditure because they perceive that 
they will not benefit from such investment in the future. In addition to the agency problem 
between manager and owner, a similar agency problem also exists between the various 
principals, in which organisational rents can be appropriated by various stakeholder groups 
(Coff, 1999). It is not unsurprising that a large proportion of the original rents fail to stay 
within the firm, but instead are diverted to certain stakeholders groups (David et al., 2010). 
According to agency theory scholars, shareholders comprises groups of people with 
different types of  character conflicts and the potential for “owner opportunism” (Connelly 
et al., 2010; Bosse et al., 2014). In emerging countries, concentrated ownership is prevalent 
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(Rafael La Porta et al., 1998). While this ownership structure reduces managerial agency 
costs, it results in the principal-principal agency problem. In particulalr, blockholders can 
appropriate firm surpluses to the detriment of minority shareholders by extracting assets 
and profits.  
A few studies have applied the agency paradigm to analyse the effect of political 
connection on firm performance. In an attempt to overcome agency issues, politicians, seen 
as outside directors, may be capable of monitoring and controlling the management in a 
better way due to their presumed independence compared to insiders, with the aim of 
ultimately improving firm performance. In addition to the advantage of helping firms to 
access to financial favours, politicians, as directors, may also contribute to improving firm 
performance by giving insights into imminent regulatory policies which may facilitate 
firms to make efficient investment decisions. Nonetheless, politicians can also exacerbate 
agency-associated problems by forcing management to engage in self-interested actions 
that protect the interests of politicians, thus weakening firm performance (Saeed, 2013). 
Furthermore, in the context of the existence of blockholders on the board structure, Sun et 
al. (2016) suggest that board political capital can increase the principal-principal agency 
problem by boosting more appropriation of firm wealth. Specifically, politically connected 
board directors can serve as a buffer against the discipline of legal/regulatory rules and that 
of the equity market. First, self-dealing activities conducted by blockholders can attract 
legal and regulatory sanctions, which should be enforced by the courts and securities-
market regulatory agencies. However, the enforcement of legal and regulatory regulations 
related to investor protection is by no means exempt from political influence. In the case 
of judicial systems in emerging countries, the courts are further dependent on politics 
(Ginsburg & Moustafa, 2008). Therefore, politically connected firms are more likely to 
manipulate courts to resolve disputes (Ang et al. 2014), and if they are sued, they suffer 
lower shareholder wealth losses and have a higher possibility of making favorable appeals 
(Firth et al., 2013). Regulatory officials are more likely to feel pressured if they decide to 
discipline politically connected companies. Early political economy literature, such as 
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Stigler (1971), proposes that regulatory agencies can be taken over by interest groups who 
want regulatory arrangements to satisfy their own benefits. Furthermore, thanks to the 
firms’ political capital, they are more likely to influence regulators (Gordon & Hafer, 
2005).  
Secondly, controlling shareholders who take part in persistent rent misappropriation may 
face punishments from the equity market and outside directors, resulting in lower firm 
performance and the loss of future equity financing opportunities (Durnev & Kim, 2005). 
However, politically connected board directors can assist controlling shareholders to obtain 
alternative access to resources and channels of financing. Therefore, such directors can 
considerably diminish controlling shareholders’ dependence upon equity finance, hence 
reducing the effect of market-based disciplines. For instance, in the study of Leuz & 
Oberholzer-Gee (2006), Indonesian companies with close political networks were less 
subject to scrutiny from foreign or developed capital markets. Chaney et al. (2011) 
uncovered a lower quality of accounting information disclosure in politically connected 
companies compared to unconnected companies, but only the political connections they 
possessed helped them to avoid sanctions for the poor quality of information disclosure.  
3.4.4. RESOURCE-BASED THEORY:  
According to Penrose (2009), the growths of firms depends largely upon the management 
of bundled available resources. Wernerfelt (1984) used the resource-based view to support 
the notion that business success is greatly affected by its resources. The basic assumption 
of this theory is that the companies’ resources and capabilities affect their competitive 
advantage. Resources in this instance simply relate to companies’ possessions, both 
physical and financial, employees’ skills and even organisational processes. On the other 
hand, capabilities refer to those actions a firm can perform drawing upon its resources.  
Barney (1991) further investigated use of the resources-based view, which points out that 
resources must be valuable, not likely to be imitated, and rarely supported by tacit skills 
for a firm to maintain its competitive advantage. Barney (1991) further showed that a 
resource for a firm could be deemed to be valuable if it can increase the willingness of 
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customers to pay for related products or services. The scarceness of the resource will create 
the premium and strong competitive superiority for the company over its competitors, as 
well as the inimitability of that resource. Moreover, the skills which the companies have 
developed to manage their resources can add value to them. Furthermore, based on resource 
dependence theory, business organisations confront an array of interdependences with 
external entities. Therefore, organizational survival and growth are reliant on their ability 
to acquire resources from, and deal with uncertainties brought about by external 
constituents. Among these constituents, the government is one of the most difficult 
environment dependencies to control (Hillman et al., 2009). Based on the viewpoint of 
Pfeffer & Salancik (2003), the organisation, via political mechanisms, makes an effort to 
establish for itself an environment which is more suitable for its own interests, as well as 
to establish political power in the external environment. Such power can be used at some 
future time in the organisation’s interests.  
Boards of directors help firms to deal with power imbalances with external entities. 
Specifically, if firms have directors with connections to external entities on which they are 
reliant, these board members will lower the uncertainty and transaction costs, and benefit 
the firm. The previous studies propose that politically connected board directors can 
provide organisational legitimacy, opportunities to forge the networks with political actors, 
and a wide array of regulatory and financial resources owned by political institutions 
(Goldman et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2012). Hillman et al. (2009) argued that firms which 
forge relationships with political authorities are more likely to obtain the performance 
benefits. This assertion has been supported by empirical studies examining the positive 
economic consequences of political ties (A J Hillman, 2005).  
3.4.5. CONTINGENCY THEORY:  
Contingency theory, as explained by Donaldson (2001), is a subset of the scientific 
contingency approach. Donaldson (2001) argues that the contingency approach can be 
interpreted by the influence of a variable on the relationship between two main variables. 
Therefore, the change in the third variable or factor will impact the relationship between 
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the two research variables. Johansson et al. (1989) state that the sub-system of 
organisations and the relationship between the corporate environment and the 
organisational system are inter-correlated. In the contingency framework, there are no 
specific best approaches to structure an organisation (Islam, 2012; Cole & Scott, 2001). 
Profitable companies need to adapt their systems and structures to be consistent with the 
contingent conditions, especially their external business environment. Contingencies in 
this case consist of certain issues, namely stakeholders’ strategic relevance, and economic 
circumstances. Flynn et al. (2010) argue that the environment in which an organisation 
performs will frame its structure and processes. In other words, an organisation’s 
performance will be improved if the demands of the external environment with which the 
organisations interacts is adequately dealt with. As a result, organisational performance is 
reliant on the extent to which the strategy that it seeks to follow is associated with the 
demands of its environment (Flynn et al., 2010). In the strategic management literature, 
Van de Ven & Drazin (1984) described such an alignment between firm performance and 
strategy as “fit”. In particular, it is the interactive effect of organisational structural 
variables on firm performance (Van de Ven & Drazin, 1984). When the structural variables 
of an organisation fit at a level that is proportionate to its organisational contingencies, firm 
performance is improved, and vice versus (Donaldson, 2001). Based on Zona et al. (2013), 
the better the fit, the more effective the organisation.  
The concept of the fit of an organisational structure is the main feature of contingency 
theory. It is related to the concept that a firm is considered to be fit when it is structured 
and positioned to perform well in its organisational activities. In contrast, a misfit is the 
discrepancy from the ideal fit. Based on Miles & Snow (1984), fit is illustrated as the 
process through which a firm is capable of aligning its strategy with its environment and 
also preparing internal resources to facilitate such an alignment. Miles & Snow (1984) 
considered the mechanism of such an alignment and the internal structure as organisational 
structure and the process of management, because it is extremely hard for every company 
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to closely integrate these important parts in a dynamic environment. Consequently, they 
suggest that organisations should always aim for, rather than fulfil, a perfect fit condition.  
For the previous studies on the relationship between political connection and financial 
performance, the contingency framework is likely to be applicable and to be suitable (Zhao 
et al. 2016). It is most likely to be applicable to the political connection literature when the 
framework argues that the institutional context can influence the effect of political 
connection on the firms’ operations (Zhou 2014). Unlike resource dependence theory, 
which proposes that the value of political connections still remains when governments 
control critical resources and production factors (Walder, 2003), the progressive view, 
rooted in market efficiency, argues that as the transition deepens, it is market forces such 
as the decreases in the resource redistribution power of governments and the emergence of 
market-support institutions that remains, so the value of political connections will be 
eroded (Cao & Nee, 2000). In particular, Zhao et al. (2016) argue that these two views 
converge explicitly in the role of the institutional environment in influencing the value of 
political connections, which shows that the debate about the value of such connections 
makes more sense and is more relevant if its effect is analysed in association with the 
particular contexts of institutions and organisations. In particular, the role of political 
connections in facilitating firms’ operations is dependent upon the context and is likely to 
be better analysed by taking into account the specific institutional and organisational 
contexts. However, Zhou (2014) suggests two conflicting views on the effect of the 
development of the market and institutional systems on the role of political connections. 
On the one hand, the complementary view argues that the development of market and 
institutional systems will have little effect on the role of political connections. This view 
posits that the positive role of political connections in many less developed and transition 
economies is primarily associated with long-existing or newly emerged political markets, 
but not due to the lack of a sound institutional environment or market system. Furthermore, 
some evidence shows that political connections still play significant roles for entrepreneurs 
and firms in acquiring a number of benefits, for example loose regulatory oversight and 
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preferential treatment in competition for government contracts, amongst many others, even 
in developed market economies (Dixit, 2004; Faccio, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). 
Therefore, this view supports the notion that the effect of political connections still remains 
positive and changes little when market and institutional systems develop in an emerging 
country.  
On the other hand, the substitution argument argues that market systems and institutional 
development will reduce the role of political connections. According to the helping-hand 
framework, one strategy by which political connections influence entrepreneurship in a 
less developed economy is by securing the acquisition of resources and information. In a 
transition economy, in which the government initiates market-oriented reforms, thus 
increasing the market allocation of factor resources, the firms will acquire resources and 
market information more easily through formal markets (Peng, 2003). This view supports 
the notion that the benefits of political connections in acquiring information and resources 
will be weakened.  
3.4.6. SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY:  
Social capital is formulated via social relations that can be utilised to facilitate the 
acquisition of essential resources, influence and sponsorship (Adler and Kwon 2002). 
Social capital is linked to the relationships that facilitate collaboration and cooperation in 
order to obtain mutual benefits. Network relationships can comprise feelings of gratitude, 
reciprocity, respect or friendship (Carolis et al., 2009). Dess & Shaw (2001) demonstrate 
that a firm’s social capital can be difficult to quantify because it involves not only a 
complex set of dynamic relationships within a group, but also the unique conditions and 
interactions between that group and its external environment.  
Adler & Kwon (2002) show that social capital is a form of capital because it has the six 
following characteristics:  
1. It is a long-lived asset into which other resources could be likely invested, with the 
expectation of a future flow of benefits.  
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2. The resource is both appropriable and convertible.  
3. It can substitute for or complement other resources.  
4. It needs maintenance.  
5. Some types of social capital are collective goods meaning that they are not the private 
property of those benefiting from them.  
6. Investments in the advancement of social capital do not seem to be quantifiable. 
Being connected to a social network stimulates mutual knowledge and recognition 
(Bourdieu, 1985). The benefits originating from a firm’s social capital can lie in the form 
of both tangible and intangible assets, namely funding and financial information (Jonsson 
& Lindbergh, 2013). Social network members are likely to lead to sources of information 
and opportunity; however, in certain cases, social capital may be utilised to create a firm’s 
social status or reputation. It has been found that social capital is important in providing 
legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994); mitigating the liabilities of being a new organisation 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), facilitating firm growth (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), and helping 
avoid the failure of a firm (Miner et al., 1990). It also relates an entrepreneur to 
opportunities which are crucial to a firm’s success (Bull & Willard, 1993; Ellis, 2000), 
gives a firm support, credibility, and contacts (Ostgaard et al., 1996); and can promote 
innovation while reducing risks (Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994).  
Firms’ social capital is influenced by the context, and in particular by the institutional 
environment (Spence et al., 2003). According to North (1990), institutional arrangements 
are divided between formal and informal institutions. The concept of formal institutions is 
associated with the institutionalised rules, regulations, laws and supporting mechanisms 
that create the order in economic, legal and political frameworks. Informal institutions 
consist of the norms, beliefs, values and conventions that act as the basis of socio-cultural 
relations in society. With regard to transition countries, Ireland et al. (2008) explain that 
while formal institutional strategies and structures favouring capitalism have consistently 
developed, informal institutions are divided between old and new economic mechanisms. 
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In a study of Vietnamese entrepreneurial firms, Nguyen et al. (2009) demonstrated that 
networking plays a crucial role in SMEs’ activities, particularly in developing countries, as 
such firms seek access to resources for their development. Nguyen et al. (2009) argue that 
the lack of effective market institutions makes networks play an important role in spreading 
knowledge about a firm’s activities. Networks also make firms learn appropriate behaviour, 
and thus acquiring essential support from key stakeholders and the general public. 
Therefore, personal relationships and networks often act as effective substitutes for well-
established institutions (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006). Previous studies suggest that 
networking between entrepreneurs, bankers, government officials, friends and relatives 
may reinforce a firm’s legitimacy and play an important role for both lending institutions 
and corporate borrowers (Peng & Shekshnia, 2001; Le et al., 2006). For corporate 
borrowers, networks can facilitate access to resources, information and support from other 
parties (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). 
Adler & Kwon (2002) propose that the bridging view is one of the categories of social 
capital. Based on this notion, the bridging view primarily concentrates on social capital as 
a resource inherent in the social network, linking a focal actor to other actors. From this 
perspective, social capital can help explain the difference in success of individuals and 
firms over their competitors: The businesses of individuals and groups can be mainly 
facilitated by their direct and indirect connections to other factors in social networks”. 
Carolis et al. (2009) suggest that the bridging form of social capital is the most prominent 
determinant in the entrepreneurship literature because of its relevance to the creation of 
new ventures. This form can bring two direct benefits to the success of entrepreneurial 
firms: information and influence. Social capital can help the firms to access to information, 
which is an important ingredient of entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane et al. 2000).  It 
also contributes to improving the timing, relevance and quality of information (Adler & 
Kwon 2002). Carolis et al. (2009) declare that “individuals with close ties to universities, 
perhaps via alumni associations, may advance the relationships with researchers and hence 
have access to information on emerging commercialised technologies. The advantages 
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provided to individuals include earlier access to the new technologies before they become 
the public knowledge. Another advantage of social capital is the influence. Individuals may 
accumulate favours possessed by others in their network, and then call in those favours in 
the near future. Several previous studies have shown that bridging social capital facilitates 
a firm’s operations and generally improves their performance (Burt, 2004; Maurer and 
Ebers, 2006; Shaw et al. 2005).    
In the context of emerging economies, the forms of bridging social capital are mainly 
connected with the political sphere (Cao et al., 2016). Ireland et al. (2008) stress the 
importance of investigating the effect of political-economic systems on the firm’s 
behaviour. They argue that interactions between political and economic systems are 
widespread in developing and transitional economies; in which economic activities need 
to be understood in the context of taking into account the political system and the changes 
within it. One characteristic of most emerging countries is weak formal institutions (Rafael 
La Porta et al., 1998). In this type of arrangement, the firms utilise the disproportionately 
closed business networks of friends, relations, and government officials to compensate for 
the lack of formal institutions. However, this dependence on networks can provide an 
appropriate environment for agreeing and honouring corrupt deals (Fischer & Reuber, 
2007; Morck & Yeung, 2004).  
In former and current socialist countries, the government continues to play a large role in 
allocating scarce resources. In comparison to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private firms 
receive little support from the government, and they normally lack market legitimacy. In 
such countries, the market mechanism and the government-led redistributive mechanism 
often coexist, which shows that bureaucrats still have a strong influence on business 
performance (Li et al., 2007; Boisot et al., 1996). Managers’ links with government 
officials, the official networks, depict a special type of managerial resource in emerging 
countries because of the benefits enjoyed by the entrepreneur in easing the obstacles in the 
business environment (Li et al., 2007). The power of official networks is prominent in 
various emerging economies such as China (Peng et al., 2000; Xin and Pearce, 1954), 
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Vietnam (Le Ngoc & Nguyen, 2009), and Eastern European Countries (Smallbone & 
Welter, 2001). Therefore, establishing official network with bureaucrats is not just an 
aspect of life for conducting business in those emerging countries, but it also shows the 
disparity between success and failure.     
In a nutshell, social capital plays an important role in the entrepreneurs’ activities, helping 
to ease the obstacles confronting them in the business environment. Among the different 
types of social capital, political connection is seen to be one of the most important social 
capitals in emerging countries, because such networks not only increase a firm’s legitimacy 
in society and business, but also facilitates its acquisition of resources, information, 
technology and a talented labour force from the market. Therefore, political capital is an 
important intangible asset of firms in emerging countries (Cao et al., 2016) 
3.5. THE EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON POLITICAL 
CONNECTION:  
3.5.1. THE POSITIVE FACETS OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS:  
3.5.1.1. THE GOVERNMENT RESOURCES ACQUISITIONS:  
From the above discussion, it is evident that the main goal of political connections is to 
obtain economic benefits that are favourable to a firm’s continued economic success. 
Economists have long argued that those firms that lobby or maintain political connections 
obtain a variety of economic benefits in exchange (Fisman, 2001). Depending upon the 
viewpoint of access to government resources in developing countries, firms may seek to 
build on connections with the most influential individuals in their system, primarily 
politicians, in order to have access to the firm-specific political favours, mostly in the form 
of easy access to government resources, such as bank loans, government contracts and 
regulatory power. This is because governments continue to be involved in the resources 
allocation, such as access to bank loans in emerging countries characterised by a high 
extent of government intervention in economic activities and resources allocation, 
especially access to bank loans (Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Li et al., 2008; Johansson & Feng, 
2016). For instance, Li et al. (2008) consider the role of being connected to the ruling 
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Communist Party in the operation of private enterprises in China. In their arguments, the 
lingering legacy of the command economy and the slow development of market-supporting 
institutions in many transition economies result in many obstacles for private entrepreneurs 
in running their businesses and enable them to establish political connections to access 
state key resources, namely bank loans. These are often reserved for state-owned 
enterprises, or are subject to heavy government regulations (red tape) or “extralegal” fees. 
Based on a nationwide survey of private firms, Li et al. (2008) empirically showed that 
political connection exhibited by party membership could help businessmen to gain more 
legitimacy, and facilitate the private firms’ ability to obtain loans from banks or other state 
institutions, and empower their confidence in the legal system. With reference to a 
transition economy characterised by an interventionist state that plays an active role in 
capital allocation through the banking system, such as China, and the exploitation of the 
launch of a large stimulus programme in the autumn of 2008 as a typical case, Johansson 
& Feng (2016) found that political connection helped private firms to mitigate the 
discrimination that they faced from Chinese banks and to give them easier access to the 
national stimulus credit programme. Malesky & Taussig (2009) focused on the Vietnamese 
context, where, like in China, the private and financial sectors are developing dramatically, 
but the rule of law has not matched the speed of development of these two sectors. 
Although Vietnam’s banking sector is in transition toward a healthier system, it still 
distributes a disproportionate share of credit to “connected” enterprises in less competitive 
regions. Malesky & Taussig (2009) found that political connection, in particular, was an 
ineffective tool for directing bank credit to the most profitable investors, as banks placed 
greater value on connections than ons performance. Kostovetsky (2015) argues that due to 
the financial institutions’ connections to their home state senators, these firms are more 
likely to display risk-taking behaviours and were leveraged to a greater extent prior to the 
2008 financial crisis, thus having more access to leverage when the local housing prices 
rose. Despite this, they had less likelihood of going bankrupt or becoming insolvent during 
and after the financial crisis and experienced higher stock returns during the period. The 
findings from these studies might not be generalisable to other contexts because of their 
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focus on the single countries. In order to solve this issue, at a cross-country level, and using 
a sample of politically connected and unconnected firms in 47 countries, Faccio's  (2010) 
empirical evidence show that politically connected companies have higher leverage than 
their counterparts, and that this effect is stronger in the countries characterised by a high 
level of corruption.  
In addition to access to external financing through bank loans, government subsidies, tax 
breaks and obtaining government contracts, there are other government resources which 
politically connected firms are likely to enjoy. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 
1999 to 2007, Wu et al. (2012) investigated the effects of politically connected managers 
on the tax benefits received by firms with different types of ownership. Their results show 
that the effective tax rates (ETRs) of private firms with politically connected managers 
were lower than those of private firms without such managers. Nonetheless, the role of 
politically connected manager is reduced in SOEs when there is no significant difference 
between their ETRs with connected managers and those without such managers. These 
results show that the connected managers of private firms help their firms to obtain tax 
benefits, but that such a pattern is not applicable to SOEs in China. This means that the 
value of politically connected managers is only useful in privately-controlled listed firms, 
not in state-controlled listed ones. Similarly, Wang (2015) also discusses the role of 
politically connected independent directors in helping firms secure more subsidies from 
government. In addition, Wang et al. (2017) used internal administrative data on 
applications to China’s Innofund program to clarify which application characteristics were 
correlated with greater chances of obtaining grants. They found that political connection 
helped some firms whose scores did not meet funding standards but who still received 
grants.  
In addition, Sojli and Tham (2017) studied the value of foreign political connections. They 
focused on the proxy of foreign political connection as foreign government investors aim 
to actively participate in management. Their empirical results give evidence that an 
increase in firm performance appears to be associated with the provision of government-
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related contracts. Therefore, it is documented that government-related contracts are one of 
the mechanisms by which government connection can influence firms’ operational 
efficiency.  
3.5.1.2. THE REMOVAL OF THE REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS: 
In addition to the benefit of political connection with regard to government resources 
appropriation, it also helps firms to remove the regulatory constraints faced by them. In 
some countries, governments continue to intervene to a great extent in regulatory processes 
such as firms’ IPO applications and merger and acquisition processes, so political 
connection is more valuable in such countries (X. Du, Li, Liu, & Lai, 2016). Specifically, 
younger firms usually have more growth opportunities than their mature peers; so obtaining 
approval from government agencies and then going public to secure external funding are 
therefore very useful for them. However, because of limited performance records, 
information asymmetry, and greater uncertainty in bad market conditions, it is more 
troublesome to evaluate a start-up’s value. Therefore, many previous studies argue that 
investors aim to use firm-specific features, such as the CEO network, to evaluate the 
potential of an IPO firm (Yang et al., 2011). Based on this viewpoint, Bao et al. (2015) 
argue that having a specific political connection through being a member of the ruling party 
and a member of the firm or having a network of contacts with government officials, will 
diminish a firm’s risk of ideological discrimination, supporting it in obtaining key 
information and better preparing it for the pre-IPO process (Hongbin Li et al., 2008). Their 
empirical findings support their hypothesis that political connections help start-ups to 
reduce IPO denial risk because the chance of gaining approval for a firm’s IPO increases 
when it has political connections. Employing empirical evidence from a sample of Chinese 
IPO cases during the period from 2006 to 2011, Chen et al. (2017) indicate that politically 
connected underwriters use their reputation and relationships with regulatory agencies to 
increase the probability of clients’ IPO applications being accepted by the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).   
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3.5.1.3. GOVERNMENT PROTECTION:  
Connected firms may receive government protection through their political networks. A 
politically connected firm could be bailed out if in financial trouble (Faccio et al., 2006). 
Faccio et al. (2006) analysed the probability of government bailouts of 450 politically 
connected firms from 35 countries during the period 1997 to 2002, and showed that such 
companies had a higher likelihood of being bailed out if facing financial difficulties. In 
addition, the government protection is another important mechanism from which 
politically connected firms benefit. Such firms may receive protection because they are 
operating in industries of natural interest and government protection will ensure national 
security, economic interests, natural resources and assets, government ownership and a 
reduction in the impact from foreign competition (Cheng et al., 2016). Moreover, because 
of the nature of strategic firms, they also enjoy business and economic advantages, such as 
receiving subsidies, benefitting from favourable tax treatment, securing government 
contracts and enjoying property rights protection (Boubakri et al., 2012). Therefore, the 
findings of Cheng et al. (2016) demonstrate that the benefits of government patronage help 
strategic politically connected firms to outweigh the costs of political links with 
government bureaucrats. 
3.5.1.4. EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF THE BENEFITS OF POLITICAL 
CONNECTION TO FIRM PERFORMANCE:   
In general, political connection helps a firm to obtain government resources, avoid 
regulatory constraints and receive the government protection if in financial trouble or if 
facing severe competition from competitors. Due to these factors, politically connected 
directors can also improve the performance of their companies. Li et al. (2008) applied 
party membership as a measure of political connections, and their empirical evidence 
shows that the performance, measured as the return on assets and return on equity, of 
member firms was greater than that of their non-member counterparts. Additionally, such 
effects of political connections on firm performance are more evident in the regions with 
less advanced and legal systems. The appointment of politically connected managers can 
help private firms to avoid the disadvantagous positions and the private firms with 
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politically connected managers had higher performance than those without such managers 
in terms of enjoying tax benefits from the government (Wu et al. 2012). Wang (2015) 
argues that without state ownership, listed privately controlled firms have to cope with an 
unfavorable economic environment. Wang’s study gives empirical evidence that the 
performance effect and incentives of appointing politically connected independent 
directors are shaped by a firm’s ownership structure. To be more specific, Chinese listed 
privately controlled companies which are dominated by a large percentage of politically 
connected independent directors have more value than their non-connected counterparts, 
due to the ease of access to external debt financing and receiving the subsidies received 
from the government. 
Haveman et al. (2017) explain that in the process of Chinese economic development, the 
privately-owned sector of the economy developed and replaced the state-owned sector; 
market transitions displaced state redistribution; new types of organisations were 
developed to replace state-run production facilities and ministries; new types of goods and 
services were devised to replace state-issued standard ones; and economic growth goals 
were mainly allocated to state bureaucrats, whose careers increasingly relied upon meeting 
targets. These changes opened up many opportunities for businesses, but also greatly 
enhanced the uncertainty confronting them, increasing the probability of making costly 
mistakes. The changes were gradually implemented at different times in different regions, 
with such persistent and uneven change enhancing the uncertainty. The Communist Party 
maintained control over the state bureaucracy and the rule of law remained weak, so the 
state retained the control of key business resources, and electoral processes were not 
available for disciplining bureaucrats. Therefore, stagnation in political institutions 
resulted in uncertainty and diminished trust in state authorities. Connections to state 
bureaucrats were necessary to reduce this uncertainty and strengthen trust in state 
authorities, and this need developed as market development proceeded and uncertainty 
increased. This theoretical view is strongly supported by the empirical findings of 
Haveman et al. (2017), who showed that a firm’s ties to state bureaucrats was essential in 
75 
 
boosting its performance and operational efficiency during the economic development in 
China.  
Shin et al. (2017) explain the role of politically connected outside directors in the activities 
of Korean business groups. These groups (chaebol) provide an ideal setting to study the 
effects of such directors on firm performance. While the importance of maintaining close 
relationships with government cannot be overemphasised in virtually all firms, Korea is 
unique in the sense that chaebol leaders have worked closely with government at every 
stage of Korea’s economic growth since the Korean War. Therefore, Korea provides a very 
powerful setting to test the role of ‘politically connected’ boards in helping firms create 
links with the government. Shin et al. (2017)’s findings provide evidence that the presence 
of politically connected outside directors will provide many benefits to firm operation and 
market performance, and also lower any risks faced.   
Wu et al. (2018) examined the effect of CEOs’ political connections on firm performance 
and CEO pay using a sample of private Chinese companies. Their study enriches the 
understanding of the effects of political connections, a crucial but under-examined 
construct, based on the viewpoint of resource dependency theory. Integrating the agency 
theory with resource dependence theory in the context of China’s sociopolitical 
environment to analyse CEO pay, Wu et al. (2018) empirically demonstrate that political 
connectedness improves firm performance due to its role in guaranteeing political 
legitimacy and securing access to government-controlled resources. Hence, political 
connectedness is a crucial determinant of executive pay in private Chinese firms. These 
findings are in line with the logic of agency theory because CEOs’ political connections 
improve firm performance and are an important determinant of determining CEO pay. 
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3.5.2. NEGATIVE FACETS OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS:  
3.5.2.1. POLITICAL GOALS:  
Politically connected managers often pursue the political goals that are not consistent with 
the maximisation of the value of firm. Wu et al. (2012) empirically showed that local state-
owned enterprises with politically connected managers often have a lower performance 
than those without such managers. They also identified the channels through which 
politically connected managers impair firm performance, which is a greater policy burden 
in the form of surplus labour. Similarly, using a sample of Russian banks, Okhmatovskiy 
(2010) discovered the different effects of various types of political connections on bank 
performance. These findings show that the firms with direct ties to the government will 
experience significant costs linked to government officials’ involvement in the corporate 
governance process. In contrast, firms with ties to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
indirectly connected to the government, experience performance improvements through 
their direct access to government resources. Okhmatovskiy (2010) explain that firms with 
direct ties to the government are often subject to government intervention in their decision-
making processes. Such intervention is often linked to political goals rather than 
maximisation of firm value. In the study of Wang (2015), the appointment of politically 
connected independent directors in listed state-owned enterprises may exacerbate the 
conflict of interest between the government as the controlling shareholder and other small 
stock market investors. Indeed, besides economic goals, the government, as the controlling 
shareholder, may pursue its political and social objectives, which does not need to be 
consistent with the interest of other minority investors. Politically affiliated independent 
directors may not be independent from the government as the controlling shareholder, thus 
distorting their role in protecting all shareholders’ interests.  
3.5.2.2. INDIVIDUAL RENT-SEEKING GOALS:   
In addition to political goals, many studies also acknowledge the rent-seeking individual 
behaviours of politically connected directors in the form of corruption, facilitating the 
extraction of major resources from the firm. Domadenik et al. (2015) developed and tested 
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a theory of how political corruption (linked to political connectedness) influences the 
corporate governance and performance of partially or fully state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Their game-theoretic model discusses the notion that if underdeveloped democratic 
institutions do not punish political corruption, this will result in the political connectedness 
of firms, which in turn has a negative influence on performance. Using firm-level panel 
data on virtually all medium-sized and large industrial firms in Slovenia, Domadenik et al. 
(2015) assess a firm’s political connectedness by the percentage of politically connected 
individuals on its supervisory board. Their empirical findings show that a higher percentage 
of such supervisory board members results in lower total factor firm productivity. Malesky 
& Taussig (2009) empirically found that although companies with the presence of 
politically connected managers enjoyed easier access to bank loans from state-owned 
commercial banks, they also had lower performance than those without politically 
connected managers. They conclude that politically connected managers had ineffectively 
used government resources such as bank loans, indirectly negatively affecting firm 
performance.  
The findings of Fan et al. (2007) are consistent with the “grabbing-hand” government 
argument. They posit that firms with politically connected CEOs are reluctant to improve 
board professionalism and appear to have board structures with a greater number of current 
or former government bureaucrats. These firms with politically affiliated CEOs also show 
poorer accounting and stock return performance relative to politically unconnected firms. 
The resulting negative effects are evident in IPO pricing and in stock returns shortly after 
the initial trading day. Chen et al. (2017) investigated the role of underwriters’ political 
connections in the Chinese IPO market. Also consistent with the “grabbing hand” 
government argument, although the political capital of underwriters helps firms to 
significantly increase the likelihood of obtaining IPO approval from the CSRC, the 
underwriters and their clients can exploit the benefits of political capital at the cost of the 
minority shareholders interests. Therefore, the post-IPO performance of firms underwritten 
by PC-firms is worse than those of firms underwritten by non-PC firms in terms of stock 
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return and earnings growth. Similarly, Boubakri et al. (2008) employed a sample of 245 
privatised firms headquartered in 27 developing and 14 developed countries over the period 
1980 to 2002 in order to discover the extent of political connections in newly privatised 
companies. They found that continuing government control of privatised firms created 
rent-seeking behaviours and made the privatisation effect slower, indicating that the 
performance of politically connected privatised firms was inferior to that of their non-
connected counterparts. Xu et al. (2016) studied the connections between cash holdings 
and political uncertainty of firms in China. Under the grabbing hand assumption of 
politicians, when the political uncertainty exists and newly appointed officials display 
grabbing-hand behaviour, firm tend to hide their cash holdings as a strategic response. 
Furthermore, the market value of cash holdings is significantly negative during periods of 
political uncertainty as a result of the loss of cash caused by political extraction. 
Liu et al. (2015) and Hu et al. (2016) refer to the downside of political connection in 
facilitating the tunneling activities of controlling shareholders. Liu et al. (2015) argue that 
family founders’ political connectedness exacerbates Chinese family firms’ incentives to 
hold more cash for tunneling, but that such cash holdings are value-damaging. Hu et al. 
(2016) developed a combined theoretical framework of both agency theory and resource 
dependence theory to explain the rent appropriation of blockholders. Their results reveal 
that politically connected directors invited onto the board are primarily aim to create rents 
for focal firms. However, the unexpected consequence of this combination is the formation 
of a shield for blockholders against disciplinary forces in legal/regulatory and market-based 
mechanisms. This shield helps blockholders to appropriate wealth from firms at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Unlike previous studies, that of Hu and Hillman (2016) 
was the first to explain the negative implications of combining resource dependence theory 
and agency theory. They answered the question of political board capital providing 
“resource provision for whom?” based on the viewpoint of agency theory. In the study of 
Hung et al. (2012), politically connected directors on the board were found to be rent-
seekers when their political interests impaired firm performance. They employed the 
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overseas listing of their firm in the Hong Kong market as a mechanism to generate rents. 
The results obtained by Hung et al. (2012) show that among politically connected firms, 
managers of overseas listed ones probably enjoy more recognition in the political media or 
are promoted to a senior government positions more than those of domestically listed firms, 
and that the post-overseas listing performance of connected firms is worse than that of non-
connected firms.  
Unlike the study of Wang (2015), which found a positive relationship between politically 
connected independent directors and firm performance, Shi et al. (2018) found a negative 
effect of politically connected independent directors on firm performance in a sample of 
the Chinese A-share market . Using (risk-adjusted) market reactions around the event data 
as their key measure to quantify the value of politically connected independent directors, 
they found strong and consistent evidence that such directors, especially those associated 
with a central-level position, with a relatively high political ranks and serving in the 
government, the Party, the National People’s Congress (NPC) or the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), impaired rather than improved the value of 
the firms that they served, in comparison to their non-politically connected counterparts. 
More surprisingly, Shi et al. (2018) explain the reasons why politically connected 
independent directors are less valuable than non-politically connected ones. First, the 
former are less effective in monitoring managers than the latter when a principal-agency 
conflict exists. Secondly, politically connected independent directors are not different from 
non-politically connected ones in mitigating a principal – principal conflict, and extract the 
political resources from the firms they serve.  
Jackowicz et al. (2014) examined the effect of politically connected directors on the 
performance of listed non-financial firms. Using a dataset covering the 2001-2011 period, 
they obtained the new empirical evidence from the Polish context by discovering that 
political connections reduce firm profitability, as measured by the ratio of income to sales 
in the sample. The negative impact is strongest when a firm possesses multiple connections, 
has politically connected members on its supervisory board, or uses ex-politicians with 
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central government experience. Therefore, their findings do not support claims based on 
resource dependence theory. The Polish market’s specificity is most likely associated with 
the instability of the political scene.    
3.5.3. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON CONTINGENT VALUE OF POLITICAL 
CONNECTIONS:  
Previous empirical studies have applied the contingency framework to analyse the role of 
political connections in the dynamic institutional environment. From the contingency 
perspective, the effect of political connection is likely to be moderated by institutional 
development (Zhao et al., 2016). For instance, according to Zhou (2014), whereas previous 
studies have stressed on the importance of political connections in the success of Chinese 
entrepreneurial companies in the period of early reform (1978 – 1999), regional 
institutional developments have significantly contributed to the growth of entrepreneurial 
activities, and hence played a crucial role in boosting entrepreneurial performance during 
that period. Zhou's (2014) study empirically shows that not only legal protection of 
property rights but also the development of the market system facilitates entrepreneurial 
performance. Moreover, Zhou (2014) demonstrate that the role of political connections 
becomes less important during regional institutional development. Hence, the effect of 
political connections is contingent upon the institutional environment during the period of 
economic reform in China.  
In a similar vein, Brockman et al. (2013) analyse the impact of political connections on 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities. In particular, they examine whether the post-
merger stock and operating performance of politically connected acquirers is different from 
those of unconnected acquirers. Using a sample of M&A deals made by politically 
connected companies and their unconnected counterparts, their study reveals that 
politically connected acquirers have lower performance relative to that of their 
unconnected counterparts after M&A deals. However, this effect varies depending upon 
the institutional context in which the politically connected acquirer is located. With the 
interaction between political connection and institutional context, politically connected 
acquirers often under-perform after M&A deals in the countries with strong institutions 
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(low legal weakness or low corruption). In contrast, politically connected acquirers 
outperform after M&A deals in countries with weak institutions (high legal weakness or 
high corruption). 
Table 3-3 summarises the empirical outcomes of studies on the relationship between 
political connections and financial performance relevant to this study. The table is divided 
into six (6) columns, with the details of the authors’ names and year of publication, the 
country of research, the sample size utilised in the study, the methodologies employed, the 
definitions of political connections used for the research and the key findings.  
TABLE 3- 3: EMPIRICAL OUTCOMES OF STUDIES ON THE BENEFITS AND 
DRAWBACKS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION: 
Author(s) 
Year 
Country Aim and Main Method Observati
ons 
The Definitions 
of Political 
Connections 
Main findings: 
negative(-); 
positive(+); or 
ambiguous 
Faccio et al. 
(2006) 
Cross-
country 
- The paper 
undertakes a systematic 
examination of the link 
between political 
connections and 
corporate bailouts 
- Logit regressions 
- Multivariate 
Analysis 
900 A company is 
politically 
connected if one 
of its large 
shareholders or 
top officers is or 
was: (a) a 
member of 
parliament, (b) a 
minister or the 
head of state, or 
(c) closely 
Negative 
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related to a top 
official 
Joseph P.H. 
Fan, T.J. 
Wong, Tianyu 
Zhang (2007) 
China - The paper 
examines the role of 
government intervention 
in China's newly 
partially-privatised firms 
- OLS regression 
780 The paper traces 
the CEO's 
(director's) 
political 
connections by 
examining 
whether he or 
she is currently 
or was formerly 
an officer of 
either the central 
government, a 
local 
government, or 
the military 
        Negative 
Hongbin Li, 
Lingsheng 
Meng, Qian 
Wang, Li-An 
Zhou (2008) 
China - The paper 
examines the value of 
political connections for 
private entrepreneurs in 
China 
- OLS regressions 
2324 - A former 
public manager 
- A former 
cadre 
- A current 
member of the 
People's 
Congress 
- A current 
member of the 
Chinese People's 
Positive 
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Political 
Consultative 
Conference 
- Party 
membership 
Narjess 
Boubakri, 
Jean-Claude 
Cosset, Walid 
Saffar (2008) 
Cross-
countries 
- The paper 
investigates the extent of 
political connections in 
newly privatised firms 
around the world 
- OLS regression 
- IV regression 
245 A company is 
politically 
connected if at 
least one 
member of its 
board of 
directors (BOD), 
or its 
supervisory 
board or largest 
shareholders is 
or was a 
politician; that 
is, a member of 
parliament, a 
minister or any 
other top 
appointed-
bureaucrat 
Negative 
Wu et al. 
(2012) 
China - The study 
investigates the impact of 
political ties conditional 
on ownership for a 
9629 The study 
defines a CEO as 
politically 
connected if he 
Positive in non-
SOEs and negative 
in SOEs 
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sample of Chinese firms 
over the period 1999-
2006 
- Ordinary Least 
Squares Regression  
or she is 
currently serving 
or formerly 
served in the 
government or 
military.  
Jackowicz et 
al. (2014) 
Poland - The paper 
analyses the impact of 
political connections on 
the operational 
performance of non-
financial companies in 
Poland. 
- GLS estimation 
- GMM estimation 
2428  The study 
defines a 
company as 
politically 
connected if one 
of board of 
directors or 
supervisory 
board members 
is an official of 
central and local 
governments, 
national 
parliament 
Negative 
Kostovetsky 
(2015) 
United 
States 
- The paper 
examines how political 
connections affect the 
risk exposure of financial 
institutions. 
- OLS regressions 
864 Politically 
connected 
directors include 
former members 
of the Senate and 
House of 
Representatives, 
former White 
Positive 
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House officials 
and aides, 
former heads of 
federal 
executive 
departments and 
cabinet-level 
agencies, former 
state governors, 
and former US 
ambassadors to 
other nations 
Wang (2015) China - The paper 
empirically investigates 
politically connected 
independent directors in 
Chinese listed firms using 
7487 firm-year 
observations from the 
Shanghai stock exchange 
during the period of 
2003-2012 
- OLS regressions 
7487  A politically 
connected 
independent 
director is 
defined as: 
- A former 
government 
official 
- A current 
or former 
member of the 
People's 
Congress (CPC) 
- A current 
or former 
member of the 
Positive in non-
SOEs and 
ambiguous in SOEs 
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People's 
Political 
Consultative 
Conference 
Domadenik et 
al. (2015) 
Slovenia - The paper presents 
and tests a theory of how 
political connectedness 
(often linked to political 
corruption) affects the 
corporate governance and 
productive efficiency of 
firms 
- GMM panel data 
method 
- OLS regression 
2712 Politically 
connected 
supervisory 
board members: 
Former 
government 
officials 
Negative 
Shin et al. 
(2017) 
South 
Korea  
- The study 
examines the 
performance impact of 
appointing politically 
connected outside 
directors (PCODs) in 
Korean chaebol firms 
- OLS regressions 
1480 
 
- Regulator
s or Former 
government 
officials 
- Legal  
former judges or 
prosecutors 
- Politician 
or former 
politicians 
- Current 
or former 
Positive 
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journalists or 
social activists 
- Member 
of congress 
Haveman et 
al. (2017) 
China - The paper studies 
business - state ties in 
China, which have 
experienced great 
economic change, 
coupled with political 
stability 
- Fixed-effect 
regression 
11145 The study 
defines directors 
as politically 
connected if they 
are or were 
governmental 
officials   
Positive 
Zhou (2014) China - The paper studies 
the role of political 
connections during 
regional institutional 
development  
- Hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) 
1541 The study 
defines 
entrepreneurs as 
politically 
connected if they 
were  
government 
officials in any 
period before the 
foundation of the 
firm, or if a close 
personal 
connection – the 
entrepreneur’s 
father, spouse, or 
This study shows 
that political 
connections played 
a diminishing role in 
entrepreneurship 
during China’s 
formal institutional 
development.  
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adult children – 
is currently a 
government 
official or was 
before 
retirement.   
Brockman et 
al. (2013) 
Cross-
country 
- The paper studies 
the performance of 
politically connected 
acquirers after M&A 
deals in the different 
national institutional 
environments  
- OLS regressions 
1018 The study 
defines a 
company as 
politically 
connected under 
three 
circumstances:  
- At least 
one of its top 
officers or large 
shareholders is a 
member of 
parliament  
- At least 
one of its top 
officers, large 
shareholders, or 
their relatives is 
a minister or the 
head of state. 
- The 
company is 
In countries with 
strong legal systems 
or low levels of 
corruption, 
politically 
connected acquirers 
underperform their 
counterparts and 
vice versus.  
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closely related to 
a top politician 
or party.  
 
3.6. A SUMMARY AND LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON THE 
POLITICAL CONNECTION LITERATURE: 
Despite the number studies on the relationship between political connection and firm 
performance, there remains several limitations which call for further investigation and 
research. First, one of the major limitations of the existing research in terms of the above 
relationships are the conflicting results obtained, which warrants the need for further 
research (Wu et al., 2012; Li et al., 2017; Fan et al., 2007). The literature has focused on 
answering the question “Do political connections destroy or create firm performance?” but 
has yielded contradictory results with some of the reasons for this being difference in 
geographical locations, methodology, sample size, control variables, and time variables 
(Wang, 2015). Some researchers have found a positive relationship (Haveman et al., 2017; 
Hongbin Li et al., 2008; Shin et al., 2017), while others have found a negative one 
(Domadenik et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2007; Jackowicz et al., 2014). On the other hand, some 
studies have found an inconclusive or ambiguous relationship (Fisman 2001; Chen et al. 
2017). The mixed findings on political connection make the need for further research 
essential; including testing of the performance effect of political connection in new 
contexts, and use of different control variables, sample sizes and time spans. Many of the 
studies in the field of political connections were conducted in China or the USA; with the 
limited number in emerging countries as Vietnam. This study aims to contribute to the 
ongoing debate on the relationship between political connections and firm performance in 
emerging countries by analysing a sample of manufacturing listed firms in Vietnam over 
the nine year period from 2007 to 2016. Through the study, the Vietnamese results should 
provide additional information for governmental agencies to make interventions and policy 
adjustments and firm-specific solutions.   
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Second, recent scholars have reformulated the research question into “What factors affect 
or drive the political connection-firm performance relationship?”. One of the factors is 
ownership structure. This study aims to resolve the conflicting findings on whether 
ownership structure influences this link (Wu et al. 2012). For instance, some previous 
studies have shown that political connection may be harmful to the value of state-owned 
enterprises (Wu et al. 2012), whereas other studies have revealed an inconclusive effect of 
political connections on the value of state-owned enterprises (Wang et al. 2017). These 
ambiguous findings may a provoke major debate on how ownership structure, such as state-
owned or non-state-owned enterprises, shapes a firm’s incentives to develop political 
connections, and the appointment of politically connected directors may have the different 
value effects on the value of firms controlled by the different types of owner. This study 
aims to explore and compare the effects of the appointment of politically connected 
directors on firm value in the non-state-owned and state-owned enterprises. Vietnam was 
chosen because the country is experiencing a slow privatisation process, with government 
ownership remaining in many firms. Moreover, partially or fully government-owned 
enterprises may still pursue political agendas, which is not in line with their value 
maximisation goals of the firm (Kim et al. 2010; OECD 2013). To help the government 
achieve its goals, it often assigns the politically connected directors to boards. Therefore, 
the presence of such directors in the state-owned enterprises is widespread in Vietnam. For 
non-state-owned enterprises, politically connected directors may be still needed because 
they can help their firms to gain legitimacy in the business environment and to gain 
competitive advantages over competitors (Le Ngoc & Nguyen, 2009).  
One of the other major limitations of the existing research is that some studies (Fan et al., 
2007; Ferris et al., 2016; C. D. Hung et al., 2017; Hongbin Li et al., 2008; Saeed, 2013) 
have made a number of both theoretical and empirical contributions to the relationship 
between political connection and firm performance without considering its dynamic effects 
during institutional development. This also raises the following question: “What is the 
role played by political connection in different institutional settings?” This question 
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remains empirically unexplored and has contributed to the ambiguity in the findings (Zhou, 
2014).  
3.7. CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER:  
This chapter has provided a review of the empirical literature on political connection. It 
has analysed the interrelationship between political connections and firm performance, 
starting with the discussion of the definitions, measurements and types of political 
connection. Subsequently, a small section focused on the antecedents of building political 
connections and reviews of the conceptual framework. The empirical literature on the 
consequences of forging the political connections was then discussed. The final section 
shows the lack of consistency in the current empirical evidence on the impact of political 
connections on firm performance, and together with the calls for further research in the 
field.   
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION: 
According to the research aims and questions, this chapter critically discusses the available 
methodological options and provides justification for the methodological approaches 
undertaken. Methodological guides depict a wide variety of research methodologies from 
which researchers can choose the most appropriate. Moreover, a major decision on research 
paradigms has to be made when a researcher selects a methodological approach because 
such a selection clearly demonstrates not only on the nature and requirements of the work, 
but also on the researcher’s view of it. In order to make an appropriate choice, the 
researcher needs to have a broad understanding of the different paradigms and their 
application to research. Given that such understanding is prerequisite to undertaking 
research, this chapter will begin with a discussion of the research paradigms and provide 
justification for the choice made for this research. It will then discuss why the quantitative 
approach was selected. The following section will provide specific discussion of the data 
collection instrument, sampling technique and process, and the different techniques used 
in the analyses made in the empirical chapters.  
4.2. RESEARCH PARADIGMS:  
An understanding of research philosophy leads to awareness of the available philosophical 
alternatives that assist researchers in selecting a philosophical view that influences, 
determines and even informs their decisions on research strategy and methods. Guba & 
Lincoln (1994) describe a paradigm as “…a set of beliefs (or metaphysics) which deals 
with ultimate principles. It shows a worldwide viewpoint that defines the nature of the 
‘world’, the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world 
and its parts” (p.200). It can also be defined as a general world direction and the essence 
of the research in which the researcher believes (Creswell 2009). Sarantakos (2005) defines 
research paradigms as ontological, epistemological or methodological prescriptions that 
instruct the research mechanisms. Based on Guba & Lincoln (1994), paradigms answer 
three basic questions:  
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• The ontological question: that is, what is the essence of ‘reality’? Is there a real 
world that is independent from our knowledge, upon which foundations can be 
made? (objective)?. Or is the world socially formulated; and hence depends upon a 
particular time or culture (socially constructed)?  
• The epistemological question: the essence of the relationship between researchers 
and what they aim to grasp. It answers the question of how we know what we aim 
to know.  
• The methodological question: How do we obtain knowledge in the world? That is, 
how does the researcher go about finding knowledge? The methodological question 
answers questions about the choice of research approaches and the data collection 
instruments used.  
 
Esterby-Smith et al. (2012) discuss three reasons why it is important to understand the 
paradigms associated with research methodology. First, they help the researcher to specify 
and refine the research methods employed in the study. Second, they enable the researcher 
to gauge different methodologies and methods and hence avoid their inappropriate use and 
unnecessary work by clarifying the limitations of particular approaches at an early stage. 
Third, they allow the researchers to be creative and innovative when adopting methods that 
are outside their expertise. Saunders et al. (2012) show that when undertaking research, 
each researcher adopts important viewpoints on how they view or perceive the world, and 
these views and assumptions will influence the research strategy and methodology chosen. 
These world views are shaped by the researchers’ past experiences and discipline area and 
will result in their choice of methods and approaches. Two main paradigms dominate social 
research – positivism and interpretivism. Many scholars have clarified a number of related 
paradigms that mainly depend upon these two. With regard to the choice of research 
paradigm, a brief discussion of the most important paradigms in management research is 
made and justification for the adoption of a particular paradigm is identified.   
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Positivism allows for the application of the natural science methods to the study of social 
reality. Developed from the empiricist view of natural science, it proposes the objective 
view that the researcher should be independent from the research objects and that the 
research should be conducted in a value freeway (Remenyi et al. 1998). It uses theory to 
produce hypotheses which can be tested, with the purpose of seeking general laws and 
causal statements on a social phenomenon (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Methodologically, 
positivists utilise quantitative methods as their research techniques and their results can be 
replicable and generalisable. Their purpose is to seek explanations in behaviour rather than 
in-depth meaning. This approach focuses on an empirical data collection process; it is cause 
and effect-oriented and usually based on previous theories (Creswell 2009). Its strengths 
are that the research findings can be generalised and replicated on many different samples 
and future predictions can be made (Johnson et al., 2007). However, the debate on the 
appropriateness of applying natural science models for the study of society has been a long- 
stance, because researching social issues is more complicated than researching physical 
objects (Bryman et al. 2015). Moreover, positivism has major shortcomings as it needs to 
control both researchers’ bias and nature’s tendency to confound (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
 
Post-positivism was suggested as an attempt to resolve the criticisms of positivism 
discussed above. In such an approach, the purpose of research is to reach agreement 
between the researcher and the nature of reality (Creswell 2009). The main difference 
between positivism and post-positivism is that the positivist observes reality without 
interference from the researcher, which can be understood by his/her observations and by 
following general laws, while in the post-positivist viewpoint, our understanding of reality 
is constrained by its complexity, the researcher’s limitations and other external limitations 
(Schutt, 2006).  
 
However, post-positivism also has its weaknesses. Some scholars argue that social 
phenomena are too complicated to be understood by quantitative paradigms and requires 
in-depth qualitative analysis, while the objectivity suggested by positivist paradigms is 
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insufficient (Johnson & Duberley, 2000). In the methodological view, post-positivism 
suggests empirical observation and measurement but also acknowledges that research bias 
remains (Saunders et al., 2012). For instance, one aspect of such bias is the researcher’s 
own beliefs and values, which are likely to be embedded in the logic through which the 
researcher selected the research topic and how he or she dealt with the research process 
(Saunders et al., 2012). The knowledge developed through a post-positivist lens is based 
on observation and measurement of the objective reality, and hence the accepted approach 
to research by post-positivists is that the researcher starts with a theory and then collects 
data that either supports or refutes it (Creswell 2009).   
 
On the other hand, interpretivists believe that it is impossible to make objective statements 
about the real world because there is in fact no such thing. In their view, the world is 
socially constructed, so social phenomena cannot be explained and examined by objective 
natural science methods (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Interpretivists make assumptions that 
individuals seek the understanding of the world in which they work and live, and improve 
subjective meanings of their experiences (Creswell, 2009). Because of their belief in non-
objectivity, methodologically, interpretivists aim to use qualitative research methods and 
seek to comprehend social behaviour in more depth, rather than concentrating on 
explaining it. They believe that the construction of reality can be formed by the interplay 
between the researcher and the respondent, and interpreted by qualitative techniques. The 
purpose of the research under the interpretivist lens is to depend upon as much as possible 
on the participants’ viewpoint of the phenomenon being studied. Researchers’ own 
backgrounds exhibit their interpretation and they position themselves to acknowledge how 
this interpretation is affected by their personal, cultural and historical experiences 
(Creswell, 2009). This research does not aim to understand the meaning of political 
connections. It accepts the existing definitions and meaning of the construct in order to 
understand its antecedents and outcomes. For this reason, interpretivism was not 
appropriate for the study.  
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Guba & Lincoln (1998) regard critical realism as a paradigm that over time has been 
constructed by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic and gender factors, and then 
crystallised into a series of structures that are now taken as ‘real’. Critical realism refuses 
the main principles of both positivism and post-positivism and suggests that the 
researcher’s values not only influence the subject of inquiry, but that the two are 
interactively associated, leading to value-mediated findings (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). 
Methodologically, critical realism aims to identify how the factors and structures creating 
it may determine human actions by the use of either qualitative or quantitative research 
methods.  
 
Pragmatism proposes that instead of considering methods, the researcher must concentrate 
on the research problem and utilise all the available approaches to comprehend it (Creswell 
2009). Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998) show that it is essential to focus on the research 
problem and then use pluralistic approaches to understand it. Based on Creswell (2009), 
pragmatism gives researchers more freedom of choice over the methods and techniques 
that best meet their needs and goals.  
4.3. THE CHOICE OF A PARADIGM: 
With reference to the discussion of the different paradigms above, which is most suitable 
for this study? The answer to this question is relevant to the three basic questions, 
(ontological, epistemological and methodological) suggested by the research paradigms. 
In addition, the researchers’ own sets of beliefs developed overtime will influence their 
choice of research paradigm. The choice of a particular paradigm will further affect the 
choice of a research method, design and instrument. Creswell (2009) proposes that the 
researcher’s world view is influenced by a number of things: (a) the discipline area; (b) the 
beliefs of the supervisors and other faculty members; and (c) the researcher’s past 
experiences. According to these points and the paradigms discussions above, a positivist 
perspective of the philosophical debate was selected.  
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Based on the line of reasoning of Johnson & Clark (2006), the most important issue is not 
whether the research is philosophically informed, but how well the researcher is able to 
explain the philosophical adoption and the reasons why it is appropriate compared to 
alternatives. In the explanation of  Saunders et al. (2012), no research philosophy is better 
than another. They are all ‘better’ at doing different things, and which is ‘better’ is 
dependent upon the research questions the researcher is seeking to answer. The study’s 
aims and objectives stated above will be better addressed from a positivist approach to the 
philosophical debates. Although the researcher chose the positivist paradigm, it is also 
acknowledged that the principles of positivism are extremely difficult to follow in any 
social research context. In order to resolve the limitations of this study, the post-positivist 
approach is considered to be the most appropriate. This is because such an approach 
acknowledges that our understanding of an empirical reality is constrained by its 
complexity and the researcher’s bias, together with other limitations (Schutt, 2006). 
4.4. THE CHOICE OF QUANTITATIVE APPROACH:  
As suggested in the previous section, the selection of research approach greatly depends 
on the philosophical position. On the other hand, it is also influenced by the research aims, 
objectives and questions (Creswell, 2009). In particular, this study does not aim to produce 
a new theory from the data but to test and develop an existing one. For this reason, it does 
not take an inductive approach, which requires the use of a qualitative research method. In 
this study, the research problem focuses on understanding the effect of political connection 
on the market-based performance of the company, and how this effect is moderated by 
ownership structure and regional institutional development. Therefore, it adopts a 
deductive research approach. In addition, the objective of the study is to empirically test 
the established theoretical relationships between the variables. Therefore, the quantitative 
method is the most appropriate for this study.  
4.6. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATASET:  
In order to answer the research questions, the study population was obtained from the listed 
manufacturing companies on the two main markets of Vietnam, namely the Ho Chi Minh 
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stock exchange (Hose) and Hanoi stock exchange (HNX), covering the period of 2007 – 
2016. The choice of the period was influenced by the boom in the Vietnamese stock 
exchanges, from 2007, the number of listed firms began to surge due to the increasing 
inflow of investment10. Therefore, many firms aimed to utilise this chance to be listed on 
the stock exchange, and full availability of corporate governance and financial data became 
available in 2007.  
To arrive at the sample, the study only consists of Vietnamese manufacturing firms because 
they have their long history in the business environment of Vietnam. The primary type of 
enterprises in Vietnam was mainly small manufacturing household or state-owned 
enterprises (OECD, 2013). In the past, since the initiation of economic reform in 1990 and 
with the policy of opening up the economy, many governmental officials have left their 
jobs in governmental agencies, and started their own businesses in the small manufacturing 
sectors (Rand, 2017; Malesky & Taussig, 2009). Until now, their businesses have grown 
and some manufacturing companies have been listed on the stock exchanges (Vu et al., 
2015). Therefore, compared to other industries, many owners in the large or small-medium-
sized manufacturing companies had been government officials in the past or had the 
relatives working in governmental agencies at the national or provincial level (Markussen 
& Tarp, 2014; OECD, 2013). Furthermore, the manufacturing sector was the one most 
influenced by the business environment in Vietnam (Vu et al., 2015). Specifically, the 
majority of domestic manufacturing companies were the main target of regulatory 
inspections from government officials, enjoyed less favouritism from the government, and 
almost confronting variations in governmental regulations (USAID et al., 2016). On the 
other hand, in recent years the government has tended to attract and to prioritise the foreign-
invested companies in the manufacturing sector, for example SAMSUNG and LG, in order 
to boost economic development and to increase foreign investment inflow (Perkins & Anh, 
2009). Compared to the manufacturing FIEs and other sectors, although domestic 
manufacturing companies contribute a significant proportion of GDP growth in Vietnam, 
 
10 2007 was when Vietnam joined the World Trade Union and started to attract an inflow of foreign investment.   
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they still face disadvantages in the business environment, and enjoy less patronages, and 
developmental policies from the government (Vu et al., 2015). Furthermore, with 96% of 
manufacturing companies being small-medium-sized enterprises, this creates a bigger 
hurdle for domestic manufacturing companies due to the fact that their developmental 
resources are limited (Pham et al. 2010). Many previous studies in Vietnam have shown 
that domestic manufacturing companies have utilised political connections with 
governmental agencies or politicians with higher political status to obtain support and 
patronage from the government in terms of developmental policies and resources (Rand, 
2017; Malesky & Taussig, 2009; Nguyen et al., 2009). Therefore, the focus of this study is 
on the manufacturing sector, broadening the scope of previous studies in Vietnam, and 
evaluating the performance effect of political connection on listed manufacturing 
companies in the country.  
In order to be included in the final sample, companies needed to have a financial statement 
for the period from 31 December 2007 to 31 December 2016. However, not many firms 
were listed from the year 2007, but only in subsequent years. Therefore, the overall sample 
comprises unbalanced panel data including listed firms in the manufacturing sector. 
Moreover, the sampling period starts in 2007 because the State Securities Commission of 
Vietnam has required listed firms to report relevant information in annual reports and 
prospectuses since 2007. The information on politically connected directors is mainly 
hand-collected from their biographies in annual reports and the prospectuses of listed 
manufacturing companies. The requirement for disclosure rules of the State Securities 
Commission of Vietnam is that annual reports and prospectuses should provide 
information on the personal background of each director. However, the annual reports do 
not contain all such information. Therefore, the study aimed to collect additional 
information on the biographical data of directors from other central and provincial 
government agencies and from other internet sources11 in Vietnam. Firm-level accounting 
and financial data were collected from the Vietstock’s database (finance.vietstock.vn). In 
 
11 Another source of information was Vietnamese versions of the online newspapers.  
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particular, the database gathers financial and accounting data on an annual, quarterly and 
monthly basis from income statements, balance sheets, explanations for the financial 
statements, and annual reports of all the listed companies on two stock exchanges, namely 
HOSE and HNX. In addition, corporate governance data, such as ownership concentration, 
CEO duality and board size, are not available on the Vietstock’s database, so were mainly 
individually hand-collected from the annual reports and prospectuses of the listed 
companies. Manufacturing firms that had missing values in years subsequent to 2015 were 
excluded. As a result, the number of excluded firms in the final sample of unbalanced panel 
data was 172 Vietnamese manufacturing listed firms and 1296 firm-year observations 
during the 9-year period from 2007 to 2016. Details of the procedure for choosing the study 
sample are shown in Table 4-1.  
The following section gives a more detailed description of the sample, including the 
sectoral breakdown, the number of politically connected firms compared to unconnected 
ones, and the number and revenue level of firms in each sector compared to the industry 
overall.  Following the sectoral breakdown of Vietstock, the research sample is divided 
into six sectoral codes, namely Chemicals, Energy, Equipment, Fisheries, Food, and 
Material. For the assessment of the sample representativeness, it was split into the six 
sectors, and compared with all manufacturing firms. At the same time, a comparison in 
percentage terms between the revenue of the study sample and of the overall manufacturing 
industry was conducted to improve the evaluation of the sample.  
From Table 4-2, it can be seen that the number of politically connected firms is larger than 
that of their unconnected counterparts, while Table 4-3 shows that the study sample in all 
the sectors is broadly representative of all the manufacturing firms on the stock exchanges. 
Of these, the Chemical sector has the highest percentage of representativeness (87.8%), 
whilst the Energy sector has the lowest (55.56%). Table 4-4 shows the relative percentage 
comparison in revenue between the sample and all manufacturing firms on the stock 
exchanges, with the comparison ratio ranging from 88.4% to 63.87% over the period 2007 
to 2016, thereby indicating that the size of the sample constitutes a high proportion of the 
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overall manufacturing industry in terms of revenue. However, this ratio gradually declines 
during the 9 year research period because the number of listed companies in all sectors rose 
up to the end of 2016. There was a fall in the proportion of each sector compared to the 
industry as a whole, excluding Energy and Equipment, which experienced a big increase 
in their share. In brief, it is concluded that the study sample is sufficiently representative in 
relation to the number and revenue level.  
TABLE 4- 1: FINAL NUMBER OF COMPANIES: 
Original Sample – Number of Companies  235 
Less companies to be listed from 2015 20 
Less companies with missing financial 
and corporate governance data 
43 
Total number of companies excluded 63 
Final total number of companies 172 
 
TABLE 4- 2: NUMBER OF POLITICALLY CONNECTED COMPARED TO 
UNCONNECTED COMPANIES: 
Year The Number of 
Politically 
Connected 
Companies 
The Number of 
Unconnected 
Companies 
Total Number of 
Companies 
2007 30 12 42 
2008 43 17 60 
2009 62 24 86 
2010 96 36 132 
2011 106 42 146 
2012 114 43 157 
2013 113 51 164 
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2014 116 56 172 
2015 115 57 172 
2016 110 62 172 
 
TABLE 4- 3: DISTRIBUTION OF FIRM SAMPLE BY SECTOR 
Industry Code Size of Firm 
Sample 
Total Sample of 
Manufacturing 
Firms 
Percentage of 
Sample Size to 
Total Sample 
Chemical 36 41 87.8% 
Energy 5 9 55.56% 
Equipment 20 30 66.67% 
Fishery 13 18 72.22% 
Food 16 22 72.73% 
Material 82 115 71.30% 
Total 172 235 73.19% 
Source: Vietstock database; author’s calculations. 
TABLE 4- 4: PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF REVENUE BETWEEN THE 
FIRM SAMPLE AND OVERALL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY ON THE 
STOCK EXCHANGES 
Year Fishery Energy Chemical Equipment Food Material Total 
2007 25.83 0.0139 13.55 0.0005 19.73 29.28 88.40 
2008 20.81 0.0141 16.7 4.97 20.30 23.56 86.35 
2009 16.78 0.0119 15.55 18.73 16.48 19.05 86.60 
2010 14.75 4.089 14.04 16.77 14.59 16.79 81.029 
2011 12.87 11.52 12.23 14.60 12.85 14.62 78.69 
2012 12.11 10.80 11.49 13.71 12.92 13.73 74.76 
2013 11.88 10.57 11.25 13.42 12.83 13.44 73.39 
2014 12.21 10.82 11.53 13.93 13.36 13.77 75.62 
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2015 11.55 10.19 10.87 13.13 12.84 12.98 71.56 
2016 11.43 3.054 10.72 12.94 12.93 12.80 63.87 
Source: Author’s calculations; Vietstock database 
4.7. METHODOLOGY:  
The aim of this section is to briefly explain the various methods selected in order to analyse 
the data. Based on Saunders et al. (2003) and Zikmund (2012), the primary purpose of 
conducting any study is to provide information to facilitate the answering of the research 
questions. In order to obtain the relevant information, raw data are gathered, and then 
analysed with the assistance of analytical methods to aid the decision-making process 
(Davis, 1996). According to Zikmund (2012), there are three main determinants which 
guide the researcher in the choice of a particular type of statistical analysis to help come to 
concrete conclusions: (1) the type of question to be answered; (2) the number of variables; 
and (3) the scale of measurement.   
The purpose of this study is to enhance understanding of the relationship between political 
connection and companies’ market-based performance. The central questions are relevant 
to the main impact of political connection on the performance of listed companies in the 
manufacturing sector and are what drive this conjunction. This is associated with the 
diverse theoretical frameworks and other empirical research applied to the analysis of 
political connections and firms’ market-based performance. The three research goals are 
re-stated as follows:  
1. To determine whether there is a relationship between the existence of and the 
different types and strength of political connection and the market-based 
performance of Vietnamese companies.  
2. To determine whether the effect of political connections on firm performance can 
be shaped by ownership structure, namely state-owned enterprises versus non-state-
owned enterprises.  
3. To determine whether the effect of political connection on firm performance might 
be contingent on the development of different institutional indicators.    
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4.7.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 
Descriptive statistics are described as the starting point for any statistical analysis as they 
help to uncover any abnormalities in the data collected. Descriptive analysis is specifically 
useful because it is a holistic approach that indicates preliminary, but useful, features of 
the data. In the empirical chapters of this research, descriptive analysis consisting of 
calculation of the mean, standard deviation, and maximum and minimum values will be 
presented. 
4.7.2. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS: 
In order to test the association between the variables, bivariate analysis is employed 
(Zikmund, 2012). Based on Zikmund (2012), such analysis aims to test the hypothesis that 
the relationship between two or more variables differs. On the other hand, the measures of 
association refer to the values designed to represent co-variation between the variables. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was chosen to calculate this association between the 
individual variables, which considers the joint variation in two measures (Ghauri & 
Grønhaug, 2005). The test helps to determine the intensity of the relationship between two 
variables. The coefficient of correlation assumes a value ranging from -1 to +1. A variable 
with coefficients closer to either -1 to +1 shows a stronger association (negative or 
positive), whereas a correlation coefficient of zero indicates that the variables are not 
associated. In this study, a correlation matrix is used to test whether the inclusion of  various 
independent variables in the models will not result in any problems of multicollinearity 
among them. The results of the analysis are discussed in the empirical chapters of the study.    
4.7.3. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS:   
Panel data analysis is employed to answer the three main research questions. This 
technique arranges the repeated observations over time of a cross-section of firms, 
individuals, countries etc. The technique comprises two dimensions (time series and cross- 
section), which helps to provide sufficient information about the data. Panel data have a 
number of advantages over regular time-series or cross-section studies. Firstly, they control 
for individual heterogeneity. Unlike time-series and cross-section techniques, panel data 
105 
 
explain that individual firms are heterogeneous so do not entail the risk of acquiring biased 
findings (Baltagi, 2005). Secondly, panel data offer more informative data, adequate 
variability, less collinearity, more degrees of freedom and greater efficiency (Baltagi, 
2005).  
 
Thirdly, panel data can better detect and measure effects which cannot be simply observed 
in pure cross-sections (Hsiao, 2003). Panel data can discover the dynamics of adjustment 
over time in a given set of data. Finally, under certain assumptions, panel data can be used 
to obtain consistent estimators if certain variables are omitted (Wooldridge, 2002). These 
omitted or unobserved variables are usually presented to the error term in the use of cross-
section data. If there are correlations between these omitted or unobservable variables and 
the dependent variables, ordinary least squares (OLS) will produce the biased estimates. If 
panel data are available on individuals over time, this problem may be resolved.  
 
A classical panel data regression is shown as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable for the observation; subscript i denotes the cross-section 
dimension (e.g., industries, countries, regions, etc.); subscript t shows the time-series 
dimension (e.g., years, months, quarters, etc). 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observations of the 
explanatory variables; 𝛽 is a vector of unknown coefficients; 𝜇𝑖 is the unobserved 
individual specific effect; 𝛾𝑖 is an unobserved time specific effect; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the zero mean 
random disturbance. From the above model, a panel data equation can be estimated using 
one way errors (𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) or two way errors (𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖).  
 
In order to proceed with the analysis and to achieve the panel data model, it is essential to 
choose whether the cross-section effects of each individual unit are constant, fixed or 
random. However, the selection of the method will be concluded after the application of 
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the statistical tests. Therefore, all the models will be estimated and discussed in the 
following paragraphs and the essential tests applied to them before the appropriate model 
is chosen. Figure 4-1 shows the conditions under which a particular panel regression model 
should be adopted. The details of the processes involved are given in the subsequent 
sections of this chapter.  
FIGURE 4- 1: PANEL DATA REGRESSION EFFECT DECISION TREE 
Can the observations be illustrated as being a random sample from a given 
population? 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dougherty (2007) 
4.7.4.1. FIXED EFFECTS (FE): 
In the concept of fixed-effect models, there is the assumption that for all sampled 
companies, the slope coefficients are constant throughout, but that there are variations in 
the intercepts. It is also assumed that there is a correlation between the individual specific 
effects and the independent variable, and that there is thus no need to consider that the 
effects of the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are independent. In the fixed-effects model, the effects of 
variables whose values are fixed across time are not estimated. Instead, they are controlled 
Conduct both fixed effects and 
random effects regressions 
Employ fixed effects 
Yes No 
Does a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test show 
significant differences in the coefficients? 
Provisionally choose random effects. Does 
a test show the existence of random 
effects? 
Employ fixed effects Employ 
random effects 
Employ fixed 
effects 
Yes 
No 
Yes No 
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fully or partially over time. According to Williams (2012), there are the omitted variables 
which are correlated with other variables in the model; it is then likely that the fixed-effect 
model may offer the solutions to controlling omitted variable bias. Therefore, the subjects 
serve as their own controls in the fixed-effects model. In addition, whatever effects the 
omitted variable have on the subject at one time, they will also have the same effect later, 
meaning the effects will be constant or fixed. It has been believed that the fixed-effects 
estimation is more important, as in some cases the data can fall into categories such as 
industries, states or families. Baltagi (2005) also reveals that fixed effects estimation is 
suitable when the intention is to concentrate on a specific set (N) of companies or regions. 
However, if there are variations within the subjects, the standard errors from fixed-effect 
estimation may be too large to tolerate. One weakness of such estimation is that too many 
dummies may lead to the problem of multicollinearity among the independent variables.  
4.7.4.2. RANDOM EFFECTS (RE) 
Random effects (RE) estimation is considered as appropriate when there are no omitted 
variables, or when the omitted variables are not correlated with the explanatory ones in the 
model. In such a case, the random effects model is expected to deliver unbiased estimates 
of the coefficients, to employ all the data availability, and to create the lowest standard 
error (Williams, 2012). As argued by Taylor (2015), the effect is random if the levels that 
are observed in a group are to be sampled from a large population.  
In support of the use of random effects estimation, Clark & Linzer (2015) suggest that it 
creates a compromise between fixed effects estimation and pool models, and thus steers 
estimates of the regression coefficient away from the less-stable fixed effects estimation 
and is nearly equal to more-stable pooled estimates. There are more degrees of freedom in 
the use of random-effects estimation because it includes estimation of the parameters which 
can describe the intercept distribution. Moreover, the random-effects model is the preferred 
one, as it can estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables constantly over the 
period in question. However, the limitation of random effects estimation is that although it 
predicts the effect of time-invariant variables, the estimates may be biased, because the 
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omitted variables are not controlled. Moreover, Hsiao (2003) indicates that when using the 
random-effects model, one of its major limitations is the need to assume the patterns of 
correlation present in the effects and explanatory variables.  
4.7.4.4. HAUSMAN TEST:  
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test (commonly called the Hausman test) is the most 
commonly employed test to decide on whether the fixed or random effects model should 
be selected for a specific panel data analysis. It first has to test for the correlation between 
the explanatory variables and the unobserved heterogeneity of each unit of the model. If 
no correlation is found, the random-effects (between groups) GLS estimator can be 
employed for the estimations. However, the random-effects can become biased, as the 
correlations between the independent variables and the unobserved heterogeneity become 
stronger, which makes the fixed effects model preferable. If a correlation is found, the 
fixed-effects (within group) estimator can be used to obtain a consistent estimation of the 
intercepts.  
In the test for the choice of specification models, when the results of the Hausman test 
show that the p-value that is less than 0.05, there is correlation between the independent 
variables and the unobserved heterogeneity of each unit of the model. Therefore, the fixed-
effects estimator is selected. In contrast, if the results of the Hausman test show a p-value 
greater than 0.05, there is no correlation between the independent variables and the 
unobserved heterogeneity of each unit of the model. Therefore, the random-effects model 
is chosen.    
4.7.4.5. GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS (GMM) 
An additional issue encountered in corporate governance and finance studies is the 
likelihood of interrelationships between dependent and independent variables, which leads 
to endogeneity in the model. This is the presence of correlation between the explanatory 
variable and the error term, stemming from the existence of causality among the dependent 
and independent variables (Wooldridge, 2002). In other words, the problem of endogeneity 
is likely to occur as the explanatory and dependent variables are simultaneously 
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determined. It is observed that the problem of endogeneity is caused by three determinants, 
namely errors in measurements of the variables, the presence of causality among the 
dependent and independent variables, and omission of important variables. There are two 
universal GMM estimator approaches for dynamic panel data, namely difference GMM 
and system GMM estimators. Compared to the difference GMM approach, system GMM  
provides lower finite sample bias and greater estimation accuracy (Blundell & Bond, 
2000). Therefore, this thesis employs the system GMM approach to deal with the 
endogeneity involved in the simultaneous determination of key variables in the theoretical 
model. Moreover, to reduce the number of instruments produced in the system GMM, the 
thesis incorporates the option of collapse in the system GMM techniques. This way of 
reducing the number of instruments was suggested by Roodman (2009), because having 
too many instruments (relative to the number of firms) makes estimation results unreliable.  
In order to guarantee the validity of this system approach in the thesis, a set of diagnostic 
tests was conducted. The first was the Arellano-Bond test, which provides evidence that 
the consistency of the Arellano and Bond estimator relies upon the assumption that the 
errors are not serially correlated. In this case, it is important to test for the presence of serial 
correlation. The Arellano-Bond test reports the first and second order serial correlation of 
the differenced residuals. Therefore, the presence of first order serial correlation should be 
evident, but no second order serial correlation (Roodman, 2009). The second diagnostic 
test is the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions, which is used to test the overall 
validity of the instruments in the application of GMM technique. The null hypothesis for 
the Hansen J test is that the instruments are valid, thus showing that they are not correlated 
with the errors in the first differenced equation (Roodman, 2009). 
Difference and system GMM techniques are typically employed in one-step and two-step 
variants. One-step GMM estimators consider the weight matrices to be the independent if 
parameters are estimated, whereas the two-step GMM estimator considers the moment 
conditions via a consistent estimate of their covariance matrix (Windmeijer, 2005). In 
general, the two-step GMM estimator results in smaller asymptotic variance, and statistical 
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tests based on this estimator tend to be asymptotically more robust than those based on the 
one-step estimator (Hwang & Sun, 2018). Therefore, this study uses the two-step procedure 
to produce more efficient estimates of the system GMM technique.  
In a nutshell, to address the problem of endogeneity which is likely to be encountered in 
the study, GMM-dynamic panel estimation is employed as a robustness check to check the 
results of the static-fixed effect baseline model.  
4..8. THE CHAPTER SUMMARY:  
This chapter has provided a detailed discussion of the methodology utilised in the research, 
together with presentation and discussion of the various procedures used to answer the 
research questions. The HOSE and HNX stock exchanges were used as the population for 
the study, over the period 31 December 2007 to 31 December 2016. The remaining sections 
of the chapter explained the research methods, with the analysis of the econometrics used 
in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION 
AND ITS INTERACTION WITH STATE OWNERSHIP ON FIRM 
PERFORMANCE  
5.1. INTRODUCTION:  
As argued in Chapter 3, political connections become widespread in the settings with weak 
property rights protection (Fan et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2014), while the study of Goldman 
et al. (2009) found such connections to be common in the United States. The issue of the 
relationship between business and government also exists in emerging countries such as 
Vietnam. One of the most notable studies to have paid attention to this problem is that of 
Malesky & Taussig (2009). In general, studies evaluating the effect of political connection 
across multiple countries are less widespread because of country heterogeneity and varied 
political scenarios, so studies on individual countries are therefore more common (Wong 
et al., 2018). Vietnam is one of the underexplored country in this field, given its focus on 
the ‘relationship-based’ model of economic development which has spurred the growth of 
its economy over the last decade (Markussen & Tarp, 2014). In addition, given the 
regulatory states across nations, Hillman (2005) also argues that future research should 
explore the issue from a single country perspective. Consequently, this study seeks to 
investigate how political connection influences firm performance in a single country, 
Vietnam. The findings from the analysis will contribute to the growing literature on the 
role of political connection in emerging countries by providing more insights into how it 
influences firm performance in Vietnam. Moreover, the study attempts to divide political 
connection in Vietnam into four different types, with the data hand-collected, which is a 
laborious task, but which allows for the production of insights into how different types of 
political connection could have different impacts on firm performance. The few studies on 
Vietnam do not extend to such detailed relationships (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). The 
findings from this chapter demonstrate a negative relationship between political connection 
and firm performance, and closely align with the agency theory, identifying that the 
politically connected directors might not integrate their interests with the maximisation of 
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the company performance. By virtue of this, agency problems could arise in the companies 
and the corporate governance structure will become less efficient when politically 
connected directors are present on the board.  
Furthermore, it is evident that although many studies have focused on evaluating the 
consequences resulting from the acquisition of the firms’ political connection, there is a 
dearth of research relating to many institutional and contextual determinants in order to 
examine the specific empirical outcomes of political connection. The rationale to take into 
account with regard to ownership structure is that the motive for non-SOEs to have 
politically connected members of boards of directors and supervisory boards is different 
from that of SOEs. Among such determinants, ownership structure is likely to affect the 
relationship between political connection and firm performance (Wang, 2015; Xu et al., 
2015). Between 2007 and 2016, a key characteristic of many Vietnamese listed companies 
was the dominance of former state-controlled enterprises that were listed through share-
issuing privatisation, and in which Vietnamese state-owned business groups remained  
significant shareholders after the firm’s partial privatisation (Kim et al. 2010; Tran et al. 
2017). Indeed, the empirical results of some previous studies show the importance of 
separating the effects of political connectedness in state-controlled and privately controlled 
enterprises, especially in circumstances in which the government still controls the power 
over the allocation of economic resources (Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Chen et al., 
2017). More specifically, the appointment of politically connected board directors in listed 
state-controlled enterprises is one mechanism used by the government to pursue its own 
political and social goals; e.g., cross-subsidising state-controlled enterprises in the 
financially troubled situations, or conducting overinvestment to reduce unemployment and 
to boost GDP growth. This practice exacerbates the tunnelling motives of the controlling 
shareholder and contradicts the role of board directors in maximising firm performance.  
In contrast to the Vietnamese listed state-controlled enterprises, listed privately controlled 
enterprises tend to have to confront an unfavourable business environment. A potential 
solution for entrepreneurs in such enterprises is to build close relationships with politicians; 
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for instance, by appointing them as members on boards of directors or supervisory boards, 
in order to resolve any ideological discrimination in relation to their non-state 
characteristics and to have access to key resources controlled by the Vietnamese 
government (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). Therefore, the appointment of politically 
connected board directors serves as a substitute for the protection of property rights in listed 
privately controlled enterprises. However, few studies have analysed the relationship 
between political connection and firm performance with regard to state-controlled and non-
state-controlled enterprises, and these only focus on Chinese samples of listed enterprises 
(Wang, 2015; Wu et al., 2018; N. Xu et al., 2016). On the other hand, different to other 
emerging countries, and despite the fact that Vietnam has acknowledged the potential 
development and contribution of the private sector to the Vietnamese economy, and 
starting the privatisation process in 1990, the model of economic development in Vietnam 
appears to be conflicting. In this regard, the Vietnamese government still considers the 
state economic sector as a leading economic development force in Vietnam, whereas the 
private sector, although acknowledged since 1990, continues to fall behind. Therefore, 
faced with a biased environment, the private sector in Vietnam may employ the political 
social capital in the form of political connection differently to the state sector (Nguyen et 
al., 2009). This evidence makes Vietnam a suitable institutional background to investigate 
the effect of political connection on firm performance between the state-controlled and 
non-state-controlled enterprises. Furthermore, as suggested in Chapter 2, the government 
in Vietnam does not directly control the listed companies through ownership, establishing 
state-owned business groups to represent the state ownership and assets of the companies. 
According to Okhmatovskiy (2010), ties to the state via state-owned enterprises and the 
government have the different features. In particular, ties to state-owned enterprises may 
bring many benefits to the firms by having access to resources and critical information on 
market conditions, whereas ties to the government may result in companies pursuing 
political or social agendas. For that reason, due to the specific nature of state ownership, 
mainly in the form of state-owned business groups, this study also considers the role of 
political connection in the listed manufacturing enterprises controlled by state-owned 
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business groups. Moreover, the types of political connection covered in the study are 
broader than those of other previous studies, which is indicative of the extensive effect of 
political connection on firm performance in the Vietnamese context. Therefore, based on 
the above arguments, the purpose of this chapter is to evaluate whether the performance 
effect of political connection differs between listed state-controlled enterprises and listed 
privately controlled enterprises in the sample of manufacturing companies in Vietnam 
during the period 2007 to 2016. The findings from the research will help to increase the 
generalisation of the findings of the few studies in China. By using different data sources 
and industries, and a single emerging country, the study sheds new light on how 
Vietnamese listed state-controlled and non-state-controlled enterprises employ politically 
connected members of the board of directors or supervisory board in the manufacturing 
industry.   
The empirical results are robust to those from the two-way system GMM technique 
controlling for the endogeneity issue and the uses of the first type and strength of political 
connection. Regarding other types of political connection, this chapter find no evidence for 
their relationship with firm performance. Additionally, in line with previous studies (Sun 
et al., 2016; L. Wang, 2015), this study employs the different measurement of the 
percentage of politically connected directors on the board, discovering an insignificant 
effect of this measurement on firm performance. The structure of the chapter is structured 
as follows: section 5.1 presents the conceptual frameworks and hypothesis development, 
section 5.2 comprises the data analysis and discussions, while the final section draws the 
conclusions and discusses the contributions of the findings to research on political 
connection.  
5.2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT: 
5.2.1. HOW POLITICAL CONNECTION INFLUENCES FIRM PERFORMANCE:  
Resource-dependence theory proposes that companies may employ political connections 
to deal with the uncertainty in the business environment and to acquire government-
controlled resources. As summarised in Chapter 2, private companies in Vietnam operate 
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in a hostile environment (Vu et al., 2015; Malesky & Taussig, 2009). Obtaining political 
legitimacy and government-controlled resources is therefore important for their survival 
and success. Many studies show that in the advanced economies, the rights of private 
companies to operate freely are guaranteed by the institutional infrastructure. In a 
transitional economy such as Vietnam, such rights are not guaranteed automatically due to 
the lack of supporting-market institutions (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). Private companies 
follow strategic actions to create their legitimacy in society in order to eradicate the 
negative effects of the unfavourable political, economic and legal environment. 
Establishing political connections is one crucial and effective legitimacy-building strategy 
(Vu et al., 2015).  
As discussed in Chapter 3, political connection has its own benefits, consisting of 
favourable regulatory conditions, access to credit markets and bank loans, preferential 
treatment in competition for government contracts, and lower taxation (Faccio et al., 2006), 
all of which ultimately improve financial returns and firm performance (Fisman, 2001; Li 
et al., 2008). In the context of the Vietnamese transitional economy, political connection 
has become strategically crucial, helping firms to achieve competitive advantages. Political 
alliances are an important determinant for Vietnamese executives in the negotiation and 
enforcement of contracts in the absence of a mature legal system and market-supporting 
mechanisms (Nguyen et al., 2009). Through their executives, Vietnamese companies often 
utilise political connections with the government to obtain government support and 
favourable treatment, which can help to effectively eradicate political uncertainty (Nguyen, 
et al. 2009). Political connections give Vietnamese companies more confidence in the legal 
system (Malesky & Taussig, 2009) and help companies to acquire the resources from the 
government (Rand, 2017). Following this thread in the literature on political alliances in 
Vietnam, a positive impact of political connections on firm performance in Vietnam is 
anticipated. Hence, the first testable hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 5.1: The presence of politically connected members of boards of directors or 
supervisory boards will positively influence firm performance.  
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However, the way in which resources from the government are exploited depends upon the 
management skills and capacities of board of director members. The dark side of political 
connection encourages firms to pursue other goals that are not in line with the value 
maximisation, including political goals (Okhmatovskiy, 2010) and individual rent-seeking 
goals (You et al., 2012; Cao et al., 2017). Therefore, in terms of corporate governance, 
such action will likely result in agency problems, which in turn will impair firm 
performance and the interests of minority shareholders (Ding et al., 2014; Saeed et al., 
2017). More importantly, considering the low institutional development and higher levels 
of corruption in less developed economies such as Vietnam, the influence of political 
connections may tend to be negative (Malesky & Taussig, 2009; OECD, 2013). According 
to Malesky & Taussig (2009), politically connected owners in Vietnamese companies have 
the advantage of receiving government support and resources, but they tend to operate their 
company less efficiently compared to unconnected business owners. In such a situation, 
the negative facet of political connection may outweigh the positive. Therefore, the 
following counter hypothesis to 5.1 is postulated:   
Hypothesis 5.2: The presence of politically connected board directors or supervisory 
board members will negatively influence firm performance.  
In a transitional economy such as Vietnam, the state plays conflicting roles as social 
welfare administrator and controlling shareholder of state-owned enterprises. This situation 
creates incentives for self-interested governments to utilise their political power over state-
owned enterprises for social and political goals. The political cost of government 
intervention is a major hindrance to the efficient operation and performance of these 
enterprises (Zhang et al., 2016; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998).  
Although government intervention inevitably distorts the value maximisation objective of 
state-controlled enterprises (Boubakri et al., 2008), the extent of such interventions in fact 
varies across different listed firms. In Vietnam, the privatisation process through economic 
reform helps state-owned enterprises to pay more attentions to maximising their value, and 
the establishment of state-owned business groups results in a buffer between government 
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and firms that have lower direct intervention from local governments (Vu et al., 2015). To 
have better control over and wider intervention into listed state-controlled enterprises, the 
government prefers to assign politically connected managers who hold current or former 
government positions, as their goals are more aligned with those of government, and they 
are better at implementing preferred government policies in state-owned enterprises (Fan 
et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2012).  
In addition to encouraging government intervention, politically connected managers are 
motivated to execute government agendas because, (i) their financial compensation is not 
usually associated with firms’ financial performance (Firth et al., 2013) and they are less 
likely to be punished for poor performance (You et al., 2012); and (ii) their future political 
promotion or long-term career development is based on their contribution to social 
objectives. Overall, the interests of politically connected managers in state-controlled 
enterprises are linked to the government, not to minority shareholders. Previous studies 
have shown that political connections usually lead to underperformance in terms of firm 
value, market performance, growth in sales and profit, and investment efficiency (Fan et 
al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008; Saeed et al., 2017). In other words, because of the social 
welfare administrator’s role in state-owned enterprises, firms’ SOE status is likely to be a 
moderating variable which influences the relationship between political connections and 
firm performance. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the value effect of political connections 
will be moderated by the ownership structure of enterprises in Vietnam. Based on this 
argument, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 5.3: State-controlled companies with politically connected members of 
boards of directors and supervisory boards have lower performance than those without 
them.  
The primary goal of non-SOEs is to maximise their value, which is why political 
connections are sought and maintained, particularly if they will lead to economic benefit 
and help in obtaining privileges in the business market. Nguyen et al. (2009) adopt the 
institutional perspective and argue that networking increases a firm’s legitimacy, which in 
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turn positively affects its access to government resources. In the absence of effective 
market institutions, networks play an important role in spreading knowledge about a firm’s 
presence and its practices. Networks also facilitate a firm’s learning of appropriate 
behaviours, allowing it to obtain necessary support from key stakeholders and the general 
public. In most cases, networking substitutes for the lack of an effective market and can be 
an effective way for non-state-owned enterprises to facilitate their operations in emerging 
economies. In reality, political connection is one type of networking which helps to 
increase the legitimacy of entrepreneurial firms and avoid the major threats from external 
stakeholders in the business environment (Cao et al., 2016). Therefore, political connection 
brings many major benefits for the value of entrepreneurial firms in the institutional context 
of emerging countries characterised by low legitimacy towards non-state-owned 
enterprises and weak market institutions. The incentive for private firms to establish 
connections with the government is ultimately due to the state control of key resources in 
the market, because key investment opportunities in Vietnam are still controlled and 
regulated by the government (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). According to the helping-hand 
and resource-based views of political connection, this tie may be beneficial for Vietnamese 
privately-controlled firms, which unlike state-controlled enterprises, do not have state 
ownership as a blood tie with the government. Therefore, it is hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 5.4: Privately-controlled companies with politically connected members of 
boards of directors or supervisory boards have higher performance than those without 
them.  
5.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY:  
5.3.1. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES: 
The financial variables for the sample of firms in this chapter were mainly collected from 
the Vietstock database and were subject to the availability of data for each firm. For the 
biographical information of the directors or supervisory board members, the data were 
obtained from the annual reports of each company, taken from their website. The advantage 
of financial and biographical data is that it is always available from the annual and financial 
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reports of the listed companies. Furthermore, these sources of data are annually audited by 
the prestigious audit companies, namely the Big4. These companies are formally accepted 
by and subject to the regulations of the securities commission of Vietnam.  
For the dependent variable, to quantify the economic value of the firms, Tobin’s Q was 
employed for the main analysis (Chen et al., 2017; Chan et al., 2017). The formula for 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets over their replacement cost. In 
principle, this market value can be computed by taking the market value of the firm’s debt 
and equity, while the replacement cost of assets can be computed from accounting 
information and the price at which assets can be purchased or sold12. However, in reality, 
calculation of the market value of debt is a difficult task, so this study follows previous 
studies (Chen et al. 2017; Tran et al. 2017) by using the book value of debt. In summary, 
the usual formula of Tobin’s Q is the ratio of book value of debt plus the market value of 
the equity to book value of total assets. In line with previous studies on Vietnam (Phung & 
Mishra, 2016; Tran et al., 2017), this study employed data at every fiscal year-end13 to 
calculate Tobin’s Q because the data had just been made publicly available on this date on 
the Stock Exchanges, according to the regulations of the Securities Commission. Because 
the financial data for the calculation of Tobin’s Q varies annually, there are the variations 
of its value in each fiscal year-end. There are several arguments against the utilisation of 
accounting-based measures of performance in the finance and strategy literature (Amit & 
Livnat, 1989; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). Some significant problems have been 
suggested concerning accounting-based performance; for example: a) it typically only 
reflects past information and is not foward looking; b) it is not adjusted for risk; and c) it 
is flawed by temporary disequilibrium effects, tax laws, and accounting traditions 
(Bharadwaj et al., 1999). In addition, accounting measures of firm performance are not 
susceptible to the time lags essential for capturing the potential of capital investment. In 
order to tackle such problems, the financial market-based measure was employed as 
 
12 The usual formula of Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity to book value of assets 
13 The fiscal year-end date is 31 December.  
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Tobin’s Q as it is forward-looking, risk-adjusted, and less sensitive to variations in 
accounting practices (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). By virtue of its superior 
performance over other financial performance indicators, Tobin’s Q is considered to be the 
most appropriate measure of financial performance (Chen et al., 2017).  
For the independent variable, to code political connection, information was collected from 
the biographies of each listed firm’s chairman, board members, chief executive officer 
(CEO) and all other top executives/non-executives. The identification of political 
connection based upon their biographies stems from the viewpoint of social capital, in that 
the bridging political social capital of directors, CEOs, board members, and all other top 
executives/non-executives on the board are deemed to be an intangible asset in helping the 
firm to obtain competitive advantages over its counterparts (Cao et al., 2016). The personal 
background of the CEO, chairman, board members and other directors is officially 
published in primary data sources such as annual reports and prospectuses. These 
documents were downloaded from the website of finance.vietstock.vn 
(finance.vietstock.vn). The definitions of political connection used in the study are as 
follows:  
One important characteristic of the Vietnamese economy is that there is a firm-level 
Communist Party Committee (CPC) in every state-controlled enterprise, and on certain 
occasions, a CPC member (secretary, deputy secretary, or any committee member) may 
engage in the control of a firm as a director, supervisor, or senior executive (Li et al., 2017). 
Generally speaking, a distinct characteristic of Vietnam that differentiates it from other 
transition countries is the continuous rule of the Communist Party and the continuous 
ideological discrimination against private ownership, regardless of the dramatic reform of 
the economy (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). Party membership in Vietnam confers a measure 
of political status, and more importantly, shows a certain connection with the only ruling 
party in Vietnam (Perkins & Anh, 2009). In a setting in which scepticism, mistrust and 
discrimination continue to be faced by private enterprises continue to exist, ties to the ruling 
party demonstrate congruence and trustworthiness (Nguyen, 2016). Consequently, solid 
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connections with the ruling party convey a perception to government officials that the firm 
can be trusted. Granting executives or non-executives party membership shows that they 
have gone through a careful screening process and will adhere to the party agenda and 
ideology (Li et al., 2008). It also indicates their pledge to be committed to a greater level 
of political scrutiny and responsibility, and consequently the firms with executivies or non-
executives who are party membership tend to be favoured, as they do not threaten the 
legitimacy of the Communist Party in Vietnam (Harvie, 1997). As party members, owners 
are required to participate in party activities on a regular basis, meaning they have more 
opportunities to interact with government officials who are also Communist Party 
members. Engaging in such activities may help owners to advance both the quantity and 
quality of their personal relationships with government officials, giving them with more 
opportunities to procure preferential treatment (Chen et al., 2012). As a result, this study 
suggests that CPC control, with regard to having a CPC member as a director, supervisor, 
or senior executive, may advance firm performance.  
In the Constitution of Vietnam, the National Assembly is recognised as the highest 
government organisation and the highest-level representative body of the people. The 
general function of the National Assembly is to make, amend and adopt laws and policies, 
as well as to appoint the top government officials in central government. Therefore, 
becoming a member of the National Assembly may pave the way for someone to be 
involved in discussing and dealing with national affairs. Furthermore, members also have 
the opportunity to query top government officials, namely the ministers, about the ongoing 
economic and societal issues.  
In other words, the members of the National Assembly have a in-deep professional and 
practical know-how, a high degree of reputation and respect from others, and very close 
links with other top government officials in central and local government (Bui, 2016). As 
a result, National Assembly members serving as directors, supervisors, board members, or 
senior executives may help their firm to obtain legitimate recognition in a business 
landscape which discriminates against the private ownership (Chen et al., 2012). In 
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addition, the reputation and influence of National Assembly members serving may afford 
the company preferential treatment from the state, giving them access to resources that are 
not accessible on the free market, restraining complex government red tape, and procuring 
legal or non-legal protection for their business (Brockman et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2016). 
Unlike the National Assembly, the People’s Council is the highest government 
organisation at the provincial level, and is in the charge of resolving provincial affairs, and 
supervising and managing the Provincial Government in its jurisdiction. The members of 
the People’s Council also have a major influence and high social status in their province, 
so hiring them may provide a firm with a business edge in winning provincial government 
contracts or obtaining beneficial information for its economic and operational activities 
(Bui, 2016). From the above arguments, current or former members of the National 
Assembly or People’s Council can be considered as types of political connection. It is 
expected that appointing members of National Assembly or People’s Council will have a 
postive impact upon firm performance.  
In Vietnam, industry associations play a crucial role in delivering messages on industry 
health and dialoguing with the government in seeking the possible solutions to reducing 
the regulatory and business obstacles confronted by them, especially in the times of 
economic turmoil (Tran et al., 2007). On a regular basis, members of industry association 
have formal meetings with top government officials, such as the prime minister or 
ministers. On these occasions, they may be given the opportunity to interact with top 
government officials, and accordingly they are likely to build trusted relationships with 
major political figures. In some cases, industry associations may be considered as quasi-
governmental organisations which help the government by contributing ideas to formulate 
industrial policy (Tran et al., 2007). In addition, membership of industry associations also 
implies a measure of political connection due to their tight networking with political 
leaders, and it is expected that members of Industry Association serving as board members, 
directors, supervisors or executives have a positive effect on firm performance. 
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Employing former or current government officials and individuals who are closely linked 
to the party hierarchy is one approach that firms can use to help them to acquire legitimacy 
in the society in which they work (Fan et al., 2007; Sojli & Tham, 2017). Many firms in 
Vietnam may consider political background as one of the criteria in the selection process, 
as hiring former or current government officials as employees and advisers enables 
privately-owned companies to ease the uncertainties confronting their business (Tran et al., 
2017). Therefore, this study follows previous literature (Boubakri et al., 2008; Fan et al., 
2007) by including current or former government officials as a measure of political 
connection, based on the argument that they play a relatively influential role in the 
Vietnamese business climate. In the Vietnamese political system, there are two types of 
government official: civil servants in charge of administrative duties, and cadres in charge 
of professional duties14. Civil servants are often responsible for performing civil jobs in the 
public sector, maintaining law enforcement, and overseeing market conditions. In certain 
companies, the appointment of civil servants to the board reflects the willingness of the 
government to protect state capital and assets, and to adhere to their political goals, namely 
high national economic growth and reduction of the unemployment rate (Okhmatovskiy, 
2010; Tihanyi et al., 2019). Hiring former civil servants is also beneficial to firms because 
of their previous political kinships or influence in the political hierarchy (Johansson & 
Feng, 2016; Yang et al., 2015). In contrast, cadres often focus on professional or skilled 
tasks, namely research, teaching or medicine. From these, lecturers, researchers or cadres 
in state-affiliated universities or institutions are deemed to be a second type of government 
official. Some studies have cited the benefits accrued by hiring lecturers or academic cadres 
as professional advisers or experts (Shin et al., 2017). Through being governmental 
officials, moreover, lecturers and academic cadres are obliged to follow party ideology, 
which may motivate firms to hire them in order to build a legitimate reputation in the eyes 
of other government officials (Haveman et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2018). All things 
 
14 See further details at http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/ongoing-reform-of-the-civil-service-in-vietnam-6108.html 
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considered, it is hypothesised that the effect of hiring both types of government official on 
firm performance is positive.  
As a consequence, this study uses implicit and explicit measures to define directors, 
supervisors, CEOs, chairmen and board members as being politically connected if they are 
or used to be, (1) a government offical, military, court or procuracy member, or a member 
of the National Council or People’s Council (2) a member of Communist Party Committee 
at firm level; (3) members of various industry associations; and (4) a lecturer or cadre in 
many government-affiliated academic institutions or universities. The study divides the 
definition of political connection into the functions of each component. The first 
component includes the civil servants, and politicians in the charge of administrative duties 
and of resolving political affairs at national, provincial and local levels. The second 
component is associated with maintaining party ideology at the firm-level, while the third 
concentrates on the industry association representatives with a powerful voice and 
influence over government actions. The final components are those who provide 
professional advice, and help firms to build legitimacy in the business climate.  
To find proxies for political connections, previous studies have often used a dummy 
variable for measurement purpose (Faccio, 2005; Fan et al., 2007; L. Wang, 2015). In 
statistics and econometrics, particularly in regression analysis, a dummy variable only 
takes a value of 0 or 1 to convey the absence or existence of a certain categorical effect that 
may be expected to influence the outcome (Hardy, 1993). Such proxies can be thought of 
as numerical stand-ins for qualitative facts in a regression model, sorting data into mutually 
exclusive categories (e.g. political connection and non-political connection in this study). 
A dummy independent variable (also called a dummy explanatory variable) taking a value 
of 0 in observations means that there is no influence of the dummy variable upon the 
dependent variable, while a value of 1 implies an impact equal to the value of the 
coefficient upon the outcome variable (Hardy, 1993). The advantage of using dummy 
measurement is that it is easy to capture of information about the existence or absence of 
political connection in the regression specifications, which may calculate the frequency of 
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its appearance (Faccio et al., 2006; Sun et al., 2016). Therefore, if the firm has the presence 
or existence of political connections on its board, the value of the dummy variable of 
political connection (PCON) is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. The data were collected every 
year over the period 2007 to 2016 because the information could be changed over the year. 
Likewise, the presence of political connections could change every year; the dummy 
variable of political connection could take the value of 1 in some years and 0 in others. 
This is because the members of the board of directors may not have worked for the firm 
throughout the period. In some circumstances, directors reach retirement age, change job, 
or are promoted to a political career. This is in line with previous studies, in which some 
companies may lose their political connections over the research period (Haveman et al., 
2017; Hung et al., 2017).    
However, although a large body of previous studies has endeavoured to develop various 
measurements of political connection, quantifying its nature and concept has been found 
to be a difficult task (Wu et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2012). The use of dummy measurements 
of political connection may result in the lack of a full evaluation of important political 
connection-related information, for example the identity of politically connected directors; 
current or previous positions; length of tenure in the political hierarchy; the degree of their 
contribution to corporate governance efficiency relative to the size of the board; the 
strength and weight of political connection; and the interactions between the political 
connections on the board. Despite the shortcomings of calibrating the nature of political 
connection with dummy measurements, this study attempts to make a further step in 
developing the continuous measurement scale by quantifying the strength of political 
connection conditional upon political administrative rankings, thereby fitting the 
Vietnamese context. The rationale to quantify the strength of political connection stems 
from the fact that this measure can ascertain the number of politically connected 
executives/non-executives, their level of interaction on the board in influencing firm 
performance, and the very different relationships with the bases of power in the country 
that the executives/non-executives hold (Johansson & Feng, 2016). However, the 
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limitation in the construction of the strength of political connection in the study is that it 
does not incorporate the current tenure of politically connected executives/non-executives 
or those they have held in the past or currently into the formula. It is thus argued that long 
periods of tenure of politicians serving as executives/non-executives might be favourable 
for them in building a more powerful political base upon which the firm may be contingent 
in serving its operations (Chen et al., 2017).  
The Vietnamese political regime consists of three fundamental systems: the administrative 
government, the National Assembly, and the Provincial/Regional and Local/City People’s 
Council. The administrative government has three levels: The central/national level (Level 
1); the provincial/regional level (Level 2); and the local/city level (Level 3). Level 1 is 
generally relevant to the ministries and agencies under the National Assembly’s direct 
supervision, while Level 2 is relevant to the provincial government officials and 
encompasses the administrative agencies and bureaus in the provinces, autonomous 
regions, and centrally controlled municipalities, under provincial/regional People’s 
Council direct supervision. Finally, Level 3 is below the provincial level and consists of 
urban districts and county-level cities, under the local/city level People’s Council direct 
supervision. Companies can build political connections with politicians and bureaucrats at 
each of the three levels of government, the National Assembly, and the People’s Council 
through a large number of channels. For instance, it is possible for a CEO to establish 
connections with the government, the National Assembly, the People’s Council at 
provincial/regional or local/city level or at all three levels. All of the various and 
interrelated channels through which a firm’s directors, board members, supervisors, and 
executives/non-executives can be politically connected are conducive to creating a single, 
unified measure to evaluate variations in the extent of the connections across companies.        
This study initially considers firm’s annual reports released from 2007 to 2016, 
concentrating upon the biographies of directors, board members, supervisors, and 
executives/non-executives to obtain information on (1) the names and titles of those who 
are politically connected; (2) their connection channels, namely the government, National 
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Assembly, or People’s Council; (3) the level of those channels - that is, central, 
provincial/regional, or local/city; (4) their positions; and (5) the corresponding rank for 
each political position.  The study tracks each record if an officer holds different positions 
or ranks in one year. In Vietnam’s highly centralised political system, consisting of the 
government, the National Assembly, and the People’s Council, there is a strict hierarchy 
of rankings. Specifically, high-level officials possess more power than a low-level ones. 
Therefore, such rankings make it feasible to calculate the strength of each channel through 
which a firm’s political connections are established (Malesky & Taussig, 2009).  
The components of PC15 strength consist of the definitions of political connection given 
above. A connection score is assigned to the CEO, chairs, board members, directors, and 
supervisors of each sample firm, contingent upon whether that connection is with the 
government (administrative) or National Assembly/People’s Council system. For 
connections with the government hierarchy, the study covers both the political rank and 
level of a given position. Thereafter, according to political administrative rankings in 
Vietnam, a score of 3 is assigned for a connection at the central level, of 2 for a connection 
at the provincial level, and of 1 for a connection at the local/city level, for each political 
type in the study’s definition of political connection. For non-administrative types of 
political connections, namely senior managers of various industry associations, members 
of firm-level Communist Party Committees or lecturers or cadres in state-affiliated 
academic institutions/universities, a score of 1 is assigned. This is because these types of 
political connection perform the professional rather than administrative order roles.  
A director with no political experience receives a score of zero. For instance, if CEOs are 
or used to be, a government official at national level or a member of the National Assembly, 
they will receive a score of 3 for their administrative level. For provincial and local levels, 
they will receive scores of 2 and 1 respectively. Scores of political connection across all 
positions in the firm, such as CEO, chairperson, board members, supervisors and other 
directors of the firm, are obtained. The next step is to aggregate the scores across all 
 
15 PC stands for Political Connection 
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positions for each dimension of their political background, leading to PC scores for the 
CEO, chairperson, board members, supervisors and all other directors. The final firm-level 
PC strength score is the sum of the four component scores: (1) the CEO PC score; (2) the 
chairperson PC score; (3) the board member PC score; and (4) the PC scores for other 
directors and supervisors. As a result, the firm-level original PC score is the sum of the 
scores for all the connection channels through which a firm’s CEO, board chair, board 
members, supervisors and other directors are politically connected at the central, 
provincial, or local level or if they are, or used to be, a member of the Communist Party 
Committee at firm level, a senior manager of various association industries, or a lecturer 
or cadre of government-affiliated academic institutions/universities. Considering the 
skewness of the original PC scores, based on the method of Chen et al. (2017), this study 
uses a natural logarithm of the original PC strength: Ln(PC Strength)=Natural 
Logarithm(1+All Original PC Scores). 1 is added to ensure that Ln(PC Strength) remains 
zero when Original PC Strength=0.  
TABLE 5- 1: THE EXAMPLES FOR THE PROCEDURE OF CONSTRUCTING 
THE STRENGTH OF POLITICAL CONNECTION: 
Company 
Codes 
Year Names of 
Board of 
Directors 
Members, 
Supervisory 
Board 
Members 
Former or 
Current 
Positions in the 
Government 
Political 
Connection 
Score 
Natural 
Logarithm 
of Total 
Scores 
EVE 2010 Nguyen Van 
Dao (BM) 
Official of the 
General 
Department of 
Geology and 
3  
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Minerals of 
Vietnam 
Total 3 1.386294361 
EVE 2011 Nguyen Van 
Dao (BM) 
Official of the 
General 
Department of 
Geology and 
Minerals of 
Vietnam 
3  
Total 3 1.386294361 
EVE 2012 Nguyen Van 
Dao (BM) 
Official of the 
General 
Department of 
Geology and 
Minerals of 
Vietnam 
3  
EVE 2012 Ngo Phuong 
Tri (BM) 
Official of the 
Ministry of 
Finance  
3  
Total 6 1.945910149 
EVE 2013 Nguyen Van 
Dao (BM) 
Official of the 
General 
Department of 
Geology and 
3  
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Minerals of 
Vietnam 
EVE 2013 Ngo Phuong 
Tri (BM) 
Official of the 
Ministry of 
Finance  
3  
Total 6 1.945910149 
EVE 2014 Nguyen Van 
Dao (BM) 
Official of the 
General 
Department of 
Geology and 
Minerals of 
Vietnam 
3  
EVE 2014 Ngo Phuong 
Tri (BM) 
Official of the 
Ministry of 
Finance  
3  
Total 6 1.945910149 
EVE 2015 Nguyen Van 
Dao (BM) 
Official of the 
General 
Department of 
Geology and 
Minerals of 
Vietnam 
3  
EVE 2015 Ngo Phuong 
Tri (BM) 
Official of the 
Ministry of 
Finance  
3  
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Total 6 1.945910149 
EVE 2015 Nguyen Van 
Dao (BM) 
Official of the 
General 
Department of 
Geology and 
Minerals of 
Vietnam 
3  
EVE 2015 Ngo Phuong 
Tri (BM) 
Official of the 
Ministry of 
Finance  
3  
Total 6 1.945910149 
EVE 2016 Nguyen Van 
Dao (BM) 
Official of the 
General 
Department of 
Geology and 
Minerals of 
Vietnam 
3  
EVE 2016 Ngo Phuong 
Tri (BM) 
Official of the 
Ministry of 
Finance  
3  
Total 6 1.945910149 
DHT 2012 Le Anh Trung 
(Vicechair) 
Official of  Ha Tay 
Province and Ha 
Noi Capital 
2 1.098612289 
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DHT 2013 Le Anh Trung 
(Vicechair) 
Official of  Ha Tay 
Province and Ha 
Noi Capital 
2 1.098612289 
 
DHT 2014 Le Anh Trung 
(Vicechair) 
Official of  Ha Tay 
Province and Ha 
Noi Capital 
2 1.098612289 
 
DHT 2015 Le Anh Trung 
(Vicechair) 
Official of  Ha Tay 
Province and Ha 
Noi Capital 
2 1.098612289 
 
DHT 2016 Le Anh Trung 
(Vicechair) 
Official of  Ha Tay 
Province and Ha 
Noi Capital 
2 1.098612289 
 
 
DID 2009 Dinh Thi Hien 
(SB) 
Official of Ba Ria 
Vung Tau 
Provincial 
Government 
2  
DID 2009 Vu Trong 
Tuyen (SB) 
Official of the 
Labour 
Department of 
Minh Hai 
Province  
2  
Total 4 1.609437912 
DID 2010 Vu Trong 
Tuyen (SB) 
Official of the 
Labour 
2 1.098612289 
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Department of 
Minh Hai 
Province 
DID 2011 Vu Trong 
Tuyen (SB) 
Official of the 
Labour 
Department of 
Minh Hai 
Province 
2 1.098612289 
 
DID 2012 Vu Trong 
Tuyen (SB) 
Official of the 
Labour 
Department of 
Minh Hai 
Province 
2 1.098612289 
 
DID 2013 Vu Trong 
Tuyen (SB) 
Official of the 
Labour 
Department of 
Minh Hai 
Province 
2 1.098612289 
 
DID 2014 Tran Hoang 
Tuan (Chair) 
Official of Dong 
Nai Provincial 
Government 
2 1.098612289 
 
DID 2015 Tran Hoang 
Tuan (Chair) 
Official of Dong 
Nai Provincial 
Government 
2 1.098612289 
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DID 2016 Tran Hoang 
Tuan (Chair) 
Official of Dong 
Nai Provincial 
Government 
2 1.098612289 
 
 
HHC 2007 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
HHC 2008 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
HHC 2009 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
HHC 2010 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
HHC 2011 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
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HHC 2012 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
HHC 2013 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
HHC 2014 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
HHC 2015 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
HHC 2016 Tran Hong 
Thanh (CEO, 
BM) 
Secretary of the 
Communist Party 
Committee of Hai 
Ha 
1 0.693147181 
 
Source: The Author’s calculations 
On the other hand, political connection is also defined as the ratio of the number of 
politically connected directors on the board to the total number of directors (board size) 
(Sun et al., 2016). Compared to the binary measurement, political connection measured as 
a percentage gives an evaluation of the efficiency of the relative size of politically 
connected directors on the board (Wang, 2015). Through such analysis, the study aims to 
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compare whether board structure between politically connected directors and the remaining 
directors may be an optimal choice, and to measure the relative degree of concentration of 
the political connection on the board. Therefore, another measurement of political 
connection is employed, in the form of the percentage of politically connected directors on 
the board, in the additional analysis.  
Following previous studies, this study includes the governance- and firm- control variables. 
Potential ownership concentration effects were first controlled for. A variety of empirical 
studies have investigated the impact of ownership structure and concentration upon firm 
performance, as well as the connection between executives and stockholders. The empirical 
corporate governance literature has obtained inconclusive findings on the benefits and costs 
of ownership concentration structure. Some researchers have discovered a positive direct 
effect of ownership concentration upon corporate performance (Gorton & Schmid, 2000; 
Mitton, 2002), supported by the fact that the interests of owners and managers are aligned 
and aim to mitigate agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). In contrast, when major 
shareholding lies in the hands of a small group of shareholders, they tend to impose on and 
control the management, which results in negative firm performance because the 
independent decision-making process is biased (Khan et al., 2013). This study uses top1 
(the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder) and top2-5 (the ownership percentage 
of the secondth-to-fifth largest shareholder) as the representative variables for ownership 
concentration in Vietnam. The data for the largest shareholders was obtained from the 
information announcements on ownership structure in the annual reports of Vietnamese 
listed companies. Shareholder ownership is defined as concentrated if their shareholding is 
5% or higher.  
Second, the study controls for the board-level governance effect, namely CEO duality and 
board size. CEO duality exists if the same person holds both the CEO and board 
chairperson positions in a company (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). The impact of CEO duality 
on firm performance may be explained by two different theoretical perspectives. To be 
consistent with agency perspective, the roles of CEO duality and chairperson should be 
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separate in order to allow for productive monitoring and delivery of service (Jensen, 1993). 
Based on Rhoades (2001), CEO duality reduces board independence and improves CEO 
entrenchment. The primary responsibility of the CEO is to put companies’ policies into 
practice, whereas they focus on running the business as efficiently as possible. On the other 
hand, the chairperson is responsible for monitoring and assessing the activities of directors 
and being responsible for ensuring that the board runs effectively. However, according to 
the stewardship perspective, dual leadership such as CEO duality enables managers to act 
in the best interests of the owners by contributing substantially to increasing firm value. 
CEO duality was a binary variable equal to 1 if there was a combined role of CEO and 
chairperson on a board, and 0 otherwise.   
The second board-level control variable is board size. This is calculated as the total number 
of directors on the board (Wang, 2015). Previous studies (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2004) have discovered a relationship between the size of a company’s 
board and its firm performance. These can be divided into two strands of thought. In the 
first, it has been argued that smaller board size enhances the performance of many 
companies. Based on previous research (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack 1996; Eisenberg 
et al., 1998), smaller board size allows for easier coordination and interaction between the 
board members and the CEO. This helps to improve board efficiency and performance. In 
addition, it helps to improve cohesiveness between the directors on the board, allowing for 
quicker decision-making processes among members as compared to companies with larger 
boards. Less time spent at board meetings could reduce the time cost per director, which 
will result in reducing total company costs and improving performance. On the other hand, 
evidence from Pfeffer (1972), Klein (1998) and Coles et al. (2008) shows a positive 
relationship between company performance and board size; the larger the board size, the 
better the performance of the company. In addition, companies with large boards are able 
to benefit from the wide-ranging advice from board members (Dalton, 2005). Based on 
Van Den Berghe & Levrau (2004), increasing the number of directors provides an 
increased pool of expertise. A large number of directors indicates that there will be diverse 
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specialisation, which can improve the decision-making processes in a company. This 
diversity in specialisation could help companies to guarantee critical resources and also 
reduce environmental uncertainties (Goodstein et al., 1994).  
This study also controlled for conventional firm-level characteristics, including Firm Size, 
measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s sales. Based on the past studies of Singh & 
Whittington (1975) and Serrasqueiro & Nunes (2008), larger firms have higher 
performance than smaller ones because they usually enjoy economies of scales and greater 
negotiation power over their clients and suppliers (Singh & Whittington, 1975; 
Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2008). Larger firms aim to benefit from economies of scale through 
operating costs and the cost of innovation (Hardwick, 1997). Therefore, as the number of 
units produced increases, the price per unit will fall. These benefits aim to reduce the unit 
cost of production, which results in increased firm profitability. Shepherd (1989) also 
explains that company size determines bargaining power. Therefore, companies with 
superior bargaining power tend to be more profitable because they are able to influence 
their trading relationships through the amount of credit granted, the terms of payment, the 
means of delivery and the quality of the products. This in turn helps them to be more 
profitable. In contrast, according to Symeou (2010), small firms have certain characteristics 
that can outweigh the disadvantages related to their size. They are less subject to the agency 
problem (Pi et al., 1993; Goddard et al., 2005) and are characterised by more flexible non-
hierarchical structures, which may be suitable organisational forms for modifying business 
environments (Yang & Chen, 2009). Because smaller firms are mostly managed and owned 
by a small group of related shareholders, the likelihood that the management team will 
pursue its own interests rather than those of its owners is greatly reduced. Such a 
relationship helps to reduce the agency cost of management monitoring and misuse of 
funds, which in turn improves firm performance. 
Asset tangibility is measured by the ratio of fixed asset to total assets. Research by Harris 
& Robinson (2001) discovered a negative relationship between firms’ profitability and 
their tangible assets. In contrast, Braun (2003) found solid evidence to show that companies 
139 
 
with tangible assets acquired more finance from suppliers and banks at low rates of interest. 
Braun (2003) also argued that tangible assets are more easily transferred to the investors’ 
control when the relationship between suppliers and banks breaks down. For most external 
financers, the best way to guarantee safe lending is through the provision of security in the 
form of tangible assets. Therefore, some firms utilise the tangible assets as collateral to 
guarantee external funds. Because of their ability to hold financing contracts together, 
external financers are able to offer reduced financing costs. This reduction in the cost of 
finance due to asset tangibility shows that such firms will make savings on their interest 
payments, which enhances firm performance. However, most external financers rarely 
grant finance to small-medium-sized enterprises due to their lack of tangible assets.  
Financial leverage is calculated by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. This 
significantly influences firm performance (Ruland and Zhou, 2005; Onaolapo and Kajola, 
2010; Akinlo and Asaolu, 2012). According to previous studies, financial leverage 
influences the cost of capital, ultimately affecting firm performance and stock prices 
(Higgins, 1977; Miller, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Sheel, 1994). It has been found that 
the presence of debt in the capital structure generates pressure on managers to perform well 
(Akintoye, 2009; Weill, 2003). This debt pressure means that managers must work harder 
in order to be able to service the debt. Therefore, this duty to perform well will put major 
pressure on managers because the debt holders could force non-performing directors to 
liquidate the company. It has been argued that debt financing provides many benefits to 
managers if they perform well, because they tend to avoid the personal costs of failure. In 
contrast, it has also been argued that the presence of debt in a firm has a negative influence 
on firm performance. In the study of Titman and Wessles (1988), very wealthy firms had 
lower levels of leverage than less profitable ones as they first utilised their retained profit 
before seeking outside capital. Sheel (1994) also found a negative relationship between the 
debt-to-asset ratio and the non-debt tax shield, or/and between a firm’s leverage behaviour 
and its past performance. The study of Dimitrov and Jain (2005) explored the negative 
association between financial leverage and profitability.  
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The ROE variable was chosen as a control variable. Return on Equity (ROE) is a measure 
of accounting-based financial performance calculated by dividing net income by 
shareholder equity. The relationship between accounting-based and market-based financial 
performance indicators has been examined by researchers, especially in terms of how 
closely they are associated (Chakravarthy, 1986; Combs et al., 2005; Gentry & Shen, 2010; 
Keats, 1988). In theoretical terms, researchers generally define accounting measures as 
reflections of past or short-term financial performance, and market measures as reflections 
of future or long-term financial performance (Hoskisson et al., 1994; Keats, 1988). There 
are currently mixed findings in the existing literature regarding the relationship between 
accounting-based and market-based measurements of financial performance. While some 
studies have discovered a positive relationship (Hoskisson et al., 1994; McGuire and Matta, 
2003), others have indicated a negative relationship (Keats, 1988; Nelson, 2003). 
Firm age is included as a control variable in the empirical models. The relationship between 
firm age and firm performance has been extensively covered in the literature on finance 
and related disciplines, namely economics and organisational studies. Theoretical and 
empirical studies appear to be equivocal in terms of the link between firm age and firm 
performance. One stream of research implies that older companies outperform younger 
ones because they are experienced in the industry. This phenomenon is known as “learning 
by doing” (Coad et al., 2013). However, another stream of research explains that older 
companies are not flexible in adopting new changes, so they underperform younger firms 
(Liu et al., 2015).  
5.3.2. METHODOLOGY IN CHAPTER 5:  
An issue encountered in the estimation of panel data is the presence of unobserved firm-
specific effects. Excluding such effects could result in serious bias in the econometric 
estimates, especially when these effects are correlated with other covariates. Fixed-effects 
are often employed to address this concern. This chapter also considers pooled OLS 
regression, two-way random effects and two-way fixed effects estimations. Based on the 
results of the F-test between pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimations, the results of the 
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Hausman test between fixed effect and random effects estimations, and the results of the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier between random effect and pooled OLS estimations, 
two-way fixed effects controlling for both time-invariant individual company 
characteristics and time fixed effects was chosen as the main method of estimation in this 
chapter. The results of these tests are presented in Appendix. In addition, the competitive 
advantages caused by the existence of political connection and its influence on firm 
performance may be less affected by industry-level drivers (Hung et al., 2017). In line with 
the resource-based view in strategic management, Mauri & Michaels (1998) contend that 
industry-level drivers have marked effects on the core strategies (e.g., R&D and advertising 
investments), whereas firm-level drivers have strong effects on firm performance. This 
may be explained by the fact that the firms competing in the same industry tend to conduct 
homogenous competitive core strategies (e.g., investing in technology and marketing 
resources) (Mauri & Michaels, 1998). These are the easily implementable strategies, but 
cannot provide competitive advantage (Erickson & Jacobson, 1992). Moreover, sustainable 
competitive advantage can be only obtained by capitalising on and combining 
competitively unique resources that exist at lower levels of aggregation (Collis & 
Montgomery, 1995). Therefore, the analysis of competitive advantage within the resource-
based view is applicable only at low levels of analysis, unobservable by competitors (Mauri 
and Michaels, 1998). In other words, the fine-tuned analysis of resource hierachies at lower 
levels of aggregation can enable managers to detect the true sources of competitive 
advantage (Mauri and Michaels, 1998). Conforming with this viewpoint, this study 
therefore adopts the firm-fixed effects estimation to analyse the possible impact of political 
connection upon firm performance. It is believed that the firm-level analysis may help 
managers to uncover the facets of political connection (Hung et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
the firm-level is a lower level of aggregation than the sectoral-level, thereby indicating that 
sectoral dummies will be omitted in the firm-fixed estimations because firm-fixed effects 
have already included sectoral dummies (Chen et al., 2017; Hardy, 1993). In order to 
increase the robustness of the findings, the sectoral dummies are yet incorporated into 
system Generalized Method of Moments (system GMMs) models to control for 
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unobservables at sectoral-level because GMM approach can include the dummies at all 
given levels.  
This study uses margins and contrast analysis to probe the nature of the interactions 
between two variables in the models. By definition, a margin is a post-estimation 
command; a command for use after a model has been fitted using an estimation command, 
namely regress or logistic, or by using almost any other estimation command. Margins 
estimate and report on margins of responses and margins of derivatives of responses, also 
known as marginal effects. A margin is a statistic on the basis of a fitted model, in which 
some of or all of the covariates are fixed. Marginal effects are changes in the response for 
change in a covariate, which can be construed as a derivative, elasticity, or semielasticity16. 
In other words, the margins command in Stata determines the predicted mean of the 
outcome when the predictor is given at one specific value (Mitchell, 2012).  On the other 
hand, contrast analysis is used to test linear hypotheses and forms contrasts consisting of 
factor variables and their interactions, and contrast computations can be considered 
comparisons of estimated cell means arising from a model fit17. Contrast includes simple 
effects that can be used to test the overall effect of a factor variable, and applies contrast 
operators to factor variables to analyse the main effects or interactions (Mitchell, 2012).  
For the interaction between SOE and polcon, the margin analysis after the main regression 
will exhibit the average value of Tobin’s Q in the possible combinations of SOE and 
polcon18. The following analysis of contrast will demonstrate the effect of political 
connections on the performance of SOEs and non-SOEs separately. Therefore, regarding 
the effect of polcon on the performance of non-SOEs, Hypothesis 5.4 will be supported or 
rejected through the analysis of margin and contrast. The difference in the effects of polcon 
between SOEs and non-SOEs will roughly equal the interaction size of polcon and SOE 
(Mitchell, 2012).  
 
16 The definition of margins analysis can be seen in Stata manuals 13, available at https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rmargins.pdf 
17 The definition of contrast analysis can be seen in Stata manuals 13, available at https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rcontrast.pdf 
18 The possible combinations include SOEs and polcon, non-SOEs and polcon, SOEs and no polcon, and finally non-SOEs and non-polcon 
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A common issue in the literature concerning the relationship between political connection 
and firm performance is the likely presence of endogeneity. It is believed that the literature 
on the value of political connection and the state ownership is likely to suffer from 
endogeneity issues (Shi et al., 2018), which could lead to biased conclusions. Critical 
analysis of the literature on political connection contends that strongly-performing 
companies may also have incentives to build strong relationships with the government 
because such a type of networking may ease their access to critical resources, allowing 
them to sustain their high growth rates or rescue them when they go into bankcruptcy 
(Hung et al., 2017). In addition, the government, via the state-owned investment 
commission, may make considerable investments into well-performing firms as a source 
of stable dividends that contribute to the state budget, and also appoint the politically 
connected directors onto the board to act as a representative of the government ownership  
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Tu et al., 2013). Regarding state ownership, previous studies 
conjecture that government ownership/control is greatly susceptible to the features of a 
firm, including firm performance. For instance, Megginson & Netter (2001) argue that 
government may first choose to privatise the best performing firms to ensure their 
privatisation scheme has good results. Similarly, Boubakri et al. (2005) posit that 
governments tend to control the largest and best performing firms in order to establish their 
reputation and sell them in tranches in the future. This may lead to correlation between this 
study’s proxy for government ownership and the error terms, resulting in spurious 
inferences on the effect of government ownership on firm performance.  
In relation to the issue of endogeneity, studies have employed different approaches to 
overcome this problem. One of the most common is the use of external instruments in the 
two-stage least squares regression (Wu et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2015); however, it is 
extremely difficult to find a suitable instrument. This study follows the suggestion of 
Boubakri et al. (2008) to use the firm’s location19 as an instrumental variable in the two-
stage least square regression. However, the tests of the validity of this instrument fail to 
 
19 This variable equals to 1 if the firm is headquartered in the capital of Vietnam as Hanoi.  
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confirm it as a good choice. Therefore, future studies may be able to find a better 
instrumental variable. Another approach to resolving the issue of endogeneity is the use of 
external shock as a natural experiment to examine the value of politically connected 
directors, which is largely free from endogeneity concerns (Liu et al., 2016; Xu, 2018). In 
the context of Vietnam, however, looking for an exogenous event study between 2007 and 
2016 may be a difficult task between 2007 and 2016. As a result, the GMM technique is 
adopted to deal with the endogeneity issue involved in the regressions. The rationale for its 
popularity is that the technique has the advantage of employing internal instruments to 
overcome the problem of the main variable of interest not being strictly exogenous. The 
consistency of the Arellano and Bond estimator lies in the assumption that errors are not 
serially correlated. As a result, it is important to test for the presence of serial correlation; 
Arellano and Bond’s test suggests the first and second order serial correlation of the 
differenced residuals. According to Roodman (2009), while there should exist the first 
order serial correlation, the second order serial correlation does not occur. In line with 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998), Sargan or Hansen tests are used to 
examine the issue of over-identifying restrictions, testing the overall validity of the 
instruments in the application of the GMM technique. In order to apply the technique, the 
study used the first lagged value of Tobin’s Q as an explanatory variable in the model. 
Moreover, the option of collapse is employed in the GMM models to reduce the number 
of internal instruments (Roodman, 2009). This helps to guarantee that the number of 
internal instruments is less than the number of groups in the GMM model (Roodman, 
2009).       
5.3.3. ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND VARIABLES:    
This sub-section presents the baseline empirical models, with the goal of determining the 
empirical outcomes that support or reject the suggested hypotheses. In order to test the 
previously formulated hypotheses, the models will be shown as follows:  
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𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝25𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗
𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5.1) 
𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝25𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 ∗
𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 (Model 5.2)  
In which, i=1,…., 172 companies, t=2007 to 2016, and β is the magnitude of influence of 
a variable in the model on firm performance.  
Dependent variable: 
𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the Tobin’s Q of the firm i at time t in the regression model.  
Main Independent Variables:  
𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the dummy variable of the presence of political connection in the firm i at time t.  
If the director, CEO, chairman or board or supervisory member who is, or used to be: 
(1) an official of the government, military, court or procuracy, or a membership of national, 
provincial or local congresses (polcon1) 
(2) a senior manager or membership of various industry associations (polcon2) 
(3) a lecturer or official in many state-owned academic institutions/universities (polcon3)  
(4) a member of the Communist Party Committee in the firm (polcon4) 
its value equals 1 for the existence of political connection, and 0 otherwise.  
The control variables in this study consist of the following firm characteristics:   
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 representing the natural logarithm of board size, as measured by the 
number of directors sitting on the board of firm i at time t.    
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𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if the chairperson and CEO are the same 
person in firm i at time t.  
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the value of the logarithm of total sales in the firm i at time t.  
𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑖,𝑡 represents the shareholdings of the largest shareholder in the firm i at time t.  
𝑇𝑜𝑝25𝑖,𝑡 shows the shareholdings of the secondth-to-fifth largest shareholders in the firm 
i at time t.  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of the book value of liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of tangible fixed assets, scaled by total assets. 
ln(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 represents the natural logarithm of the age of the firm, as measured by the 
age of firm i at time t.  
5.4. PRE-REGRESSION RESULTS:  
5.4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS:  
This sub-section summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the chapter, 
showing the main features of the data, including mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values.  
TABLE  5- 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE MODEL VARIABLES 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Polcon 1302 0.694 0.460 0 1 
Polcon1 1302 0.630 0.482 0 1 
Polcon2 1302 0.033 0.180 0 1 
Polcon3 1302   0.078 0.268 0 1 
Polcon4 1302 0.179 0.384 0 1 
PCstrength 1302 1.080 0.831 0 2.397 
Ratio of Polcon  1302 0.1003 0.157 0 0.5 
Tobin’s Q 1300 1.028 0.437 0.378 2.110 
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CEO Duality 1300 0.383 0.486   0 1 
Ln(boardsize) 1301 1.445 0.292   1.098 2.079 
SOE 1301 0.563 0.496 0 1 
Top1 1301 35.067 17.304 10 68.64 
Top25 1301 14.332 12.842 0 39.15 
ROE 1301 15.347 11.239 -0.57 38.79 
Log(Firm Sales) 1302 11.783 0.547 10.779 12.783 
Tangibility 1302 0.282 0.166 0.058 0.657 
Leverage 1302 0.464 0.196 0.124 0.779 
Ln(Firmage) 1302 2.99 0.634 1.791 3.970 
 
Table 5-2 shows the descriptive statistics for the dataset. For the variable of political 
connection, specifically, the mean value is 0.694, with its maximum and minimum values 
ranging from 0 to 1. This result reveals that political connection is widespread in the sample 
of listed manufacturing firms, which could be because the state mainly assigns bureaucrats 
to the management and supervision of the listed state-controlled companies to directly run 
them, or entrepreneurs with work experience in government-affiliated agencies, 
universities or institutions. For the polcon variable ratio, its value ranges from 0 to 0.5, 
with a mean value of 0.1003, which indicates that the percentage of politically connected 
directors on boards is not as high as in previous studies (Sun et al., 2016; L. Wang, 2015). 
SOE has a mean value of 0.563, and maximum and minimum values ranging from 0 to 1. 
This shows that a high number of manufacturing firms in the sample are state-controlled, 
which proves that the process of equitisation has been slow during the 20 years since the 
economic reform of Doi Moi (Kim et al., 2010; Tran et al., 2008). 
For the dependent variable of Tobin’s Q, its value ranges from 0.378 to 2.110, and its mean 
value is 1.028 (Table 5-1). This means that the market value of some Vietnamese listed 
manufacturing companies is lower than the value of their total assets, but that there are 
some companies whose market value is greater than the value of total assets. For the 
corporate governance variables, CEO duality has a mean value of 0.383, which indicates 
148 
 
that the leadership structure of separation between CEO and chairman is more widely 
accepted in the selected sample of companies. Furthermore, the natural logarithm of board 
size has a mean value of 1.445, ranging from 1.098 to 2.079 (see Table 5-1). This figure 
shows that the listed companies in the sample might limit the number of directors on their 
board. Small board size might be conducive to easier decision-making processes and 
greater managerial control (Jensen et al., 1993).  
Regarding ownership concentration, the top1 (the largest shareholder) and top25 (the 
secondth-to-fifth largest shareholders) variables have mean values of 35.067 and 14.332 
(see Table 5-2), with the top1 variable varying between 10 and 68.64, and the top2-5 
variable ranging from 0 to 39.15 (Table 5-1). These figures for the variable of ownership 
concentration demonstrate that the ownership concentration in Vietnamese listed firms is 
diverse, which creates more rooms for investors who wish to invest in the listed companies. 
The average value of firm sales as a proxy for company size calculated by the logarithm of 
firm sales is 11.783, with minimum and maximum values of 10.779 and 12.783. These 
figures underline the diversity of sales volumes across the selected sample of companies in 
the manufacturing sector.  
Regarding asset tangibility, the companies have a mean tangibility ratio of 0.282, with its 
value ranging from 0.058 to 0.657 (Table 5-1). This result shows that the amount of fixed 
assets over total assets is small in many of the listed manufacturing firms. Therefore,  
companies that own a small number of fixed assets could face the problems in obtaining 
bank loans20. Moreover, this will also put more pressure on them to establish relationships 
with government officials to help with developmental resources acquisitions such as bank 
loans (USAID et al., 2016). It was also found that most listed companies have an average 
financial leverage of 0.464, with a minimum leverage of 0.124 and a maximum of 0.779 
(Table 5-1). The average value of 0.464 shows that the majority of the companies in the 
sample are using more equity capital and fewer liabilities to finance their businesses. Such 
evidence is confirmed as the sampled firms are listed companies which have access to 
 
20 In Vietnam, collateral such as fixed assets plays an important role in the lending decisions of the commercial banks (Le, 2012)  
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unlimited equity capital. The variable of return on equity has a mean value of 15.347, and 
ranging between -0.57 and 38.79. This means that the majority of listed manufacturing 
companies on the Vietnamese stock exchange reported a profit, while some incurred 
significant losses over the research period.    
5.4.2. CORRELATION MATRIX:  
TABLE 5- 3: CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
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Variable 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. Tobin’s 
Q 
1.00             
2. Polcon 0.0045 1.00            
3. Polcon1 -0.0054 0.866*** 1           
4. Polcon2 0.010 0.124*** 0.037 1          
5. Polcon3 -0.064** 0.193*** 0.081** 0.119*** 1         
6. Polcon4 0.113*** 0.310*** 0.171*** 0.023 -0.0099 1        
7. 
PCStrength 
0.064** 0.862*** 0.823*** 0.102*** 0.174*** 0.371*** 1       
8.CEO 
duality 
0.042 0.080*** 0.046* 0.053*** 0.084*** 0.058** 0.059** 1      
9. Ln(firm 
age) 
        1     
10. top1 0.104*** -0.0096 -0.0036 -0.071** 0.0079 0.121*** 0.016 -0.232*** 0.078*** 1    
11. top25 0.060** 0.0021 0.0018 0.021 -0.020 -0.101*** 0.040 0.071* -0.038 -0.344*** 1   
12. firm size 0.285*** 0.048* 0.016 0.106*** -0.017 0.140*** 0.072*** -0.014 -0.055** 0.270*** 0.0033 1  
13.ln(board 
size) 
0.165*** 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.088*** 0.050* 0.220*** 0.223*** 0.098*** -0.087*** -0.0057 0.065** 0.0033 1 
14. 
Leverage 
-0.079** 0.068** 0.059** 0.101*** -0.019 0.073*** 0.012 -0.0003 -0.084*** 0.129*** -0.063** 0.337*** 0.161*** 
15. 
Tangibility 
-0.067** -0.021 0.037 -0.054** -0.027 0.021 -0.0079 -0.095*** -0.056** 0.039 -0.045 -0.040 0.038 
16. Return 
on Equity 
0.486*** 0.082*** 0.045* -0.045* -0.042 0.089*** 0.122*** 0.045 0.135*** 0.168*** 0.0009 0.179*** 0.073*** 
17. SOE 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.110*** -0.023 -0.048* 0.261*** 0.146*** -0.069** 0.133* 0.350*** -0.198*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 
18. Ratio 0.019 0.422*** 0.345*** .090*** 0.021 0.373*** 0.541*** 0.027  0.080*** -0.009 -0.02 0.047* 
Variables 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
14. 
Leverage 
1     
15. 
Tangibility 
0.0013 1    
16. Return 
on equity 
-0.118 -0.087*** 1   
17. SOE -0.034 0.043 0.226*** 1  
18. Ratio -0.085* -0.020 0.058** 0.161*** 1 
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From Table 5-3, it can be seen that polcon1 and the strength of political connection are 
fairly highly correlated with all types of political connection. This is because these two 
variables are the components of the main variable of political connection and have been 
developed from the all types of political connection respectively. In summary, no multi-
collinearity problems were found among any of the variables.  
The results in Table 5-3 show a negative correlation between the political connection and 
Tobin’s Q. This implies that firms’ market profitability is negatively influenced by the 
existence of political connection; however, this correlation is not statistically significant. 
In contrast, there is a significantly positive correlation between political connection type 
IV, PCstrength and Tobin’s Q, but a significantly negative correlation between the political 
connection type III, the strength of political connection and Tobin’s Q.  
For the corporate governance variables, the study found a significantly positive correlation 
between the natural logarithm of board size and Tobin’s Q (0.165, as shown in Table 5-2). 
This is consistent with the Dalton et al. (2005), who explain that companies are able to 
improve their profitability and market performance thanks to the large amount of valuable 
advice from the large pool of expertise on the board. In addition, there is a significantly 
positive correlation between ownership concentration (top1, top25 and Tobin’s Q) (0.104 
and 0.060 respectively). This shows that ownership concentration has a positive effect on 
market performance measured by Tobin’s Q. For the variable of CEO duality, the presence 
of the dual role of CEO and chairman has a positive association with firm profitability 
measured by Tobin’s Q (0.042), but the association is statistically insignificant.    
Regarding other firm characteristics, firm size, as measured by the logarithm of the VND 
value of total firm sales, is significantly positively associated with Tobin’s Q (0.285). This 
demonstrates that firms with more resources, as measured by the higher value of total firm 
sales, are likely to create more profit and have higher market performance. For return on 
equity, the higher the return on equityh, the higher Tobin’s Q, which explains that a higher 
value of return on equity is likely to be a good signal for firms’ market performance 
evaluation (0.486). In terms of tangibility, firms which invest more into the fixed assets 
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have to accept the need to sacrifice some profits (0.067). Furthermore, the firms cannot 
utilise the high ratio of leverage to boost firm performance by the virtue of a significantly 
negative association between the leverage ratio and Tobin’s Q (-0.079).  
5.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION:  
TABLE 5-4: MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS: 
 Model 5-1 Model 5-2 
VARIABLE Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Polcon -0.107** -0.006 
 (0.047) (0.050) 
SOE  0.075 
  (0.078) 
Polcon*SOE   -0.159** 
  (0.071) 
CEOduality -0.058 -0.057 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
Firmsize  0.238** 0.232** 
 (0.087) (0.087) 
Top1 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.0011) (0.011) 
Top25 0.0016 0.0017 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Ln(boardsize) 0.134*** 0.130** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Leverage -0.0003 0.009 
 (0.104) (0.102) 
Tangibility -0.0164 -0.017 
 (0.109) (0.111) 
ROE 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) 
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Ln(firm age) -0.226* -0.217* 
 (0.121) (0.122) 
Constant -0.741 -0.740 
 (1.046) (1.062) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes 
Year-fixed Yes Yes 
Observations 1,296 1,296 
Number of firm 172 172 
R-squared 0.404 0.409 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The table 5-4 displays the results from the empirical model. As can be seen in Table 5-4, 
the empirical results from Model 5-1 show that the coefficient of political connection is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, which indicates that companies 
with political connections have a lower Tobin’s Q than those without such connections. 
Specifically, politically connected companies yield on average21 a 10.14% lower Tobin’s 
Q than non-connected ones. Therefore, Hypothesis 5.2 is supported and Hypothesis 5.1 is 
rejected. This result is consistent with the study of Saeed et al. (2017), which showed that 
politically connected directors and supervisory board members exacerbates agency 
problems by forcing management teams to engage in self-interested actions which protect 
their individual rent-seeking interests, hence weakening firm performance.  
This empirical outcome is also in line with the viewpoint of Shi et al. (2018), in that 
politically connected directors do not play a specific role of resource provision in firms to 
promote their performance. Specifically, the empirical findings of the negative effect on 
performance of politically connected directors and supervisory board members reveal that 
their personal wealth is not strongly tied to the company’s performance, and therefore they 
 
21 The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which is a percentage. Therefore, the dummy variable is interpreted as exp(dummy coefficient)-1. In this 
case, political connection results in a 9.606% decline in firm performance (this is the base), with other variables constant. 
154 
 
may not have a strong incentive to bring many resources to the firm. In addition, in the 
context of Vietnam, the cost of political resources provision is likely to increase over time 
and thus reduce politically connected directors’ willingness to provide such resources. 
Vietnam has been conducting an anti-corruption wave in recent years after the scandals22 
involving the arrest of corrupt politically connected directors in state-owned economic 
groups, which have been well-publicised since 2010 (OECD, 2013). This anti-corruption 
wave is likely to have influenced politicians’ incentives, as well as their capacities of 
bringing resources to the firm they serve. Politicians may hesitate to provide favours to 
business entities to which they are related (Vu et al., 2015). This all implies that the cost 
of resources provision for firms is likely to be greater than the benefits obtained.  
Furthermore, the empirical findings from this study also agree with the theoretical 
grabbing-hand viewpoint of Shleifer & Vishny (1994) and the empirical viewpoints of Fan 
et al. (2007), who demonstrate that companies with a board structure populated by current 
or former government bureaucrats display low degrees of professionalism, as fewer 
directors have relevant professional backgrounds. In particular, politically connected board 
directors in Vietnamese manufacturing listed companies are often less skilled in their 
managerial roles, which in turn impairs firm performance and causes agency problems in 
the firm (Malesky & Taussig, 2009; OECD, 2013).  
However, these above findings contradict those of other studies such as Li et al. (2008), 
Shin et al. (2017) and Hung et al. (2017), who show a specific resource-providing role of 
politically connected board directors, which in turn promotes firm performance. Their 
findings reveal that the negative role of political ties puts firms at the risk of firm failure, 
or market investors expect the resignation of politically connected board directors and 
supervisory board members in the sample of Vietnamese listed manufacturing companies.  
On the other hand, the results from model 5-2 presented in Table 5-4 suggest that SOEs 
that are politically connected underperform their counterparts in the full sample of listed 
 
22 In reality, the anti-corruption campaign was held at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017. Previously, only ambiguous or weak anti-corruption 
strategy had been conducted.     
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manufacturing companies in Vietnam. This implies that having politically connected 
boards of directors or supervisory members is detrimental to the performance of state-
controlled companies. The statistically significant coefficient estimate of -0.159 indicates 
that politically connected SOEs yields, on average, a 14.7% lower Tobin’s Q than their 
unconnected counterparts, thus confirming Hypothesis 5.3. This result is consistent with 
the findings of previous studies (Wang, 2015; Wu et al., 2012).   
TABLE 5-5: THE ANALYSIS OF MARGINS IN MODEL 5-2 
 
 Polcon*SOE Margins 
0        0 1.057*** 
(0.043) 
0        1 1.133*** 
(0.055) 
1        0 1.051*** 
(0.031) 
1        1  0.967*** 
(0.023) 
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The values shown in the margins column show the average Tobin’s Q: 
0: Non-existence of political connection and state-controlled type of ownership 
1: Existence of political connection and state-controlled type of ownership 
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TABLE 5-6: THE ANALYSIS OF CONTRAST IN MODEL 5-2 
 
The Effect of 
Political Connection 
Contrast 
SOEs (1) Non-SOEs (2) Difference 
(1) – (2) 
Polcon -0.166** 
(0.063) 
-0.0060 
(0.050) 
-0.160** 
(0.071) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the margin analysis shown in Table 5-5, the values shown in the margins column display 
the average Tobin’s Q associated with the four possible value combinations of political 
connection and SOE. From Table 5-5, it can be seen that the average Tobin’s Q for SOEs 
and polcon is 0.967. In addition, the average for SOE and non-polcon is 1.133. The effect 
of polcon among SOEs is -0.166 (0.967-1.133). By contrast, for non-SOEs, the effect of 
polcon is -0.006 (1.051-1.057). The contrast analysis in Table 5-6 shows the simple effect 
of polcon separately for SOEs and non-SOEs. The first test indicates that the effect of 
polcon is statistically significant for SOEs, while for non-SOEs, the political connection 
effect is not statistically significant. Therefore, the margins and contrast analyses re-
confirm Hypothesis 5.3, but Hypothesis 5.4 is not confirmed because the impact of political 
connection on non-SOEs appears to be equivocal. This finding is different from those of 
studies of other emerging countries (Wu et al., 2012; Wang, 2015).  
Those findings of this study concerning the distinct economic outcomes caused by the 
presence of politically connected members of boards of directors or supervisory boards in 
listed privately controlled and state-controlled companies may be related to their different 
motivations for firms to have political connections. More interestingly, according to Wang 
(2015), in listed SOEs the appointment of politically connected board of directors or 
supervisory board members may intensify the conflict of interests between the government 
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as controlling shareholder and other small stock market investors. In fact, in addition to 
economic considerations, as the controlling shareholder the government may follow its 
political and social agendas, and activities which are not consistent with the interests of 
other minority shareholders. Consequently, the findings from this study suggest that 
politically connected board of directors or supervisory board members may be heavily 
influenced by the government decisions and therefore distort the purposes of maximising 
the value of their listed manufacturing companies in Vietnam. Therefore, this study 
concludes that, in line with the findings of previous studies, such as those of Wu et al. 
(2012) and Wang (2015), the appointment of politically connected board of directors or 
supervisory board members may result in agency problems in relation to the corporate 
governance of the companies in question. This proves the grabbing-hand facet of political 
connection in the Vietnamese state-controlled manufacturing companies (Wang, 2015; 
Cheung et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2017). Such findings should alert SOEs seeking political 
connections about the potential of adverse economic consequences.  
Unlike the majority of the research that considers the political connections as valuable 
resources for firms, this study demonstrates that the presence of politically connected board 
of directors or supervisory board members does not help to facilitate the operational 
performance of private firms in Vietnam, especially listed privately-controlled companies. 
This may be in contrast to the helping-hand and resource-dependent perspectives of earlier 
studies and the viewpoint of Cao et al. (2016), who indicate that political connection may 
be seen as political bridging social capital in emerging countries intended to remove 
uncertainty in the business environment and consequently boost the performance of listed 
entrepreneurial companies in emerging countries. Therefore, in contrast to listed state-
controlled enterprises, the role of political connection in privately-controlled listed 
enterprises emerges as equivocal.  
Turning to control variables, a strongly significant positive relationship was discovered 
between company size and Tobin’s Q. This empirical finding agrees with the proposal by 
Cabral & Mata (2003) that larger companies have higher performance than smaller ones 
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due to their easy access to developmental resources, such as financing from financial 
institutions. Specifically, larger companies may own the assets required for collateral in 
order to guarantee the supply of the essential credit to make profitable investments. This 
empirical finding also means that larger companies likely have the advantages of attracting 
considerable investments from investors on the market.  
For the variable of the number of directors on the board, Model 5-1 shows a significantly 
positive relationship between the natural logarithm of the number of board directors and 
Tobin’s Q (b=0.132). Therefore, this empirical result is in line with the resource-based 
viewpoint, as companies with a larger board size are able to benefit from the wide range of 
advice from board members (Dalton & Dalton, 2005). Van Den Berghe & Levrau (2004) 
explain that a larger board size can provide firms with a pool of expertise and a diversity 
of specialisation. Return on equity has a significantly positive effect on the market-based 
performance of a company, thereby indicating that it can be a predicted to be an indicator 
of a company’s good market-performance. The study complements the mixed findings of 
Gentry & Shen (2010) concerning the relationship between accounting-based performance 
measurements and market-based performance measurements. These authors encourage the 
future studies on this relationship in emerging countries.  
In terms of assets tangibility, the study found an insignificant relationship between asset 
tangibility and Tobin’s Q. This is in contrast with previous studies on the significant 
relationship between the assets tangibility and companies’ market-based performance. The 
finding indicates that companies with a high ratio of fixed-asset to total asset show no 
difference in market-based performance, compared to those with a low ratio. On the other 
hand, no significant relationship is found between financial leverage and Tobin’s Q in 
Model 5-1. Therefore, this outcome on financial leverage is also not consistent with 
previous studies on the significance of the relationship between financial leverage and the 
market-based performance of the firm. It is concluded that high leverage does not help 
firms to improve their performance.  
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Regarding the variable of CEO duality and ownership concentration, CEO duality seems 
to have ambiguous effects on the market-based performance of firms. The evidence shows 
that neither the positive value impact of CEO duality based on stewardship theory, nor the 
negative value impact of CEO duality based on the agency theory, are not clear-cut in the 
sample of manufacturing listed companies in Vietnam. In terms of the variable of 
ownership concentration, the variable top1, which portrays the shareholdings of the largest 
shareholder, and the variable top25, which represents the shareholdings of the secondth-
to-fifth largest shareholders, do not have any particular effects upon market-based 
company performance. Therefore, concentrated ownership may not cause any type II 
agency problem in the form of principal – principal conflict in the chosen sample of 
manufacturing companies. Regarding the natural logarithm of firm age, the study shows a 
decline in firm performance during the maturity period of the firm. Accordingly, such an 
empirical result coincides with the notion that the old firms seem to adapt to innovative 
and dynamic approaches more slowly than younger ones, which may delay their attempts 
to advance their performance (Barron et al., 1994; X. Liu et al., 2015). This is in line with 
the milk hypothesis of Coad et al. (2013), in that compared to younger firms, older ones 
have lower expected sales, profits and productivity growth rates, lower profit levels, and 
are less able to convert employment growth into sales, profits and productivity growth.  
5.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS:    
In this section, the robustness of the baseline results is evaluated by carrying out the four 
following exercises. First, the baseline analyses were re-run in the two-step dynamic GMM 
models to control for endogeneity issues. Secondly, based on Shi et al. (2018) and Wong 
et al., (2018), there are the different roles played by the various types of political 
connection, which sets the stage for examining the performance effects of the different 
types of political connection. Third, the study also follows the suggestion of Chen et al. 
(2017) by investigating how the strength of political connections influences the 
performance of the listed companies in the sample. Finally, a different measurement of 
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political connection is adopted, namely the percentage of politically connected directors on 
the board, in order to capture the concentration of political connection.  
5.6.1. ENDOGENEITY TESTING: 
The estimated two-step GMM dynamic model with the first lagged Tobin’s Q as an 
explanatory variable is as follows:  
𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 +   𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝25𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9 ∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (5.2) 
𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 +   𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝25𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (5.3) 
where 𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the first lag of Tobin’s Q, while all the GMM models also include firm, 
sectoral and year dummies to control for unobservables at firm-, sectoral-, and year- levels 
respectively.  
The results for the dynamic panel GMM two-step system technique with regard to the 
relationship between political connection and firm performance are shown in Table 5-7.  
TABLE 5-7: THE TWO-STEP SYSTEM GMM RESULTS IN THE PRESENCE 
OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
 Model 5-3 Model 5-4 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
L.Tobin’s Q 0.839*** 0.735*** 
 (0.063) (0.082) 
Polcon -0.091* 0.027 
 (0.047) (0.041) 
SOE  0.111 
  (0.074) 
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Polcon*SOE  -0.187** 
  (0.072) 
CEO Duality -0.01 0.0048 
 (0.016) (0.019) 
Lnboardsize 0.019 0.210 
 (0.052) (0.043) 
Top1 -0.0005 -0.00004 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Top25 0.0007 0.0001 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Tangibility 0.176 0.277 
 (0.148) (0.195) 
Leverage -0.144 -0.085 
 (0.140) (0.140) 
ROE 0.0065*** 0.0069*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Firm size 0.020 0.052 
 (0.054) (0.054) 
Ln(firm age) 0.0063 0.018 
 (0.014) (0.016) 
Constant -0.859 -0.400 
 (0.565) (0.549) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes 
Sectoral-fixed Yes Yes 
Year-fixed Yes Yes 
Observations 1127 1127 
Number of groups (firm) 172 172 
Number of Instruments 99 102 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.319 0.288 
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Hansen test (p-value) 0.483 0.266 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction is applied to two-
step estimations 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results also include the Arellano-Bond’s tests for autocorrelation, the Hansen J-test 
of over-identifying restrictions and the number of instruments used in the model. As can 
be seen from Table 5-7, the p-values of the J-Hansen test indicate that the GMM model is 
not likely to suffer from the issue of over-identifying restrictions, so the validity of the 
selected instrument is confirmed. Moreover, Table 5-7 also shows the presence of first-
order autocorrelation (the significant value of the AR(1) test) but the absence of second-
order autocorrelation (the insignificant value of the AR(2) test). Arellano & Bond (1991) 
show that only the presence of second-order autocorrelation makes the GMM estimates 
inconsistent. Therefore, both Models 5-3 and 5-4 become feasible with the values of ARtest 
(1) and ARtest (2).  
Another feature of the GMM technique is the number of instruments used in the model. 
Too many instruments can bias the value of the J-Hansen test (Roodman, 2009). However, 
a rule of thumb suggested by Roodman (2009) is that the number of instruments should not 
exceed the number of groups in the model. As seen in Table 5-7, the number of instruments 
is less than the number of groups in both Models 5-2 and 5-3, which satisfies the 
suggestions of Roodman (2009) for the GMM models.  
Considering the variables of interest, Model 5-3 shows the statistically significant negative 
coefficient of political connection, which explains the grabbing-hand facet of political 
connection. This result closely aligns with that of the firm fixed-effect baseline models, 
implying that the main results are not purely an object of endogeneity biases. Likewise, the 
joint effect of political connection and SOE on firm performance remains negative in 
Model 5-4, which is in line with that of the firm fixed-effects model. Regarding control 
variables, their coefficients obtain different values compared to the results from the firm 
fixed-effects estimation. While the coefficients of return on equity remain positive, the 
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impact of all other control variables is statistically insignificant. The lagged dependent 
variable is highly significant and positive in the two-step GMM model 5-2, indicating high 
persistence of past firm performance improvements and learning effects. 
5.6.2. THE REGRESSION RESULTS FROM THE DIFFERENT TYPES AND 
STRENGTH OF POLITICAL CONNECTION: 
 
TABLE 5-8: THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES, STRENGTH AND RATIO 
OF POLITICAL CONNECTION ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: 
 Model 5-5 Model 5-6 Model 5-7 Model 5-8 Model 5-9 Model 5-10 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Polcon1 -0.104***      
 (0.037)      
Polcon2  0.0082     
  (0.115)     
Polcon3   0.056    
   (0.051)    
Polcon4    -0.023   
    (.058)   
PCstrength     -0.058**  
     (0.028)  
Ratio of Polcon      -0.132 
      (0.144) 
CEOduality -0.058 -0.056 -0.055 -0.055 -0.060* -0.057 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Firmsize 0.236*** 0.229*** 0.239***   0.230*** 0.234** 0.231 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) 
Top1 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.00057 -0.00053 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Top25 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0019 0.0017 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
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Ln(boardsize) 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.138*** 0.120*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.043) 
Leverage 0.0015  -0.0072 -0.0094 -0.0023 0.013 -0.0015 
 (0.104) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.106) (0.107) 
Tangibility -0.020 -0.041 -0.040 -0.041 -0.033 -0.040 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
ROE 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Ln(firm age) -0.229* -0.205* -0.212* -0.207* -0.216* -0.205* 
 (0.121) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.121) (0.122) 
Constant -0.728 -0.752 -0.842 -0.749 -0.740 -0.751 
 (1.047) (1.064) (1.063) (1.063) (1.049) (1.064) 
Year-Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 
Number of firm 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Within R-
squared 
0.405 0.398 0.395 0.398 0.402 0.399 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Among the distinct types of political connections, the presence of former or current of 
government, procuracy, court or military officials, or members of the National Congress 
or People’s Council, constitutes the largest percentage of all types of political connection. 
For that reason, further analysis first focuses on testing the performance effect of the four 
types of political connections separately. Compared to other types of political connections, 
that proxied by the presence of officials or members listed above is likely to hamper firm 
performance. In comparison, the coefficient of the presence on the board of politically 
connected board of directors or supervisory board members who are or used to be members 
of the Communist Party Committee is insignificantly higher than zero, although with a 
positive sign (b=-0.023). Similarly, the coefficient of politically connected board of 
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directors or supervisory board members who are, or used to be, managers or members of 
various industry associations is positive, but statistically insignificant (b=0.019). Although 
the coefficient of the presence of politically connected members of boards of directors or 
supervisory board who are or used to be lecturers or cadres in state-affiliated academic 
institutions/universities is negative, the result is statistically insignificant (b=0.056). This 
demonstrates that the presence of current or former government, military, procuracy or 
court officials or the members of the National Council or People’s Council, is likely to be 
a cause of weak corporate governance in the sample of manufacturing listed companies, 
leading agency problems at the expense of firm performance and the interests of minority 
shareholders (OECD, 2013). Among alternative explanations of the “grabbing-hand” 
viewpoint, politically connected members of boards of directors or supervisory boards may 
pursue individually rent-seeking or political goals, which is not in line with the goals of 
value maximisation on the market (Kim et al. 2010). In contrast to the first type of political 
connection, the role of Communist-Party membership, managers or memberships of 
various industry associations, and lecturers or officials in state-affiliated academic 
institutions/universities, seems to have an equivocal influence on company performance. 
However, the results for the performance effect of Communist-Party committee members 
on the board are not consistent with the concluded findings of previous studies, such as 
those of Li et al. (2017); Malesky & Taussig (2009) and Li et al. (2008). This suggests that 
the presence of Communist-Party committee on the boards often tends to spreads the 
political ideology rather than plays a role in the corporate and economic governance of 
firms (Vu et al., 2015). The results related to managers or members of various industry 
associations and lecturers or officials in state-affiliated academic institutions/universities 
are consistent with the findings of Shi et al. (2018), who explained that the presence of 
politically connected independent directors who are the current or former members of 
Chinese industry associations or of lecturers and cadres of state-affiliated academic 
universities, does not incrementally either improve or hamper company performance. 
Overall, the evidence shown in Table 5-7 based on Tobin’s Q concludes that investors 
expect the future departure of politically connected members of boards of directors or 
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supervisory boards who are or used to be government, military, court, procuracy officials, 
or members of the National Congress or People’s Council. In contrast, investors are not 
concerned about the potential resignation of politically connected board of directors or 
supervisory board members who are or used to be Communist-Party membership, 
managers or members of various industry associations, or lecturers or cadres in many state-
affiliated academic institutions/universities.   
This study also aims to investigate whether multiple political connections with different 
political administrative rankings are in fact harmful to firm performance. In particular, 
Table 5-8 reveals that the strength of political connection has a significantly negative 
association upon firm performance (b=-0.058). The empirical findings suggest that firms 
with multiple politically connected directors with various political administrative rankings 
are likely to underperform their counterparts which are less politically connected or 
unconnected. This finding about the performance effect of the strength of political 
connections is similar to the findings of the study of Chen et al. (2017) in China, which 
indicated that a great number of interactions with the government officials tends to hinder 
rather than help firms. However, unlike the study of Chen et al. (2017), this study constructs 
the strength of political connection by including additional components, namely the 
officials of military, court and procuracy; Communist-Party members, managers or 
members of various industry associations; lecturers or officials in state-affiliated academic 
universities/institutions. The findings of the study also corroborate those of Malesky & 
Taussig (2009), that companies characterised by multiple political connections are likely 
to underperform their unconnected counterparts. However, the study of Malesky & Taussig 
(2009) employed the headcount method to calculate the strength of political connections, 
which is a different approach to this study. As a result, this study is among the firsts to 
investigate the strength of political connections based on political administrative rankings 
in the Vietnamese political system. Compared to other emerging economies outside China, 
the findings from the regression results in this study are also consistent with those of 
Jackowicz et al. (2014), in that firm profitability was lower in some cases in which the 
167 
 
strength of political connections was high. For instance, the negative influence on 
performance was especially marked when Polish companies had multiple and simultaneous 
political relationships and when they utilised ex-politicians with experience in central 
powers. On the other hand, this study also employed a different measurement of political 
connection, the percentage of politically connected directors on boards, to measure the 
concentration of political connection. In particular, this study does not discern a concrete 
impact of the ratio of polcon on firm performance, thus indicating that the concentration of 
political connection does not matter for firm performance. This finding does not coincide 
with those of Sun et al. (2016) and Wang (2015), who discovered a strong impact of the 
ratio of politically connected directors on firm performance.  
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5.6.3. THE EFFECTS OF DISTINCT TYPES OF POLITICAL CONNECTION ON 
THE PERFORMANCE OF SOEs AND NON-SOEs: 
 
TABLE 5-9: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF 
DISTINCT TYPES, STRENGTH AND RATIO OF POLITICAL CONNECTION IN 
STATE-CONTROLLED LISTED MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 
 Model 5-11 Model 5-12 Model 5-13 Model 5-14 Model 5-15 Model 5-16 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Polcon1 -0.014      
 (0.048)      
Polcon2  0.013     
  (0.123)     
Polcon3   0.069    
   (0.067)    
Polcon4    0.037   
    (0.078)   
PCstrength     -0.010  
     (0.041)  
Ratio of Polcon      -0.059 
      (0.149) 
SOE 0.045 -0.058 -0.057 -0.049 -0.039 -0.056 
 (0.070) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.050) (0.051) 
Polcon1*SOE -0.129**      
 (0.063)      
Polcon2*SOE  -0.024     
  (0.101)     
Polcon3*SOE   -0.028    
   (0.075)    
Polcon4*SOE    -0.059   
    (0.065)   
PCstrength*SOE     -0.067  
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     (0.042)  
Ratio of Polcon*SOE      -0.086 
      (0.173) 
CEO duality -0.056 -0.055 -0.054 -0.054 -0.058 -0.055 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Ln(boardsize) 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.125*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.044) 
Top1 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.00062 -0.00053 -0.00044 -0.00051 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Top25 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0018 0.0017 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Firm size 0.233*** 0.224** 0.233** 0.224** 0.227** 0.225** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) 
ROE 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0086*** 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 0.0087*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Tangibility -0.020 -0.041 -0.040 -0.043 -0.033 -0.042 
 (0.110) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) 
Leverage 0.0035 -0.003 -0.0072 0.0031 0.018 0.003 
 (0.103) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.105) (0.107) 
Ln(firm age) -0.225* -0.197 -0.203 -0.201 -0.209* -0.195 
 (0.122) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.121) (0.122) 
Constant -0.732 -0.676 -0.761 -0.675 -0.712 -0.691 
 (1.066) (1.079) (1.074) (1.074) (1.062) (1.078) 
Firm – fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year – fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 
Number of firm 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Within R-squared 0.409 0.399 0.400 0.399 0.405 0.400 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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For the interactions between the distinct types of political connection and the dummy SOE 
variable, it is shown that the interaction between polcon1 and SOE has a negative 
coefficient, thereby suggesting that SOEs characterised by the presence of polcon1 have a 
lower performance than their counterparts without this presence. Therefore, this finding 
lends support to the first result, associated with the performance effect of the interaction 
between all types of political connection and SOE. On the other hand, no significant 
interactions between political connection types II, II, IV and SOE were found. Therefore, 
it can be shown that the role of Communist-Party membership; lecturers or cadres in state-
affiliated academic universities/institutions; or managers or members of various industry 
associations in Vietnam appears to have no influence on the performance of state-
controlled listed companies in Vietnam. Moreover, there are no joint effects of the strength 
or ratio of political connection and SOE on firm performance in either model 5-15 or 5-16.  
TABLE 5-10: THE ANALYSIS OF THE MARGINS IN MODELS 5-11 TO 5-14: 
Possible 
Combination 
Margins 
0           0 0           1 1           0 1            1 
Polcon1 * SOE 1.061*** 
(0.040) 
1.107*** 
(0.043) 
1.047*** 
(0.033) 
0.964*** 
(0.023) 
Polcon2 * SOE 1.062*** 
(0.029) 
1.0036*** 
(0.023) 
1.075*** 
(0.121) 
0.993*** 
(0.106) 
Polcon3 * SOE 1.057*** 
(0.030) 
0.999*** 
(0.022) 
1.126*** 
(0.065) 
1.040*** 
(0.058) 
Polcon4 * SOE 1.059*** 
(0.034) 
1.0098*** 
(0.024) 
1.096*** 
(0.059) 
0.987*** 
(0.055) 
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The values reported in the margins columns are the average Tobin’s Q. 
0:  non-political connection and non-SOEs 
1: political connection and SOEs 
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TABLE 5-11: THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRASTS RELATED TO THE 
EFFECTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION: 
The Effect of 
Types of 
Polcons 
Contrasts 
SOEs (1) Non-SOEs (2) Difference 
(1 – 2) 
Polcon1 -0.143*** 
(0.048) 
-0.014 
(0.048) 
-0.129** 
(0.063) 
Polcon2 -0.010 
(0.112) 
0.013 
(0.123) 
-0.024 
(0.101) 
Polcon3 0.040 
(0.058) 
0.069 
(0.067) 
-0.028 
(0.075) 
Polcon4 -0.021 
(0.059) 
0.037 
(0.078) 
-0.059 
(0.065) 
PCstrength -0.077** 
(0.032) 
-0.010 
(0.041) 
-0.067 
(0.042) 
Ratio of Polcon -0.145 
(0.129) 
-0.059 
(0.149) 
-0.086 
(0.173) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The margin analysis shows the average Tobin’s Q for each combination of polcons and 
SOE, while the contrast analysis focuses on gauging the overall effect of polcons on the 
performance of SOEs and non-SOEs and between SOEs and non-SOEs. The investigation 
of the margins with reference to Table 5-11 indicates that the effect of polcon1 for SOEs 
is -0.143 (0.964-1.107), while the effect for non-SOEs is -0.014 (1.047-1.061). However, 
in Table 5-11, similar to the effect of polcon, the effect of polcon1 on SOEs is statistically 
significant, but its effect on non-SOEs is statistically insignificant. Taken together, the 
additional findings show that the existence of polcon1 on boards is unable to help either 
SOEs or non-SOEs to increase their performance. Collectively, the findings from the 
performance effect of polcon1 on SOEs and non-SOEs reinforces Hypothesis 5.3, but offer 
no support for Hypothesis 5.4.  
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For the performance effect of polcon2 seen in Table 5-11, the effect of polcon2 on SOEs 
is -0.010 (0.993 - 1.0036) and on non-SOEs it is 0.013 (1.075 - 1.062). However, neither 
effect is statistically significant, as evidenced in the contrast analysis shown in Table 5-11. 
This demonstrates that there is no certain effect of polcon2 on the performance of SOEs or 
non-SOEs in the contrast analysis. Regarding the performance effect of polcon3, it can be 
observed that the effect of polcon3 on SOEs is 0.040 (1.040 – 0.999) and on non-SOEs is 
0.069 (1.126 – 1.057). However, similar to the performance effect of polcon2 on SOEs and 
non-SOEs, the effect of polcon3 on both is not statistically significant in the contrast 
analysis. Collectively, it is found that polcon3 could ambiguously help both SOEs and non-
SOEs to improve their performance in the contrast analysis. For polcon4, the margin 
analysis points to the fact that the effect of polcon4 on the performance of SOEs and non-
SOEs is -0.021 (0.987 – 1.0098) and 0.037 (1.096 – 1.059) respectively. These effects 
remain statistically insignificant in the contrast analysis. Such empirical results regarding 
the impact of the four different definitions of political connections conclude that only the 
first type of political connection has a negative impact on the performance of state-
controlled companies, that is, the presence of government, military, court or procuracy 
officials or members of national, provincial and local Congresses. This finding from the 
performance effect of polcon1 in the further analysis continues to support the grabbing-
hand role of political connection of all types of the state-controlled manufacturing 
companies. Consequently, the dark side of the presence of government, military, procuracy 
or court officials, or members of national, provincial or local Congresses, may result in an 
agency problem in the corporate governance of listed SOEs in Vietnam. However, 
inconclusive effects are found in terms of the interactions of political connection types II, 
III, IV and the dummy variable of SOE on the performance of listed manufacturing 
companies. Therefore, the role of managers and memberships of various industry 
associations, lecturers or cadres in state-affiliated academic universities or institutions, and 
Communist-Party members is equivocal in the firm fixed-effect estimation models. As a 
result, the findings also inadequately confirm all the hypotheses regarding the positive 
effects of all types of political connection on firm performance. These further findings also 
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show that market investors should not be concerned about the presence of Communist-
Party members, members of various industry associations, or lecturers or cadres of state-
affiliated academic institutions/universities on the boards of SOEs and non-SOEs. On the 
other hand, they are likely to expect the forced or voluntary resignations of government, 
military, court, procurary officials and members of national, provincial and local 
congresses on the boards of listed SOEs. In contrast, market investors should also not be   
concerned about the presence of those officials on the board of listed non-SOEs.  
The effect of the strength of political connections for SOEs is statistically significant at b=-
0.077 and for non-SOEs it is insignificant. Therefore, when many types of political 
connection with different political administrative rankings exist wihthin a firm, the results 
show that the grabbing-hand role of such connections becomes more pronounced in SOEs 
than in non-SOEs. In other words, the politically connected directors in SOEs currently or 
formerly holding high positions in the political system are inclined to follow their rent-
seeking interests rather than focusing on firm value maximisation. Otherwise, the 
performance effects of the ratio of political connection for both SOEs and non-SOEs are 
statistically insignificant, thus indicating that the number of politically connected directors 
on the board might not be sufficient to affect firm performance. In association with the 
control variables, their results remain unchanged compared to those in all the preceding 
models. 
5.7. CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 5: 
The first aim of this chapter was to examine the direct influence of political connections 
on firm performance in the sample of listed manufacturing companies in Vietnam over the 
extended period of time from 2007 to 2016. The panel data set used in the chapter was 
mainly hand-collected from the annual reports of 172 listed manufacturing companies, 
other governmental agencies and internet sources. Market-based performance such as 
Tobin’s Q was employed as a proxy for firm performance. The findings reveal that the 
performance effect of politically connected directors on the board is rent-seeking, and 
hence the presence of such members of the board of directors or supervisory board is not 
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beneficial for the performance of the company. The above findings support Hypothesis 5.2, 
which states that political connection will have a negative influence on market-based 
company performance. The second aim of the chapter was to explore the effects of political 
connection on the performance of listed SOEs and non-SOEs. In relation to the knowledge-
based scope of the thesis, few studies have been conducted to date on whether the impact 
of political connection on the operational performance of the companies is likely to vary 
between state-controlled and non-state-controlled companies. Moreover, previous studies 
have often focused on samples of listed Chinese companies, which may result in the 
findings being generalisable to other emerging countries. Using a sample of Vietnamese 
listed companies in the manufacturing sector and a different recent research time span 
(2007 – 2016), this study is expected to extend the findings of the previous studies on 
China. As a result, the baseline model underpins the notion that political connection is of 
no value to listed privately controlled companies, which is not in line with the integrated 
theoretical resource dependency and helping-hand frameworks. In contrast, the study has 
discovered that the presence of politically connected board of directors or supervisory 
board members is detrimental to the performance of state-controlled manufacturing 
enterprises. This finding is in favour of the theoretical and empirical realms, that the 
competitive advantages of political connection are likely to be restrained in state-controlled 
manufacturing companies. In other words, such companies may aim to employ political 
connection in a different manner than privately-controlled manufacturing companies. This 
finding thus endorses the integrated theoretical agency and grabbing-hand frameworks, 
which leads to the notion that politically connected board of directors or supervisory board 
pursue rent-seeking interests instead of maximising the firm’s economic value and 
shareholder’s interests. This negative consequence inevitably results in agency conflicts 
between the state, as largest shareholder, and minority shareholders.  
The findings of the chapter contribute to the literature on the performance effect of political 
connections in emerging countries (Faccio, 2005; Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008). The 
majority of studies have discovered a positive performance effect of political connection 
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(Boubakri et al., 2008; Bao et al., 2015; Shin et al., 2017), although a few have identified 
a negative role (Wong, 2010; Habib et al., 2017). The findings from the main regression 
analysis of this study also contribute to the research on the performance effect of political 
connections in Vietnam by Malesky & Taussig (2009), who also discovered the grabbing-
hand role of politically connected owners in a survey sample of entrepreneurial companies 
employing data from the General Statistics Office. However, this study differs from that of 
Malesky & Taussig (2009), in that its approach is focused on the structure of corporate 
governance, based on the collection of biographical information of the board members, the 
board of directors and the supervisory board members. Moreover, unlike other studies on 
political connections, and in line with the Vietnamese context, this study complements the 
definitions of political connection in previous studies by expanding its meaning. 
Specifically, the study considers a Chairperson, CEO, director or board member to be 
politically connected if he or she has previously held or currently holds a position in the 
Communist Party Committee, the government, military, procuracy or courts, the People’s 
Council or National Council; is a member of the Communist-Party; or is a lecturer or 
official in state-affiliated academic universities/institutions. These types of political 
connection have often been overlooked in previous studies (Liu et al., 2016; Tang et al., 
2016; Shin et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2018). On the other hands, the findings from the further 
analysis show that the presence of type I politically connected directors or supervisory 
board members, such as government, procuracy, court or military officials, or members of 
the National Congress or People’s Council, has a negative effect on firm performance. In 
comparison to the first category of political connection, it has been found that the presence 
of politically connected directors who are, or used to be, members of the Communist Party, 
managers or members of various industry associations, or lecturers or officials in state-
affiliated academic universities/institutions is not likely to influence the performance of the 
manufacturing listed companies in Vietnam. These findings from the further analysis 
contribute to the literature on how each type of political connection might have different 
effects on corporate governance. This contrasts with the study of Wong et al. (2018), but 
is in line with that of Shi et al. (2018). Furthermore, the findings on the strength of political 
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connection extend the results of Chen et al. (2017), indicating a negative performance 
effect of companies having multiple political connections with higher administrative 
rankings in the highly unified Vietnamese political system. This shows that a greater 
number of interactions with governmental officials by a company could become 
disadvantageous to its operations based on the measurement of market-based performance. 
Therefore, these interactions result in more hurdles for firms rather than providing them 
with resources. In addition, previous studies have often analysed the effect of political 
connection on the performance of companies in multiple sectors (Wang and Lin, 2017; 
You and Du, 2012; Cao et al. 2017; Wu et al. 2018), but with a few also aiming to assess 
such impact on one specific sector, such as the manufacturing industry (Zhang et al., 2014; 
Sun et al., 2016); the real-estate industry (Ling, Zhou, Liang, Song, & Zeng, 2016); the air 
transportation industry (Brown, 2016); and the tourism industry (Wang and Xu, 2011). 
Therefore, this study contributes to this strand of literature by describing the performance 
effect of political connection on the manufacturing listed companies in Vietnam.  
Furthermore, the second finding of the study help to reconcile the inconclusive findings of 
previous research on the importance of taking into account the identity of the controlling 
shareholders, which tends to have been previously underexplored, in order to examine the 
net value effect of political connections (Wu et al. 2012; Wang, 2015; Tihanyi et al., 2019). 
In other words, this study contributes to the literature by examining the value effect of 
political connections by taking into account the different ownership ties, namely state-
controlled and non-state-controlled enterprises (SOEs and non-SOEs respectively). In 
addition, the study answers the research call from Tihanyi et al. (2019) for further 
integration of state ownership and political connections. Tihanyi et al. (2019) themselves 
made a first attempt at linking the two strands of state ownership and political connection 
by proposing that they have different goals and motivations. While companies connect with 
the state to help follow their corporate agendas, the state invests in firms to pursue its policy 
agendas. The different strategic decisions followed by these companies are consistent with 
their interests. The findings from this chapter have shown that the competitive advantages 
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obtained by political connections are restrained in SOEs. Generally, the empirical evidence 
suggests that the benefits of political connections are lost in SOEs, confirming the 
coexistence-versus-substitution effect between these forms of state involvement.  
Given the negative and positive influences of politically connected board of directors or 
supervisory board members in state-controlled and non-state-controlled manufacturing 
companies respectively, the policy makers should place more emphasis on improving the 
regulatory framework to restrain the rent-seeking or highly corrupt practices of politically 
connected board directors or supervisory board members. In parallel with the advanced 
legal framework, the government should put greater effort into creating a more enabling 
business environment for private enterprises. In particular, because of the discriminatory 
business environment faced by private companies in Vietnam, they tend to forge closer 
relationships with government officials to increase their legitimacy (Vu et al. 2015; 
Nguyen, 2009). Therefore, private companies should have more equal access to 
government resources, specifically bank loans from government, critical information and 
government contracts. Currently, however, one of the most crucial institutional and 
economic reforms in the context of the Vietnamese business environment is the 
privatisation process (Boubakri et al. 2008; Vu et al., 2015). In recent years, this process 
has only yielded a modest outcome, as the driving forces of Vietnamese economic 
development remains state-owned business groups. However, the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance of these economic groups is considered to be low, as a result of the 
rent-seeking or highly corrupt practices of government officials acting as the directors in 
these groups (Kim et al. 2010). Therefore, the privatisation is likely one of the most 
significant facets of economic and institutional reforms in Vietnam (Boubakri et al. 2008; 
Domadenik et al. 2015). Through the stronger implementation of the privatisation process 
in Vietnam, the role of state as business owner will be eroded and replaced by the role of 
regulator of the economy, which leads to the perspective that the state will transforms its 
role from economic intervention to institutional reforms23 (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Fan 
 
23 The phenomenon of the state acting both as business owner and regulator in the economy  is termed as “both kick the ball and blow the whistle” 
178 
 
et al. 2007). On the basis of this empirical chapter, the following chapter will undertake 
more in-depth investigation of the influence of legal framework improvement and the 
implementation of anti-corruption campaigns and other institutions, on the political 
connection-firm performance relationship. Conducting such analysis will help answer the 
following empirical question: “How does the role of political connection vary during 
regional institutional development?” 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CONNECTION 
DURING REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A 
UNIFIED FRAMEWORK OF CONTINGENCY AND 
RESOURCES-BASED VIEWPOINTS. 
6.1. INTRODUCTION: 
In accordance with the earlier findings presented in Chapter 5, it is recommended that the 
government should liberalise the market, decentralise state control, and restrain 
government intervention. In addition, the equitisation or privatisation process needs to be 
promoted, with the institutional reform being one of the priority government targets. A 
question naturally arises: what role does political connection play in the face of the 
progression of the regional institutional environment?. Since the early economic and 
institutional reforms of 1990, the Vietnamese government has already made the plans for 
the diffusion of liberal state models across the provinces. This emphasises the fact that 
provincial institutional development was recognised in the very early stages of the process. 
Considering the overall picture of institutional development at the national level, however, 
it can be seen that the market-oriented reforms have not been homogenous throughout 
Vietnam; the quality of formal institutions have been subject to significant variations 
among the provinces. In the institutional heterogeneity across provinces, political 
connection might play different roles in entrepreneurial activities (USAID  et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, according to the report by USAID et al. (2016), the majority of the firms 
surveyed perceived that their dependence on political connections was necessary to obtain 
information relevant to provincial developmental policies, to reach legal settlements in 
commercial disagreements, and to avoid the frequent harassment of inspections by 
government officials, among other advantages. Many previous empirical studies have 
conjectured that political connections play a substituting role for formal institutions, and 
thus their effect might weaken as such insitutions improve (Zhou, 2014). However, other 
empirical studies have also highlighted that political connections complement formal 
institutional growth in facilitating entrepreneurial growth (Ferris et al., 2016). As a result, 
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it is unclear as to whether they complement or substitute for formal institutions, since 
political connections to date have had even more influential effects on entrepreneurial 
activities (Bao et al., 2015).  
On the other hand, through the initiative of the evaluation of the business environment in 
Vietnam, the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in a joint partnership with 
the United States Agency for International Development, started to collect information on 
private companies’ perceptions of the business environment across different industrial 
sectors in 64 provinces in Vietnam in 2006. All the information collected relevant to the 
aim of forming a friendly-business environment across Vietnamese provinces is being 
compiled into a provincial competitiveness index, consisting of many institutional 
indicators. Utilising this unique database, the main aim of this chapter is to re-examine the 
performance effect of political connection once the regional institutional reforms have 
achieved a higher level of efficiency. The varied institutional indicators consist of the legal 
system, the corruption, the business support service, and the entry costs. The rationale to 
include these institutional variables derives from the limited extent of studies on how such 
variables interact with political connection in determining firm performance. It has long 
been recognised in the literature on political connection that its relationship with firm 
performance is reliant upon the specific contexts (Peng et al., 2005). However, this stream 
of research remains underdeveloped. In particular, the empirical evidence on the joint 
effect of political connection and such institutional indicators on the operational activities 
of firms is inconclusive (Brockman et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Zhou, 2014; Zhao et al., 
2016).  
The contribution of this chapter is to enrich our understanding of the contingent role of 
political connections in emerging countries in different institutional conditions. The 
majority of previous studies on political connection are limited to overall appraisal of its 
influence on firm performance. Therefore, this chapter departs from earlier research by 
taking a closer look at how the regional institutional environment influences the association 
between political connection and firm performance. Moreover, many studies have not 
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employed a specific measurement of formal institutions, but either employ a country 
dummy (one specific country versus other transitional or emerging countries) or time 
(before versus after a certain year) to show institutional differences (Cull & Xu, 2005; 
Zhou, 2011). Using a different approach to these studies, this chapter is based on one index 
jointly compiled by VCCI and USAID24 to measure the development of formal regional 
institutions. The index is different from the NERI index25 used by some studies, such as 
those of Fan et al. (2007) and Zhou (2014) in China, because it embodies more institutional 
indicators specific to the Vietnamese context and reflects the fundamental paradigm of 
institutional reforms in Vietnam. Unlike Chapter 5, in general this chapter establishes that 
the effect of political connection becomes positive as the quality of the legal system and 
the perceived level of corruption at the regional level improve. Using a unified framework 
based on the contingency approach and resources-based viewpoint, politically connected 
directors or supervisory board members become a valuable human resource asset in 
improving the operational performance of the listed companies. In contrast, the role of 
political connection does not seem to be influenced by the development of business support 
services and the extent of entry barriers at the regional level. This demonstrates that 
political connection may not help the listed companies in the sample to procure the 
competitive advantages during the development of business intermediaries and the 
different levels of entry barriers to entrepreneurial participation. These findings remain 
unchanged when the definition of political connection is narrowed down and the strength 
and ratio of political connection are employed in the robustness check section of the 
chapter. The findings may help international and market investors to comprehend the 
context of the Vietnamese business environment and the fact that mutual interaction 
between political relationships and the business environment is inevitable at any level of 
institutional development.    
 
24 VCCI and USAID stand for the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the United States Agency for International Development.   
25 The NERI index is used to measure the regional institutional development in China.  
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The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 presents the development of 
hypotheses. Section 6.3 provides the empirical strategy. Section 6.4 presents the analysis 
of results; and Section 6.5 focuses on the discussions of the findings.   
6.2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT: 
The literature in Chapter 3 shows that the role of political connection may be reshaped in 
relation to the ever-evolving institutional environment (Zhao et al., 2016; Yan and Chang, 
2018). These studies adopt contingency and resources-based theoretical angles to unravel 
how political connection and regional institutional development interactively influence the 
performance of listed companies. Adopting this theoretical line of reasoning, this study 
also adheres to the combined framework of contingency and resources-based viewpoints 
to develop the hypotheses and interpret the findings.  
The weak quality of legal enforcements opens the door to informal practices, including 
political connection (Malesky & Taussig, 2009; La Porta et al., 1998). In situations in 
which legal enforcement is not sufficient to protect firms’ operations and private property 
rights, political connections can be an alternative mechanism through which firms can 
facilitate their business activities, and consequently improve firm performance (Li et al., 
2008; Brockman et al., 2013). Specifically, political connections reduce the cost of  
settlements linked to legal failures, as in developing countries, when legal enforcement and 
protection are not available or are appropriate, disputes between enterprises, or between 
enterprises and creditors, are most resolved or influenced by government bureaucrats rather 
than the courts (Zhou, 2014; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Moreover, in 
many emerging countries, politically connected firms are more likely to receive protection 
or sponsorship from government if facing insolvency or financial problems (Cheng & 
Leung, 2016; Faccio et al., 2006). Therefore, in regions where the legal institutions cannot 
settle disputes between creditors and enterprises, creditors such as banks often perceive a 
firm’s political connections as a major form of collateral for their financing decisions 
(Malesky & Taussig, 2009). From the above arguments, inferior legal institutions in 
countries or regions make entrepreneurs participate in politics in order to give them an 
183 
 
advantage in the face of weak legal enforcement of economic and commercial disputes. 
This suggests that the benefits of an entrepreneur’s political connections may be more 
evident for firms operating in less protective legal environments (Faccio & Hsu, 2013; Shi 
et al., 2018). These previous studies support the substitution role of political connections 
for law and order weaknesses (Li et al., 2008; Brockman et al., 2013).  
On the other hand, taking the opposing viewpoint, some researchers contend that the 
facilitating role of political connection in many developing and transition economies may 
not evolve from the fragility of the legal system, but from the long-existing political 
markets that promote resource allocation and problem solving via political power (Boisot 
et al. 1996). In such circumstances, political connection has been found to play an 
important role in political and economic areas because of newly established political 
markets in those former transition economies or regions that have successfully created the 
rule of law, such as Hungary (Stark & Vedres, 2012). In addition, as the quality of legal 
institutions improves, politically connected directors on boards are less likely to extract the 
economic rents from the firm. Specifically, the legal system  becomes increasingly stricter 
and more efficient in punishing bureaucrats for any corruption (Berkman et al., 2010; 
Domadenik et al., 2015). Therefore, this line of reasoning implies that political connection 
plays a resource-providing role in the operations of the companies in regions that have 
successfully established the order of the rule of law, rather than compensating for fragility 
in the rule of law. This in turn promotes the value of the firms in these regions.   
Hypothesis 6.1: There is the positive effect of political connection on the performance of 
listed companies in the provinces characterised by better quality of legal institutions.  
Based on many earlier studies, the effect of political connection can be more pronounced 
in the regions characterised by a high level of corruption (Faccio, 2005; Brockman et al., 
2013). It could be argued that weak institutional environments give corrupt politicians a 
free hand to use firms for their private benefits, thus incurring additional costs for 
shareholders, which in turn negatively influences firm performance (Brockman et al., 2013; 
Xu et al., 2016). On the other hand, a country or region characterised by a well-functioning 
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legal system will benefit from fair application of the law, more transparency of government 
activities, and rigorous enforcement of rules and policies. In such countries or regions, 
politicians are more strictly supervised and checked to deter them from abusing their power 
in pursuit of private interests at the public’s cost. Consequently, it is assumed that the 
corrupt incentives of the politicians on boards may be controlled, making them provide 
firms with resources, rather than extracting the resources from them (Berkman et al., 2010; 
Shin et al., 2017). Many previous studies have pinpointed that in economies with a well-
functioning legal system and low level of corruption, former politicians acting on the board 
of directors might still be valuable for the firm in various ways (Ferris et al., 2016; Ridge 
et al., 2016). For instance, the prospects of future industrial employment may lead 
politicians to adapt their behaviour in a favourable way for prospective employers 
regarding the enforcement of regulations. In exchange, the companies might receive the 
networking benefits of former or current politicians, allowing them to save time when 
handling regulatory procedures. Based on the literature review, the study theoretically 
hypothesises that political connection may be harmful to firm performance in regions 
characterised by a high level of corruption, but that this effect becomes weaker or even 
becomes positive in provinces with low levels of political corruption.  
Hypothesis 6.2: There is the positive effect of political connection on the performance of 
listed companies in provinces with low levels of corruption.     
Political connections provide companies with advantages when attempting to enter 
industries or regions with high entry barriers, allowing them to seek favours from 
government officials who have ultimate control over scare resources (Tsang, 1998). Such 
patronages includes receipt of entry permits, information about governmental policies, and 
easy access to finance and technology (Hellman et al., 2003; Peng et al., 2005). Thanks to 
the potential influence of political connection on government policies, and based on the 
theoretical viewpoint of resource dependency, politically connected firms may find it easier 
to enter provinces with high barriers or to prevent the market entry of new competitors in 
the same provinces.  
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On the contrary, when firms focus their business on industries with low entry barriers or 
when their involvement in industries with high entry barriers is low, their political 
connections are therefore less important. Furthermore, in industries with less market entry 
difficulties, the role of governmental agencies in allocating resources is diminished. In such 
circumstances, instead of securing resources procured by political connection, companies 
are more likely to secure those from market intermediaries such as brokers, traders, dealers, 
and companies specialised in searching for executives (W. Li et al., 2012).  
On the other hand, Boubakri et al. (2008) employed the measurements of Djankov et al. 
(2002), namely the number of start-up procedures, to proxy for bureaucracy. In their 
explanations, a large number of such procedures will constitute a barrier to entry and will 
protect incumbent firms against competition. Many privatised firms are either monopolistic 
or quasi-monopolistic, so appreciate such entry barriers. Political connections can help to 
protect firms against competition. Specifically, politically connected firms can often use 
their influence or power to manipulate or to influence local government officials’ decisions 
on issuing the regulatory barriers against the competitors’ market participation. Therefore, 
it is hypothesised that political connection is beneficial for firm performance in the 
institutional context of high entry barriers.  
Hypothesis 6.3: There is the positive effect of political connection on the performance of 
listed companies in the provinces characterised by a high level of entry barriers. 
Intermediate institutions refer to professional service organisations that provide firms with 
supporting services in areas such as accounting and finance, talent search, law, and 
technology services (Yan and Li, 2010). McEvily and Zaheer (1999) state that such 
institutions “facilitate the development of competitive capabilities among local firms by 
acting as network intermediaries for interaction and information exchange among firms.” 
Specifically, they sit at the intersection of many firms, organisations and industries, and 
often promote the exchange of information on the innovation and the process of technology 
transfer between firms (Wolpert, 2002).  
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Furthermore, institutional deficiency, especially the lack of intermediate institutions, 
facilitates transition economies (Palepu & Khanna, 2006). A lack of intermediate 
institutions promotes firms’ dependence upon both political and informal relationships in 
order to facilitate their activities in transition economies (Peng, 2003). However, as 
economic transition proceeds, and intermediate institutions become relatively more 
developed, they fill gaps by supplying support services to facilitate market-based 
transitions and the flow of information. They are conducive to economic exchanges which 
help achieve conditions that are appropriate for making transactions more reliant on market 
institutions rather than on political or informal personal relationships (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997). Therefore, the variation in the development of intermediate institutions shows the 
different effects of political capital on firms’ operational efficiency. Furthermore, the 
development of such institutions is heterogeneous across regions in Vietnam, and it is 
expected that in regions with better-developed intermediate institutions, the capabilities of 
political capital in influencing firms’ operational efficiency will be weakened. Specifically, 
the presence of a large number of intermediate institutions in a region indicates an 
information-rich environment, which provides a variety of alternative sources of 
knowledge and information which give further opportunities to private enterprises to apply 
their skills and knowledge as they seek business opportunities (Zhao et al., 2016). 
Institution-based research explains that intermediate institutions supply objective 
information and advice and encourage the spread of information (Gulati, 1998; Wolpert, 
2002). The following hypothesis is therefore proposed:  
Hypothesis 6.4: There is a positive effect of political connection on firm performance in 
provinces characterised by low quality of intermediate institutions.  
6.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: 
6.3.1. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES:  
Similar to Chapter 5, the data sample in this chapter consists of an unbalanced sample of 
172 manufacturing companies between 2007 and 2016. The biographical information 
about members of board of directors was obtained from the annual reports of the listed 
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companies, while financial data was extracted from the financial data provider of Vietstock 
in Vietnam. The chapter utilises the same dependent, independent and control variables as 
Chapter 5. However, additional macroeconomic variables are also included in the model, 
such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, and employment. Previous studies have identified a 
relationship between a region’s level of entrepreneurial performance and its degree of 
economic development, as proxied by its income per capita (Wennekers et al., 2005). Early 
research shows a negative relationship, but more recent studies have shown a U-shaped 
relationship due to higher levels of human capital, higher product diversity, and changes in 
the sectoral variety of activities (e.g., a shift towards services) as regions obtain higher 
levels of income per capita (Wennekers et al., 2005). Based on previous research, this study 
uses income per capita as a control variable for the variation across provinces of the 
distribution of entrepreneurial effort towards high-growth activities. Previous studies have 
identified a positive relationship between the rate of GDP growth and level of 
entrepreneurial performance across countries and over time (Carree et al., 2002). Because  
the dependent variable of this study is relevant to company performance, a higher rate of 
GDP growth would be expected to be in favour of such expectations, which predict a 
positive relationship between a province’s GDP growth rate and firm performance. 
Regarding employment, some studies have shown that regions with a high percentage of 
skilled labour over total population often provide companies with sources of high-quality 
employees, which promotes company performance (Bin et al., 2020). In particular, such 
employees have high levels of education, professionalism and skills to adapt to companies’ 
increasing scales of regional production (Bin et al., 2020). Consequently, this study used 
the percentage of skilled labour aged over 18 to the total population in a province to proxy 
for the level of employment.  
With regard to institutional data, the database of the Provincial Competitiveness Index 
(PCI) jointly compiled by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was employed. The PCI 
was introduced in 2005, with the VCCI and USAID conducting an annual business survey, 
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evaluation and ranking of the economic governance quality of provincial governments in 
forming a favourable business environment for the development of the private sector. The 
data for the provincial competitiveness index for 2007 to 2016 are available on its website.  
In general, the PCI encompasses ten sub-indices, reflecting the economic governance 
sectors which influence the development of the private sector. A province that has a high 
PCI index is one that has: (1) low entry costs for business start-ups; (2) easy access to land 
and security of business premises; (3) a transparent and equitable business environment; 
(4) minimal informal charges; (5) limited time requirements for bureaucratic procedures 
and inspections; (6) limited crowding out of private activity from policy biases in relation 
to state, foreign, or connected companies; (7) proactive and creative provincial leadership 
in dealing with enterprise problems; (8) developed and high-quality business support 
services; (9) sound labour training policies; and (10) fair and effective legal procedures for 
dispute resolution.  
The PCI is formulated in a three-step sequence, referred to as “the three Cs”: 1) gather 
business survey data and published data sources; 2) compute nine sub-indices and 
standardise to a 10-point scale; and 3) calibrate the PCI composites as the weighted mean 
of nine sub-indices with a maximum score of 100 points. The firm sample was selected 
using random sampling to represent provincial populations, and the stratification was used 
to guarantee that firm age, legal type, and sector were accurately represented. This chapter 
adopts the approach of Zhou (2014) and Wu et al. (2018) by defining a region as a province 
or a central city and assigning firms to regions based on the province/city in which they 
have their headquarters. For the scope of the thesis based on the previously defined 
hypotheses, four institutional indicators are used in the study: Legal institutions, the extent 
of informal payments (the extent of corruption), entry costs and business support services. 
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TABLE 6- 1: INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS COMPONENTS. 
Institutional 
Indicators 
The Components of Institutional Indicators 
Corruption 
Indicator 
The enterprises in my line of business usually have to pay for 
informal charges 
The percentage of firms paying over 10 percent of their revenue 
in informal charges.  
The rent-seeking phenomenon is widespread in handling 
administrative procedures for businesses 
The informal charges delivered expected results.  
The informal charges are at acceptable levels.  
Corruption Score A higher score indicates a lower extent of corruption in a 
province. 
Legal System 
Indicator 
The legal system provides mechanisms for firms to appeal against 
officials’ corrupt behaviour.  
Firms are confident that the legal system will uphold their 
property rights and contrasts.  
Number of cases filed by non-state entities at the provincial 
economic court per 100 firms 
Percentage of claimants at the provincial economic court 
Non-state claimants as Provincial court judge economic cases by 
the law 
Provincial court resolve economic cases quickly 
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Court judgments are enforced quickly 
Legal aid agencies support business in the use of laws when 
disputes arise 
Formal and informal costs are acceptable; judgements by the court 
are fair.  
Willingness to use the courts when disputes arise; percentage of 
cases solved 
Legal System 
Score 
A higher score indicates the better legal system quality.  
Entry Cost 
Indicator 
Length of business registration in days.  
Median wait in days to wait for land use rights certificate.  
Percentage of firms waiting more than one month to complete all 
steps necessary to start operations. 
Percentage of firms waiting more than three months to complete 
all steps necessary to start operations. 
Percentage of firms registering or re-registering through a one-
stop shop.  
Guidance and instruction on procedures at the one-stop-shop are 
clear and adequate.  
Staffs at the one-stop-shop are professional and knowledgeable.  
Staffs at the one-stop-shop are friendly.  
IT application at the one-stop-shop is good. 
None of the above criteria are met.  
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Entry Cost Score A higher score indicates a low level of entry costs in a province. 
Business Support 
Service Indicator 
Trade fairs held by the province in previous years and registered 
for present years.  
Ratio of the total number of service providers to the total number 
of firms.  
The firm has used business information search services.  
The firm has used private providers for business information 
search services.  
The firm intends to use the service provider again for business 
information search services.  
The firm has used consulting on regulatory information 
The firm used private provider for consulting on regulatory 
information 
The firm intends to use the service provider again for consulting 
on regulatory information.  
The firm has used business match making services.  
The firm used private provider for business match making 
services.  
The firm intends to use the service provider again for business 
match making services.  
Business Support 
Service Score 
A higher score indicates a better quality of business support 
service.  
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6.3.2. ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND VARIABLES:  
This sub-section aims to illustrate the empirical models with the purpose of ascertaining 
the outcomes that support or reject the suggested hypotheses. The model used to test the 
hypotheses is shown below:  
𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4
∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝25𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11
∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽12 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽13 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where, i=1,…., 172 companies and j=1,…., n provinces.  
Identification of the dependent variable, independent and control variables was made in 
Chapter 5. The new institutional and macro-economic variables are justified as follows:  
Moderating Variables:  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 includes the institutional indicators as follows:  
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 shows the quality of the legal system in the province j in which the firm 
i is located at time t.  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 shows the extent of corruption in the province j in which the firm i is 
located at time t.  
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 shows the level of barriers against start-ups’ entry in the province j in which 
the firm i is located at time t.  
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 shows the quality of business support service in the 
province j in which the firm i is located at time t.  
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The control variables in this study consist of the following firm characteristics:   
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the measure of the economic output that accounts for the number of 
people in the province j in which the firm i is located at time t.  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the rate of GDP growth in the province j in which the firm i is located 
at time t.  
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage of trained employed workers aged 15 years of age and 
above in the province j in which the firm i is located at time t.  
According to Baron & Kenny (1986), the moderation hypotheses between political 
connection and regional institutional indicators exist if their interactions are statistically 
significant. There may be the significantly main effects of political connection and regional 
institutional indicators on Tobin’s Q, but they are not directly relevant to the moderation 
hypothesis. However, the regression models, including the interaction terms, often suffer 
from the issues of multi-collinearity (Iacobucci et al., 2017). The optimal solution, as 
suggested by Iacobucci et al. (2017), is mean-centering of the continuous predictors prior 
to calculating the product term. Therefore, before running regressions, this study tended to 
mean-center the main continuous variables in the model, namely the legal system, 
corruption, entry costs, business support services and the strength and ratio of political 
connection before interacting them together in the model.  
According to previous studies (Shi et al., 2018; Wong and Hooy, 2018), there are the 
different functions characterised by disparate types of political connection in the firms. 
Accordingly, a further step is taken in this chapter to separate the effect of different types 
of political connection. Furthermore, the aggregation of these different types may help to 
establish the strength of political connection, instead of discovering the effect of the distinct 
types of political connection (Chen et al., 2017). In doing so, it is believed that various 
types of political connection can be integrated to make the operational efficiency of the 
firm better or weaker compared to use of only one. The process of creating the strength of 
political connection has been suggested in Chapter 5. In continuation, this chapter also 
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takes account of the concentration of political connection as measured by the ratio of 
politically connected directors on the board to consider the effect of interactions of this 
concentration and regional institutional indicators on firm performance. Deployment of 
concentration of political connection may help to quantify its nature on a continuous scale, 
instead of using one binary measurement to calculate its existence. The following sections 
will examine in more details and interpret the empirical results.    
6.3.3. METHODOLOGY:  
Similar to the methodology employed in Chapter 5, this section uses panel data analysis as 
the main method of estimation to capture the long-run joint impact of political connection 
and regional institutional development upon firm performance. Therefore, fixed-effects 
and random-effects analysis of estimation are also employed. The Hausman test and F-test 
exhibit the appropriate models of estimation, and test-parm test is used to determine 
whether time dummies need to be included in all the models or not. The advantages of 
using fixed-effects and random-effects models were discussed Chapter 4. As in Chapter 5, 
two-step system GMM estimation is employed to deal with the endogeneity issue. In 
addition, the results for ARtest (1) and ARtest (2) are reported to check for issues of auto-
correlation, and a Hansen test conducted to examine the validity of instruments in the two-
step system GMM model.    
6.4. PRE-REGRESSION RESULTS:  
6.4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS:  
This sub-section presents the descriptive statistics of the variables utilised in this chapter 
for each province, representing the main characteristics of the data, and involving the mean 
value. 
The results in Table 6-2 show the distribution and incidence of all the variables for each 
province. For the variable of political connection, politically connected companies are most 
prevalent in eleven provinces. In particular, the majority of which are distributed in the 
northern and southern regions of Vietnam. Additionally, the power of political connection 
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is the highest in the province of Kon Tum (2.325), whereas its concentration is the highest 
in the province of An Giang (1.193).  
With regard to institutional indicators, Da Nang has the highest-quality legal system 
(5.862), whilst Dong Thap has the highest level of corruption (7.216). Da Nang also has 
the lowest level of market entry costs (8.899). Unsurprisingly, Ho Chi Minh City, the 
economic hub of the country, has the best quality of business support services, in terms of 
the development and size of the financial market, workforce, and services (7.190). As for 
the indicators of economic growth, Bac Ninh has the highest GDP growth (12.55), while 
BRVT has the highest GDP per capita (114.1). Regarding employment, Hoa Binh is the 
province with the largest percentage of skilled workers out of total employment (63.4).  
TABLE 6-2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ALL VARIABLES BY PROVINCES: 
Variabl
e 
Obs Polco
n 
Polcon
1 
Polcon2 Polcon3 Polcon
4 
PCstrengt
h  
Ratio 
of 
Polco
n 
Tobin’s 
Q 
CEO 
Duality 
Ln(boardsi
ze) 
Top1 Top25 
An 
Giang 
41 1 1 0.243 0.243 0.146 1.531 1.193 0.939 0.682 1.549 35.16 20.29 
BRVT 11 0.636 0.636 0 0 0.090 1.381 1.136 0.961 0.545 1.255 49.74 1.27 
Bac 
Lieu 
9 0.333 0.333 0 0 0 0.462 0 0.951 0 1.459 29.73 13.41 
Bac 
Ninh 
33   1 1 0 0 0 1.673 0.182 0.881 0.515 1.496 35.11 14.78 
Ben Tre 25 0.92 0.84 0 0 0.36 1.233 0.050 1.081 0.64 1.418 28.93 17.45 
Binh 
Dinh 
10 1 1 0 0 0 1.609 0.396 1.654 0.9 1.287 29.71 24.59 
Binh 
Duong 
88 0.727 0.647 0.079 0.068 0.011 0.916 0.013 0.933 0.386 1.436 28.98 20.44 
Binh 
Thuan 
9 1 1  0 1 0 2.015 0.287 0.979 0.875 1.258 40 0 
Ca Mau 17 0.823 0.647   0.176 0.235 0.176 0.967 0.034 1.022 0.647 1.728 36.99 21.76 
Can 
Tho 
34 0.764 0.441 0 0.411 0.205 1.306 0.112 1.351 0.823 1.336 30.35 16.69 
Da 
Nang 
51 0.705 0.549 0 0 0.137 0.834 0.086 1.017 0.431 1.381 39.77 15.17 
Dong 
Nai 
98 0.469 0.469 0 0 0.112 0.813 0.059 0.951 0.224 1.319 41.54 12.63 
Dong 
Thap 
34 0.470 0.411 0 0 0.294 0.983 0.096 1.320 0.470 1.452 36.17 19.94 
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Gia Lai 7 0.714 0.714 0 0 0 0.751 0.017 1.018 0 1.850 35.23 9.52 
Ha Nam 12 0.464 0.416 0 0 0.416 0.821 0.183 0.785 0 1.459 37.10 11.36 
Ha Noi 196 0.765 0.668 0.0051 0.102 0.158 1.170 0.065 0.941 0.443 1.423 33.02 15.20 
Hai 
Duong 
15 1 1 0 0.2 0.2 1.430 0.161 1.049 0.466 1.379 35.58 10.73 
Hai 
Phong  
42 0.690 0.690   0  0.190 0.190 1.094 0.125 0.882 0.119 1.460 32.69 10.12 
Hoa 
Binh 
8  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.526 0 1.298 29.33 4.33 
Hung 
Yen  
25 0.6 0.6 0 0 0.4 0.702 0.070 1.210 0.36 1.606 33.76 8.99 
Kon 
Tum 
7 1 1 0 0 0 2.325 0.476 0.518 0 1.304 41.67 13.75 
Lam 
Dong 
14 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.804 0.118 0.802 0.538 1.431 36.38 27.91 
Long 
An 
15 1 1 0.267 0 0 1.509 0.317 1.015 0.6 1.675 33.69 15.48 
Nghe 
An 
15 0.533 0.533 0 0 0.533 0.857 0.046 0.960 0 1.479 60.40 2.14 
Ninh 
Binh 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.378 0.5 1.442 51 20.82 
Phu Tho 10 1 1 0 0 0.1 1.126 0.15 1.177 0.1 1.512 68.56 0 
Quang 
Nam 
10 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 1.109 0.233 1.199 0 1.127 51.48 0 
Quang 
Ninh 
22 0.409 0.409 0 0 0.409 0.472 0 0.739 0.363 1.450 30.49 2.72 
Soc 
Trang 
10 1 1 1 0 1 1.905 0.161 1.005 0.9 1.801 29.26 10.49 
Son La 5 0.8 0.6 0 0 0.8 1.577 0.17 1.390 0 1.462 33.15 29.49 
Thanh 
Hoa 
14 1 1 0 0 0 1.546 0.167 0.918 0.428 1.357 54.25 2.89 
Tp 
HCM 
393 0.636 0.559 0.022 0.071 0.190 1.039 0.113 1.115 0.302 1.473 33.66 14.41 
Vinh 
Long 
9 0.667 0.667 0 0 0.667 0.732 0 1.129 0.555 1.522 37.91 12.40 
Yen Bai 9 1 1 0 0 1 1.945 0 1.241 1 1.354 10 11.41 
 Obs ROE Firm 
Size 
Tangibilit
y 
Leverag
e 
Legal 
System 
Corruptio
n 
Entry 
Costs 
Busines
Support 
Services 
GDP 
Growth 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Employme
nt 
An 
Giang 
41 11.23 12.18 0.22 54.45 5.065 6.272 8.367 5.297 7.033 24.19 56.65 
BRVT 11 15.086 11.66 0.327 41.37 4.99 6.019 8.133 5.216 5.732 114.1 52.43 
Bac 
Lieu 
9 8.69 11.56 0.349 68.34 5.76 6.403 8.258 5.044 6.1 30.1 55.71 
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Bac 
Ninh 
33 15.65 11.71 0.339 58.42 5.090 6.239 8.264 5.00083 12.55 76.47 56.36 
Ben Tre 25 16.26 11.70 0.224 45.21 5.543 7.207 8.285 4.730 6.824 22.264 61.15 
Binh 
Dinh 
10 25.059 11.19 0.346 19.73 4.923 6.251 8.639 5.130 7.468 26.29 57.18 
Binh 
Duong 
88 12.24 11.80 0.301 48.29 5.44 6.509 7.650 5.118 9.688 79.143 62.29 
Binh 
Thuan 
9 13.75 10.77 0.074 30.23 5.082 6.460 8.041 5.046 8.648 28.3 54.62 
Ca Mau 17 15.45 12.37 0.235 71.51 5.220 6.082 7.972 4.899 8.057 30.805 55.94 
Can 
Tho 
34 20.69 11.67 0.232 36.70 5.641 6.341 8.257 5.459 12.432 49.19 54.83 
Da 
Nang 
51 17.33 11.69 0.316 54.0063 5.862 6.586 8.899 5.680 10.113 50.41 50.73 
Dong 
Nai 
98 15.76 11.73 0.278 45.66 5.102 6.302 7.879 5.120 9.616 58.779 55.41 
Dong 
Thap 
34 15.75 11.87 0.291 29.46 5.787 7.216 8.437 5.142 8.599 34.31 58.40 
Gia Lai 7 5.28 11.45 0.218 64.26 5.715 5.483 7.836 5.128 7.57 29.6 59.2 
Ha Nam 12 5.61 11.65 0.599 49.42 5.094 6.192 7.998 4.714 12.535 33.35 58.43 
Ha Noi 196 14.43 11.70 0.244 46.41 4.419 5.124 7.669 6.521 8.522 63.41 52.17 
Hai 
Duong 
15 19.095 11.21 0.440 31.90 5.120 6.017 7.974 5.208 9.343 34.90 59.27 
Hai 
Phong 
42 18.16 11.69 0.324 39.91 4.937 5.172 7.856 5.789 9.798 52.52 55.307 
Hoa 
Binh 
8 4.28 11.23 0.220 43.86 5.287 4.783 7.806 5.478 6.985 35.42 63.4 
Hung 
Yen 
25 16.52 12.43 0.245 57.45 4.823 6.085 7.757 4.776 9.464 31.18 59.43 
Kon 
Tum 
7 22.13 11.38 0.241 24.98 5.151 5.552 8.417 5.202 9.182 25.44 57.58 
Lam 
Dong 
14 25.40 11.58 0.179 43.79 5.548 5.815 7.631 4.959 7.358 37.9 58.1 
Long 
An 
15 14.86 12.057 0.272 61.48 5.706 6.725 8.225 5.049 8.86     36.5 58.62 
Nghe 
An 
15 18.26 11.97 0.426 61.67 4.904 4.900 8.323 5.581 7.312 22.65 60.62 
Ninh 
Binh 
4 14.14 11.79 0.060 26.92 5.431 5.874 8.129 4.601 6.94 35.87 61.37 
Phu Tho 10 21.44 12.13 0.357 55.75 4.979 5.640 8.353 5.682 6.566 28.3 61.08 
Quang 
Nam 
10 17.21 11.21 0.323 45.69 5.825 6.538 8.619 5.127 12.492 27.85 56.14 
Quang 
Ninh 
22 10.99 11.73 0.459 64.56 5.0036 6.397 8.452 5.510 8.981 66.18 56.44 
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Soc 
Trang 
10 15.55 12.22 0.173 67.52 5.663 6.952 8.346 4.493 8.541 23.35 54.27 
Son La 5 31.33 11.70 0.390 31.30 4.999 5.498 7.961 5.780 8.306 27.16 62.5 
Thanh 
Hoa 
14 12.71 11.58 0.392 43.48 5.203 5.379 7.933 5.779 8.652 24.97 61.87 
Tp 
HCM 
393 15.20 11.85 0.271 43.40 4.771 5.647 7.575 7.190 9.099 86.014 50.91 
Vinh 
Long 
9 11.41 11.79 0.325 50.15 5.379 6.725 8.497 4.813 8.541 28.077 58.42 
Yen Bai 9 30.97 11.34 0.469 55.34 4.973 6.095 8.170 4.826 7.438 21.75 61.53 
 
6.4.2. CORRELATION MATRIX:  
Table 6-3 shows the correlation matrix between the institutional, macroeconomic variables 
and the remaining variables in the models to establish the likelihood of multi-collinearity. 
From the table, none of the variables in the models have the high values of correlation 
coefficients. Therefore, the analysis of the correlation results in no issues of multi-
collinearity. 
TABLE 6-3: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 Legal 
system 
Corruption Entry Costs Business  
Support 
Service 
GDP 
growth 
GDP per 
capita 
Employment 
Tobin’s Q -0.054** -0.048* -0.082*** 0.202*** 0.099*** -0.037 -0.104*** 
Polcon -0.0097 0.018 0.028 -0.025 0.0068 -
0.108*** 
0.043 
Polcon1 -0.010 0.025 0.018 -0.063** -0.014 -0.115 0.083** 
Polcon2 0.062** 0.081*** 0.050* -0.062** -0.019 -
0.115*** 
0.043 
Polcon3 -0.022 0.015 -0.0036 0.0045 0.041 -0.028 -0.043 
Polcon4 -0.051* 0.030 0.019 -0.023 -0.014 -
0.106*** 
-0.0015 
PCstrength -0.037 0.014 0.0047 -0.0068 0.013 -
0.081*** 
-0.0058 
Ratio of 
Polcon 
0.0095 -0.0036 0.048* 0.026 0.028 -
0.089*** 
-0.046* 
CEO 
Duality 
-0.0037 0.118*** 0.012 -0.111*** 0.060** -
0.136*** 
0.025 
Ln(board 
Size) 
-0.0092 -0.0056 -0.012 0.020 -0.052* 0.0047 -0.0021 
Top1 0.025 -0.030 0.060** -0.027 -0.037 -0.048* 0.014 
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Top25 0.0092 0.034 0.050* -0.014 -0.020 0.045 0.0076 
Ln(firm age) -0.0063 -0.127*** 0.028 0.0053 -0.088 0.104*** -0.052* 
Tangibility -0.017 0.108*** 0.028 -0.062** 0.078*** -
0.091*** 
0.096*** 
Leverage 0.024 0.047* 0.060** -0.115*** -0.050* -0.040 0.062** 
Firm Size -0.0053 -0.033 -0.016 0.025 -
0.077*** 
0.069** -0.015 
 
Additionally, the outcomes from VIF show that none of the models has the values higher 
10, and hence the problem of multi-collinearity does not exist in any of them. The further 
test conducted demonstrates the presence of heteroscedasticity as a major concern in the 
application of the regression analysis. In the Wooldridge test, on the other hand, there is an 
issue of auto-correlation. As a result, clustering of standard errors is adopted at the firm-
level to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
6.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: 
Table 6-4 shows the main regression results for models 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4:  
TABLE 6-4: MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS 
 Model 6-1 Model 6-2 Model 6-3 Model 6-4 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Polcon -0.104** -0.095** -0.106** -0.095** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
Legal -0.044**    
 (0.018)    
Corruption  -0.022   
  (0.020)   
Entry   0.000023  
   (0.021)  
Business Support 
Services 
   -0.0032 
    (0.021) 
Polcon*Legal  0.044**    
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 (0.018)    
Polcon*Corruption  0.045**   
  (0.020)   
Polcon*Entry   0.017  
   (0.014)  
Polcon*Business 
Support Services 
   -0.029 
    (0.019) 
CEO duality -0.060* -0.058* -0.059* -0.061* 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) 
Ln(boardsize) 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.139*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) 
Top1 -0.00022 -0.0004 -0.00036 -0.00023 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Top25 0.0018 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Firm size 0.239*** 0.246*** 0.242*** 0.232*** 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.087) (0.087) 
Leverage 0.0084 -0.0016 0.0054 0.00010 
 (0.103) (0.105) (0.103) (0.103) 
Tangibility -0.0007 0.0024 -0.0050 -0.024 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) 
ROE 0.0089*** 0.0088*** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.224* -0.203* -0.227* -0.244** 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.117) 
GDP percapita 0.00015 0.000085 0.00028 -0.00024 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
GDP growth  0.0098* 0.0087* 0.0087 0.010* 
 (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
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Employment 0.0083 0.0085 0.0076 0.0081 
 (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0082) 
Constant -1.365 -1.476 -1.317 -1.174 
 (1.070) (1.066) (1.078) (1.054) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 
Number of firms 172 172 172 172 
Within R-squared 0.411 0.411 0.401 0.411 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in Table 6-4 indicate the different roles of political connection during different 
stages of regional institutional development in the sample of listed manufacturing 
companies in Vietnam. More specifically, the findings show the contingent role of political 
connection during the development of the legal system, and the varying levels of 
corruption, but also the ambiguous role of political connection when entry costs are less 
common and business support services are of greater efficiency. In particular, the finding 
in model 6-1 suggests that the moderating effect of the legal system on the relationship 
between political connection and firm performance is positive. The coefficients indicate 
that politically connected companies obtain on average a 4.4% higher Tobin’s Q than 
unconnected companies in provinces characterised by better legal systems. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 6.1 is supported. The findings from this chapter are in line with those of 
Brockman et al. (2013), demonstrating that the role of political connection is driven by the 
home country’s institutional environment in which the politically connected companies are 
located. However, unlike Brockman et al. (2013), the performance effect of political 
connection in this chapter is shown to be positively driven by the development of the legal 
system. It is assumed that a stronger legal system contributes to prevention of the rent-
seeking incentives of politically connected board of directors or supervisory board 
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members at the expense of firm performance, forcing them to concentrate on the value 
maximisation goals of their company. In addition, the study of Brockman et al. (2013) does 
not include Vietnam in the research sample, and their research findings may not be 
generalisable to the Vietnam’s case.  
In addition, this finding contradicts that of Zhou (2014), supporting the substitution role of 
political connection in the face of the development of legal institutions. Using institutional 
logic, Zhou (2014) offers two different perspectives on the role of political connection in 
emerging countries. The first focuses on the substitution effect for political connection, in 
which entrepreneurs may perceive the role of political connection to be less essential for 
property rights protection in the improvement of legal institutions. Moreover, regarding 
new cases of infringement, entrepreneurs may tend to deal with these more through the 
improvement of legal institutions than through political connections. The rationale for this 
is that the former approach is less expensive and more effective (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; 
Siegel, 2007). The second perspective is defined as the complementary view, and shows 
that political connection and legal institutions are not substitutable. In particular, ties to 
political power are recognised as a source of advantage in resolving commercial disputes 
due to the long-existing or newly emerged political markets that support resource 
distribution and problem solving via political power, in addition to the alternative approach 
of deploying legal institutions (Boisot & Child, 1996). As a result, following the findings 
of Chapter 5 and using the contingency view together with the resource-based viewpoint, 
it is clear that the more stringent legal institutions contribute to reshaping the role of 
political connection, which is shown to have been transformed from value-deteriorating to 
value-supporting in this chapter.  
One further institutional indicator is the level of provincial corruption. The findings from 
model 6-2 demonstrate that the joint effect of political connection and the regional level of 
corruption on firm performance is positive (b=0.045). Therefore, Hypothesis 6.2 is 
confirmed, showing that the presence of politically connected board of directors and 
supervisory board member has a positive effect on firm performance when there are low 
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levels of corruption. The positive coefficient of interaction between political connection 
and level of corruption might extend the findings of Brockman et al. (2013), who offered 
two different viewpoints of the role of political connection under the different quality of 
institutional environments. The first viewpoint is mainly related to the positive effect of 
political connection. More specifically, the highly-corrupt settings enable companies to 
seek political connections to secure access to resources and critical information as they 
often bribe politicians to reduce various redundant administrative and regulatory burdens 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). The second viewpoint concentrates on the negative effect of 
political connection, as a highly corrupt environment provides politicians with more rent-
seeking opportunities to extract the resources from firms, which in turn is detrimental to 
firm performance. However, it is argued that when the legal system is more developed and 
the extent of corruption is lower, the role of political connection becomes different 
(Domadenik et al., 2015; Ferris et al., 2016).  
Specifically, the findings from this chapter lead to the conclusion that local anti-corruption 
efforts serve as a warning sign for politically connected directors with highly corrupt 
incentives. Moreover, the value-creating role of political connection is more pronounced 
when provincial authorities attempt to inhibit corrupt behaviour by bureaucrats, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 5. Therefore, political connection might become a useful 
intangible asset to boost firm value when corrupt government officials are closely 
monitored or arrested. This finding also contributes to the studies of Hung et al. (2017) and 
Xu (2018), showing that the provincial level of corruption has a significant influence on 
the role of political connection. However, different from Hung et al. (2017) and Xu (2018), 
who use one dummy variable defined as a proxy for the enactment of anti-corruption 
regulation, this study is based on one index that measures the level of corruption in 
Vietnamese provinces.  
In relation the joint effect of political connection and the level of entry costs, there is an 
uncertain finding on how these two factors interactively influence firm performance; 
specifically, the effect is statistically insignificant. The finding does not confirm 
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Hypothesis 6.3, which proposes that the political connection improves firm performance 
in provinces with lower entry costs. In particulalr, it is shown that politically connected 
companies might not enjoy any competitive business advantages in the face of different 
levels of market entry costs. This finding does not conform to the empirical evidence found 
in the study by Chen et al. (2014), which specifies that companies with political 
connections play a much more important role in influencing firm performance, 
accompanied by their high involvement in high-barrier industries. The above findings also 
give rise to the notion that companies in general, and market investors in particular, should 
pay less attention to the appointment of politically connected board of directors or 
supervisory board members when companies seek to make investments in or expand their 
operations into the provinces in Vietnam. The ambiguity of the role of political connection 
in helping companies to confront the barriers of market entry may originate from the radical 
reforms in the business environment. One of these reforms is the reduction in the regulatory 
barriers towards the market entry of new companies (USAID et al. 2016). Because of this, 
companies might not need to establish political connection to reduce market entry barriers 
(Boubakri et al., 2008). However, one striking difference between this chapter and the 
study of Chen et al. (2014) is the measurement of entry barriers. Whilst this chapter uses 
the index of entry barriers in a province, Chen et al. (2014) used an entry barrier dummy 
variable defined as the firm’s industry amongst the traditional ones monopolised by SOEs. 
Therefore, it is argued that the use of one index to measure entry barriers in one province 
is broader in relation to the meaning of institutional reform than the measurement of using 
the definition of one industry monopolised by SOEs (Zhou, 2014; Sun et al., 2016). The 
argument on the insignificant role of political connection in reducing the burden of market 
entry might be justified by the studies of Yao et al. (2018), who argues that compared to 
state ownership as a more direct and closer tie to the state, political connections 
characterised by entrepreneurs’ political identity play a weak role in helping companies to 
reduce entry barriers, which indirectly weakens their competitive advantage in the search 
for resources provision. This finding is also echoed by the argument of Boubakri et al. 
(2008), that political connection is not a decisive determinant influencing the market entry 
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of companies in countries with higher entry barriers. However, the research of Boubakri et 
al. (2008) does not include Vietnam in their country sample, because of its data 
unavailability in their research period. Therefore, this study also complements that of 
Boubakri et al. (2008) by including Vietnam and using the available data on entry barriers 
in Vietnamese provinces from 2007 onwards.   
Likewise, there is also a statistically insignificant finding on the interactive effect of 
business support services and political connection on firm performance. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 6.4 is not confirmed, which suggests that there is a positive effect of political 
connection on firm performance in provinces with a low quality of business support 
service. This finding is not in line with the empirical perspective of Zhao et al. (2016) 
which claim that the impact of political connection on developmental resources weakens 
during the advancement of business support services. This reveals that the effect of the 
presence of politically connected board of directors or supervisory board members is not 
contingent upon the development of business intermediaries, and that the value of political 
connection is independent of advances in such institutions. This could be because the 
uncertainty or risk in the business environment in Vietnam makes the intermediary 
institutions such as financial organisations, banks and so forth, reliant upon state-owned 
enterprises or politically connected companies as their main clients because of the absolute 
supports given to them by the government (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). Taking the example 
of bank loans, Vietnamese commercial banks are inclined to grant more of these to 
politically connected companies because of their competitive advantages derived from 
governmental supports (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). Moreover, the government is willing 
to rescue such firms in cases of operational failure (Cheng & Leung, 2016). Otherwise, 
companies that have weak political relationships may find it difficult to attract loans or 
support from the intermediary institutions. Based on this, advances in intermediary 
institutions have little effect on the role of political connection because such development 
is insufficient to substitute for, or to influence, its role. However, in order to create a larger 
picture of the joint effect of political connection and business support service, a larger 
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sample of firms, including other industries and longer research time periods, could be 
employed in future research.     
In summary, the effect of political connection on firm performance is conditional on 
regional institutional development, but not all regional institutional indicators. For 
example, political connection benefits the performance of listed manufacturing companies 
in Vietnam in provinces characterised by better legal systems and strong anti-corruption 
bodies at the regional level. In contrast, the effect of political connection is not conditional 
upon the development of business support services and the level of entry costs in the 
province in which the firm is situated.  
Regarding the control variables in all the models, the presence of CEO duality is 
detrimental to firm performance. Therefore, this finding is consistent with the theoretical 
agency framework. In addition, the companies utilise the talented resources of board 
directors, which is conductive to a company’s operational efficiency. Taking the logarithm 
of firm sales as a proxy for firm size, firms with a high volume of sales have better 
performance than those with a low volume. These findings from models 6-1 to 6-4 reveal 
that return on equity may be a predictive indicator for the market performance of a firm 
when high return on equity results in high Tobin’s Q. Similar to the effect of the natural 
logarithm of firm age on firm performance seen in Chapter 5, the effect in Chapter 6 
remains negative. For provincial-level control variables, only the GDP growth variable in 
a province positively drives firm performance, thereby showing that firms do in fact enjoy 
more economic opportunities in provinces that are economically healthier (Zhou, 2014).  
6.5. THE ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: 
6.5.1. TESTING FOR ENDOGENEITY ISSUES:  
The literature on the relationship between institutions and firm performance could be 
explained by the fact that the firm growth may influence the quality of local governance 
(Nguyen & Canh, 2020). Specifically, provinces with an effective system of governance 
may have higher levels of entrepreneurial performance, and vice versa (Wennberg et al., 
2013). More importantly, when a province is characterised by high levels of entrepreneurial 
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capital and firm growth, it is more likely to strengthen institutions being conducive to 
entrepreneurial performance (Nguyen & Canh, 2020). In particular, well-performing firms 
are likely to help the provincial government to achieve its economic and societal goals; for 
instance, they contribute greatly to provincial GDP growth by paying the very high levels 
of tax. Additionally, they also provide a large amount of employment to facilitate their 
operations, which may help to reduce the level of unemployment. In exchange, the 
provincial authorities may introduce developmental policies and institutions favouring 
their operations  (VCCI et al., 2017). In order to address this endogeneity problem, this 
study therefore proposes the use of the two-step system GMM technique.    
Table 6-5 shows the results of the two-step system GMM estimation as a robustness check 
for all firm fixed-effect baseline models. In this chapter, this approach employs the first lag 
of Tobin’s Q and reports the p-values of ARtest(1), ARtest(2), the Hansen test of the joint 
validity of instruments, and the number of instruments. Across all the models of the two-
step system GMM, there exists first-order autocorrelation but no second-order 
autocorrelation. The p-values of the Hansen test in all the models are insignificant, which 
emphasises the validity of the instruments, whereas the number of instruments in all the 
models is lower than the number of groups. Generally speaking, it is observed that the 
conditions of all the two-step system GMM models in Table 6-5 are satisfied. All the GMM 
models also include firm, sectoral, year, and provincial dummies to control for 
unobservables at firm-, sectoral-, year-, and provincial- level respectively. 
Regarding the interactions of political connection and different institutional indicators, the 
results from the two-step system GMM technique remain constant compared to the firm 
fixed-effect baseline models, such as the different interactions of political connection and 
the legal system, corruption and business support services. Overall, the endogeneity issue 
does not exist in the firm fixed-effects models with the three institutional indicators listed 
above. Conversely, a difference in empirical results is found between firm fixed-effects 
and two-step system GMM techniques regarding the interaction between political 
connection and entry costs. Despite the positive joint effect between between the two such 
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aspects, statistically significant results are found in the two-step system GMM approach, 
while they are statistically insignificant in the firm fixed-effects estimations. Therefore, 
this finding should be interpreted with caution. The finding from the two-step system 
GMM technique comcerning the interactive effect of political connection and entry costs 
on firm performance contrasts with Hypothesis 6.3, which proposes that the effect of 
political connection on firm performance is positive in regions with high levels of entry 
costs. This indicates that political connection is beneficial for firm performance in 
provinces with low entry barriers.  
TABLE 6-5: TWO-STEP SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF THE 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS: 
 Model 6-5 Model 6-6 Model 6-7 Model 6-8 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
L.Tobin’s Q 0.457*** 0.413*** 0.606*** 0.694*** 
 (0.067) (0.149) (0.143) (0.093) 
Polcon -0.107 -0.025 -0.067 0.085 
 (0.086) (0.125) (0.099) (0.138) 
Legal -0.056    
 (0.038)    
Corruption  0.080   
  (0.060)   
Entry Costs    -0.019  
   (0.031)  
Business Support 
Services 
   -0.026 
    (0.040) 
Polcon*Legal 0.053*    
 (0.028)    
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Polcon*Corruption  0.078**   
  (0.036)   
Polcon*Entry Costs   0.046*  
   (0.025)  
Polcon*Business 
Support Service 
   -0.010 
    (0.034) 
CEO Duality -0.029 -0.019 -0.043** -0.031 
 (0.030) (0.060) (0.019) (0.030) 
lnboardsize 0.116 0.272 0.255 0.149 
 (0.100) (0.172) (0.162) (0.137) 
top1 -0.00043 -0.0010 0.0015 -0.0022 
 (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0034) 
top25 0.0021 0.0019 0.0025 0.0030 
 (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
Ln(firm age) 0.027 0.071 -0.015 0.037 
 (0.040) (0.061) (0.032) (0.032) 
tangibility 0.297 0.793 0.442 0.035 
 (0.381) (0.690) (0.381) (0.309) 
leverage -0.140 0.080 0.292 -0.071 
 (0.284) (0.271) (0.264) (0.330) 
roe 0.0065** 0.0083** 0.0057** 0.0075*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0027) 
Firm size 0.152 -0.031 -0.104 0.097 
 (0.149) (0.228) (0.175) (0.160) 
GDP growth -0.0023 -0.0049 -0.0039 -0.0066 
 (0.0097) (0.021) (0.012) (0.017) 
GDP per capita 0.0015 0.00092 -0.00073 0.0012 
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 (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0020) 
Employment 0.044 0.027 -0.027 0.032 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.037) (0.032) 
Constant -4.652* -2.215 1.335 -3.696 
 (2.381) (3.811) (3.560) (3.140) 
Firm fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectoral fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,127 1,127 1,127 1,127 
Number of groups 
(firm) 
172 172 172 172 
Number of 
Instruments 
101 92 98 99 
ARtest (1) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
ARtest (2) 0.110 0.245 0.526 0.194 
Hansen J Test (Over-
identifying 
restrictions) 
0.333 0.970 0.973 0.628 
Standard errors in parentheses. Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction is applied to two-step 
estimations.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6.5.2. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES AND MEASUREMENTS 
OF POLITICAL CONNECTION AND REGIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS:  
Table 6-6 first shows the regression outcomes for the impact of different types of political 
connections on the performance of listed companies during the regional institutional 
development process. Similar to the effect of political connection of all types, the outcomes 
from the interactive terms of the various categories of political connection and regional 
211 
 
legal systems remain positive, apart from the interactive influence of polcon4 and the legal 
system. Specifically, the joint effect of polcon2 and the legal system is the highest overall, 
at 0.054. The interactive term of polcon3 and regional legal system has the second highest 
coefficient, at 0.036. Finally, the joint effect of polcon1 and regional legal system has the 
lowest coefficient value of 0.034.  
Therefore, under the combined contingency-resource dependency framework, a better 
quality of legal system contributes to the influence on the roles played by the different 
types of political connection. In particular, the findings reaffirm that more stringent legal 
systems are a warning sign for politically connected directors who do not have the incentive 
to act in the best interests of their companies. Moreover, the findings also show that the 
presence of types I, II and III of political connection plays a resource-providing role for 
companies facing continuing improvement in regional legal systems. More specifically, 
former governmental officials can utilise their knowledge or non-public information 
regarding the specific determinants most likely to influence the regulatory processes. 
Consequently, this helps firms to avoid delayed demands for more information and to save 
time in processing legal affairs (Faccio, 2010; Ferris et al., 2016). Such findings support 
the separate hypotheses associated with the resource-provisionary roles of types I, II, and 
III of political connection when regional legal systems are continually improved. On the 
other hand, the impact of Communist Party membership on the board is not significant for 
companies in the varying legal environment quality. This explains that such membership 
can simply sustain the political ideology in the company rather than provide different 
legally strategic advice to the company.  
In addition, the study also probes into the issue of how multiple political connections 
influence the performance of the listed companies when the quality of regional legal 
systems improves. In particular, having multiple political connections is positively 
associated with firm performance during the development of regional legal system. 
Overall, the moderating effect of legal systems is 0.021, indicating that the diversity of 
political connections will bring a wider range of resources to companies, which in turn will 
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lead to improved firm performance. Unlike Chapter 5, which discusses the negative effect 
of the strength of political connection on the performance of listed companies, the positive 
interaction between this strength and the regional legal system emphasises that better 
quality of regional legal systems is conducive to the usefulness of having multiple political 
connections. Such a finding complements the study of Chen et al. (2017). However, while 
Chen et al. (2017) claim that retaining many types of political connection in the firm results 
in both helping-hand and grabbing-hand effects on the performance of companies 
headquartered in weak legal environment, this study only covers the resource-providing 
role of political connection strength during regional legal system development. Contrary 
to Chen et al. (2017), this study fails to seek a non-linear effect of multiple political 
connections on the performance of listed companies in improved legal environments. 
Relevant to the Vietnamese context, this finding also complements the study of Malesky 
& Taussig (2009), although they did not take legal system development into account in re-
examining the effect of multiple political connections, only using the simple headcount 
method to calculate the strength of political connection. By considering the improvement 
in legal institutions and the construction of the strength of political connection based on 
the highly centralised administrative rankings, this study aims to provide new insightful 
findings on how institutional development influences the effect of strength of political 
connection on firm performance. However, the study does not ascertain the joint effect of 
the ratio of political connection and regional legal system on firm performance, which 
indicates that a high level of concentration of political connection may not help a firm to 
obtain a legal edge at the provincial-level. 
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TABLE 6-6: PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES AND 
MEASUREMENTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION DURING REGIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
 Model 6-9 Model 6-10 Model 6-11 Model 6-12 Model 6-13 Model 6-14 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Polcon1 -0.104***      
 (0.037)      
Polcon2  -0.010     
  (0.119)     
Polcon3   0.055    
   (0.051)    
Polcon4    0.022   
    (0.045)   
PCstrength     -0.057*  
     (0.028)  
Ratio of Polcon      -0.137 
      (0.115) 
Legal  -0.036** -0.014 -0.012 -0.041*** -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
Polcon1*Legal  0.034*      
 (0.018)      
Polcon2*Legal  0.054**     
  (0.022)     
Polcon3*Legal   0.036**    
   (0.015)    
Polcon4*Legal     -0.014   
    (0.020)   
PCstrength*Legal     0.021**  
     (0.0092)  
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Ratio of 
Polcon*Legal 
     -0.042 
      (0.061) 
CEO duality -0.060* -0.059 -0.059 -0.049 -0.063* -0.060* 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) 
Ln(boardsize) 0.140*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.118** 0.138*** 0.121*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.040) (0.043) 
top1 -0.00024 -0.00046 -0.00044 0.00018 -0.00031 -0.0004 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.00091) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
top25 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016 0.0025** 0.0020 0.0017 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Firm size 0.237*** 0.226*** 0.236*** 0.166*** 0.234*** 0.227*** 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.049) (0.084) (0.086) 
Leverage 0.010 0.0013 0.0010 -0.154 0.021 0.0096 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.106) (0.096) (0.105) (0.106) 
Tangibility -0.0057 -0.034 -0.027 -0.120 -0.019 -0.033 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.097) (0.106) (0.107) 
ROE 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0087*** 0.011*** 0.0088*** 0.0089*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Ln(firm age) -0.228* -0.204* -0.204* -0.013 -0.215* -0.196 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.035) (0.119) (0.120) 
GDP growth 0.010* 0.0099* 0.0094* 0.012*** 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
GDP per capita 0.00011 0.00011 -2.47e-06 -0.00054 0.00023 -0.000067 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.00062) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Employment  0.0076 0.0084 0.0079 -0.014*** 0.0082 0.0079 
 (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0046) (0.0083) (0.0081) 
Constant -1.320 -1.323 -1.397 -0.452 -1.406 -1.324 
 (1.069) (1.079) (1.070) (0.592) (1.071) (1.080) 
Firm-fixed Yes  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 
Number of firm 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Within R-squared 0.411 0.402 0.402 0.175 0.408 0.402 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6.5.2. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES AND MEASUREMENTS 
OF POLITICAL CONNECTION AND LEVELS OF CORRUPTION:  
Table 6-7 shows the regression outcomes for the influence of various types, strengths and 
ratios of political connection on the Tobin’s Q of listed companies in the selected sample 
and in regions with varying levels of corruption. In model 6-15, there is only the 
moderating effect of corruption on the association between polcon1 and Tobin’s Q at a 
level of 0.054, which is still in favour of Hypothesis 6.2. Similar to the findings from 
political connection of all types, the finding also contributes to the study of Brockman et 
al. (2013) when using a narrower definition of political connection. Compared to other 
types of political connection, the level of corruption will only have a significant impact on 
the role of officials of government, military, procuracy, and the members of the national 
and provincial congresses on boards. This explains that while the role of these officials and 
members exhibited grabbing-hand characteristics in Chapter 5, the level of corruption 
modifies this role. Unlike Chapter 5, therefore, the presence of polcon1 plays a role of 
resources provision for companies when the regional level of corruption is low, which 
favours the separate hypothesis of the resource-provisionary role of hiring erstwhile or 
current government officials or individuals. Generally, this finding is consistent with that 
of the joint effect of polcon and regional legal system on firm performance. Based on 
several previous studies, legal institutions and the level of corruption are the main 
institutional indicators as proxies for the quality of the institutional environment (Boubakri 
et al. 2008; Faccio 2010; Brockman et al. 2013). In particular, settings with a well-
functioning legal regime often have a low level of corruption, and vice versa. This is 
216 
 
because fair application of legal regimes will prevent politicians from abusing their powers 
for their individual benefits (Brockman et al. 2013; USAID et al. 2016). No significant 
evidence was found of the joint effects of other types of political connection and levels of 
corruption. This suggests that the level of local anti-corruption efforts is not targeted at 
modifying the role of lecturers or officials in state-owned academic institutions, managers 
or members of various industry associations, or Communist-Party members. In reality, 
corruption scandals often have their roots in governmental officials exploiting companies 
for personal gains (Vu et al., 2015).   
Likewise, the interactive term of corruption and strength of political connection is positive 
(b=0.019), and Hypothesis 6.2 continues to be supported when multiple political 
connections are employed. Consequently, having such multiple connections is also 
beneficial for the performance of listed companies in less corrupt provinces. Conforming 
to the unified framework of contingency and resource provision, this finding helps 
understanding that although multiple political connections in firms were shown to be 
detrimental to firm performance in Chapter 5, the study also supports the beneficial aspect 
of multiple political connections on boards when the corrupt incentives of government 
officials are curbed. This finding also contributes to the study of Chen et al. (2017), in that 
not only does the regional legal system modifies the role of political connection strength, 
but also that the level of corruption transforms the detrimental role of such strength into a 
useful role. Furthermore, the finding also supports the suggestion of Malesky & Taussig 
(2009) that the government should promote regional anti-corruption institutions and the 
quality of legal systems at the provincial level in order to improve the efficiency of 
governmental officials in supporting entrepreneurial activities. In addition, the study has 
not discovered any interactive effect of the ratio of political connection and level of 
corruption on firm performance. As a result, the concentration of political connections may 
not result in any protection against corurpt harrassment from provincial government 
officials.  
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TABLE 6-7: THE PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES AND 
MEASUREMENTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION ON THE VARYING 
LEVELS OF CORRUPTION: 
 Model 6-
15 
Model 6-
16 
Model 6-
17 
Model 6-
18 
Model 6-
19 
Model 6-
20 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s 
Q 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s 
Q 
Polcon1 -0.097**      
 (0.035)      
Polcon2  0.045     
  (0.115)     
Polcon3   0.051    
   (0.049)    
Polcon4    -0.017   
    (0.059)   
PCstrength     -0.056**  
     (0.028)  
Ratio of Polcon      -0.142 
      (0.118) 
Corruption -0.026 0.0093 0.0048 0.013 0.0076 0.0078 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Polcon1*Corruption 0.054***      
 (0.018)      
Polcon2*Corruption  -0.063     
  (0.041)     
Polcon3*Corruption   0.037    
   (0.026)    
Polcon4*Corruption    -0.029   
    (0.019)   
PCstrength*Corruption     0.019*  
     (0.010)  
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Ratio of 
Polcon*Corruption 
     0.050 
      (0.061) 
CEO duality -0.060* -0.055 -0.054 -0.056 -0.060* -0.057 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
Lnboardsize 0.144*** 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.140*** 0.119*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040) (0.043) 
top1 -0.00034 -0.00038 -0.00033 -0.00040 -0.00048 -0.00039 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
top25 0.0013 0.0017 0.0016 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Firm size 0.245*** 0.233*** 0.239*** 0.223*** 0.242*** 0.236*** 
 (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) 
Leverage 0.0024 -0.022 0.0061 0.017 0.014 0.0058 
 (0.105) (0.110) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) 
Tangibility -0.00021 -0.029 -0.033 -0.031 -0.017 -0.028 
 (0.107) (0.109) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) 
Roe 0.0086*** 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 0.0089**
* 
0.0088*** 0.0087**
* 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Ln(firm age) -0.191 -0.202* -0.202* -0.203* -0.199* -0.203* 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) 
GDP growth  0.0092* 0.009* 0.0085 0.0085 0.0088* 0.0087 
 (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
GDP per capita -0.000013 0.00027 0.00014 0.00041 0.00023 0.00013 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Employment 0.0078 0.0080 0.0079 0.0082 0.0081 0.0086 
 (0.0083) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0081) 
Constant -1.479 -1.367 -1.421 -1.257 -1.506 -1.414 
 (1.057) (1.088) (1.078) (1.075) (1.068) (1.084) 
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Firm fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 
Number of firm 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Within R-squared 0.415 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.408 0.402 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
6.5.3. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES AND MEASUREMENTS 
OF POLITICAL CONNECTION AND BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES AT THE 
REGIONAL LEVEL: 
Table 6-8 shows the regression results for the moderating effect of business support 
services on the nexuses between different types, strengths and ratios of political connection 
and firm performance in the selected study sample. These results show no joint effects of 
business support services and different categories, strengths or ratios of political 
connection on firm performance, apart from polcon2. Therefore, Hypothesis 6.3 remains 
unconfirmed. Different to the two previous institutions, this underlines that the 
development of business support service does not seems to influence the value of many 
types, strengths or concentrations of political connection. In line with the findings of the 
main analysis, this outcome is also in contrasts with the empirical results of Zhao et al. 
(2016), which indicated that the role that the categories, strengths and concentrations of 
political connections play is still not contingent upon the development of business support 
services. In other words, this shows that the different components of political connection 
in firms play no specific roles in helping companies to improve their performance when 
they can enjoy more opportunities from the development of business intermediaries. From 
the perspective of market investors, they cannot expect the development of business 
intermediaries to be a driving force in reducing the influential role of political connection 
in the development of regional legal institutions and local anti-corruption institutions. For 
the the second type of political connection, the finding extends the study of Zhou (2014) 
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by empirically contributing to understanding of the substitution view between political 
connection and the development of intermediary business support institutions. In 
particular, the finding is in line with Zhao and Lu (2016) and shows that managers or 
members of various industry associations play a less important role in influencing firm 
operations when business support services continue to improve in a province. In other 
words, provinces with superior quality of business support services create a more 
transparent environment for information spread, and have a more developed financial 
system. Therefore, the need for managers or members of various industry associations to 
call for the improvement of intermediary institutions will be not an important issue. This 
finding is also not consistent with the separate hypothesis on the resource-providing role 
of membership of industry associations.  
TABLE 6-8: PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF DISTINCT TYPES AND 
MEASUREMENTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION DURING DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE QUALITY OF REGIONAL BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES 
 Model 6-
21 
Model 6-
22 
Model 6-
23 
Model 6-
24 
Model 6-
25 
Model 6-
26 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s 
Q 
Tobin’s 
Q 
Tobin’s 
Q 
Tobin’s Q 
Polcon1 -0.103***      
 (0.037)      
Polcon2  -0.0010     
  (0.108)     
Polcon3   0.052    
   (0.049)    
Polcon4    -0.029   
    (0.058)   
PCstrength     -0.056*  
     (0.029)  
Ratio of Polcon      -0.116 
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      (0.120) 
Business support 
service  
-0.022 -0.024 -0.026* -0.031* -0.026 -0.026* 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Polcon1*Business 
support service  
-0.0077      
 (0.018)      
Polcon2*Business 
support service  
 -0.068*     
  (0.039)     
Polcon3*Business 
support service  
  -0.0086    
   (0.025)    
Polcon4*Business 
support service  
   0.017   
    (0.018)   
PCstrength*Business 
support service  
    -0.0086  
     (0.0099)  
Ratio of 
Polcon*Business 
support service  
     -0.033 
      (0.052) 
CEO duality -0.064* -0.061* -0.062* -0.061* -0.068* -0.063* 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Ln(boardsize) 0.144*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.142*** 0.125*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) 
top1 -0.00026 -0.00016 -0.00036 -0.00030 -0.00036 -0.00029 
 (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
top25 0.0015 0.0018 0.0016 0.0017 0.0019 0.0017 
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 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Firm size 0.229*** 0.217*** 0.231*** 0.221*** 0.229*** 0.227** 
 (0.084) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) 
Leverage 0.0055 -0.0063 -0.0065 0.0022 0.016 0.0032 
 (0.102) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107) (0.104) (0.105) 
Tangibility -0.0084 -0.033 -0.029 -0.033 -0.021 -0.026 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
Roe 0.0088*** 0.0090*** 0.0088**
* 
0.0089**
* 
0.0089**
* 
0.0088*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Ln(firm age) -0.238** -0.208* -0.216* -0.207* -0.230* -0.214* 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.121) (0.117) (0.117) 
GDP growth 0.010* 0.010* 0.0096* 0.010* 0.010* 0.0099* 
 (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0055) 
GDP per capita -0.00026 -0.00025 -0.00033 -0.00015 -0.00014 -0.00030 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Employment 0.0076 0.0071 0.0078 0.0080 0.0081 0.0083 
 (0.0084) (0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0081) 
Constant -1.129 -1.087 -1.249 -1.175 -1.155 -1.239 
 (1.050) (1.070) (1.055) (1.056) (0.993) (1.068) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 
Number of firm 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Within R-squared 0.410 0.405 0.403 0.404 0.408 0.404 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.5.4. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES AND MEASUREMENTS 
OF POLITICAL CONNECTION AND ENTRY COSTS AT THE REGIONAL 
LEVEL: 
Table 6-9 shows the regression outputs for the moderating effect of regional entry costs on 
the associations between various types, strengths and ratios of political connection and firm 
performance. As evidenced in Table 6-9, the interactive terms of regional entry costs and 
different categories, strengths and ratios of political connection on firm performance 
appear to be statistically insignificant. Therefore, the findings from the robustness check 
continue to give no support to Chen et al. (2014) and re-affirm that the impact of political 
connection on firm performance is not contingent upon the different levels of regional entry 
costs, which does not confirm Hypothesis 6.4. Compared to all types of political 
connection, however, these insignificant effects do give support to the viewpoint of 
Boubakri et al. (2008). In other words, with the exploitation of the narrower definition of 
political connection, it can be repeatedly seen that the dependence on it might be not 
essential for entrepreneurial companies seeking opportunities for investment or market 
entry in a particular industry in a particular province. Therefore, companies should pay 
more attentions to product and technology innovation, to increased labour capacity and to 
improved employee capacity, rather than developing political connections (Vu et al., 2015). 
In doing so, they could generate more revenues and build their competitive capabilities to 
fight the market entry of many new competitors with cutting-edge technology (USAID et 
al., 2015).  
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TABLE 6-9: PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF DISTINCT TYPES AND 
MEASUREMENTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTION DURING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ENTRY COSTS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL: 
 Model 6-
27 
Model 6-
28 
Model 6-
29 
Model 6-
30 
Model 6-
31 
Model 6-
32 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Polcon1 -0.103***      
 (0.037)      
Polcon2  0.0068     
  (0.112)     
Polcon3   -0.065    
   (0.049)    
Polcon4    0.035   
    (0.037)   
PCstrength     -0.057*  
     (0.029)  
Ratio of Polcon      -0.094 
      (0.089) 
Entry 0.0045 0.0096 -0.038*** -0.038*** 0.0095 -0.036*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) 
Polcon1*Entry 0.0079      
 (0.014)      
Polcon2*Entry  0.026     
  (0.016)     
Polcon3*Entry   0.025    
   (0.034)    
Polcon4*Entry     0.010   
    (0.025)   
PCstrength*Entry     0.012  
     (0.0079)  
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Ratio of 
Polcon*Entry 
     -0.029 
      (0.061) 
CEO duality -0.057 -0.055 -0.046** -0.047** -0.059 -0.047** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.023) 
Ln(boardsize) 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.138*** 0.117*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.043) 
top1 -0.00033 -0.00037 0.00031 0.00022 -0.00038 0.00026 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.00090) (0.00090) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
top25 0.0016 0.0017   
0.0027*** 
0.0026*** 0.0019 0.0027*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.00089) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.00089) 
Firm size 0.240*** 0.233** 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.237*** 0.159*** 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.037) (0.037) (0.086) (0.037) 
Leverage 0.0093 -0.00026 -0.144*** -0.149** 0.018 -0.143* 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.073) (0.073) (0.105) (0.073) 
Tangibility -0.011 -0.030 -0.121 -0.122 -0.022 -0.123 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.078) (0.078) (0.107) (0.078) 
Roe 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.0088*** 0.012*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.00097) (0.00097) (0.0012) (0.00097) 
Ln(firm age) -0.229* 0.0088 -0.018 -0.017 -0.217* -0.017 
 (0.086) (0.0055) (0.031) (0.031) (0.120) (0.031) 
GDP growth  0.0091* 0.00032 0.0057 0.0055 0.0090 0.0054 
 (0.0053) (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0053) (0.004) 
GDP per capita 0.00028 0.00032 -0.0010** -0.0010** 0.00040 -0.0011** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.00048) (0.00048) (0.0014) (0.00048) 
Employment 0.0071 0.0077 -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.0077 -0.016*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0084) (0.0043) 
Constant -1.277 -1.230 -0.141 -0.174 -1.379 -0.194 
 (1.074) (1.013) (1.081) (0.470) (1.079) (0.471) 
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Firm-fixed Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Year-fixed Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 
Number of firm 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Within R-squared 0.408 0.401 0.169 0.168 0.406 0.169 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6-10 shows the regression results on how the political connections and regional 
institutional indicators interactively influence firm performance, as tested in this chapter. 
In summary, in the table it can be seen that the quality of regional legal systems mainly 
influences the relationships between political connections and firm performance, followed 
by the corruption indicator. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence of the contingent value 
of the majority of types, strengths and ratios of political connections in the provinces in 
relation to the varying quality of business support services and different market entry 
conditions, apart from polcon2. Consequently, it can be concluded that the role of political 
connection is mainly driven by the legal system, which communicates the notion that the 
development of the legal system is the most important of all the institutional indicators 
(USAID et al., 2016). This assertion is also made by Shleifer & Vishny (1998) and Zhou 
(2014), who suggest that the protection of property rights and the stricter legal enforcement 
are the fundamental institutional reforms for socioeconomic development. 
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TABLE 6-10: EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL 
INDICATORS SHOWN IN THIS CHAPTER: 
 
Types and 
Strengths of 
Political 
Connections 
Regional Institutional Indicators 
Legal 
System 
Anti-Corruption 
Institutions 
Business 
Support 
Services 
Entry Costs 
Polcon Confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed 
Polcon1 Confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed 
Polcon2 Confirmed Unconfirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed 
Polcon3 Confirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed 
Polcon4 Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed 
Political 
Connection 
Strength 
Confirmed Confirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed 
Political 
Connection 
Ratio 
Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed Unconfirmed 
 
6.6. CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 6:  
This chapter has discussed the role of political connections in determining firm 
performance during regional institutional development. The complementary analysis 
employed the two-step system GMM technique to control for the endogeneity issue and to 
compare and contrast the effect of different types, strengths and ratios of political 
connection on firm performance. with consideration of the varying quality of different 
institutional indicators over the period of 2007 to 2016, and a given set of different 
measures, thus making the comparison between the main and additional analysis more 
consistent. The empirical strategy involved the panel data analysis of the selected sample 
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of 172 manufacturing companies between 2007 and 2016. A final significant contribution 
of the chapter was use of the available database on regional institutional quality jointly 
compiled by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the U.S Agency of 
International Development. As a result of applying this database to the analysis, the 
findings obtained were complementary to the results of previous studies which used 
regional institutional data26 in China.   
Contributing to the research on other emerging countries such as China and cross-country 
studies, it was established that the legal system and anti-corruption efforts at the regional 
level were conducive to detering politically connected directors from extracting resources 
from their firm. Following the findings on the grabbing-hand role of political connections 
obtained in Chapter 5, the boost in the reforms of the legal system and anti-corruption 
institutions in Vietnamese provinces may become the optimal solution to making the 
business environment less subject to the rent-seeking actions of bureaucrats. This is also 
confirmed by other studies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Faccio et al., 2006; Brockman et al., 
2013). Moreover, the improvements in the legal system and anti-corruption efforts at the 
regional level make them more effective, thus transforming the role of political connection 
from the value-decreasing to the value-creating. This empirical evidence is consistent with 
the integrated viewpoint of contingency and resources provision when the development of 
legal systems and anti-corruption efforts at the regional level is taken into account. On the 
other hand, in terms of the other institutional indicators, such as entry costs and business 
support services, no explicit role of political connection during the advancement of these 
institutions has been found. The results emphasises that such development might fail to 
adjust the value of political connection in an emerging country such as Vietnam. However, 
the study has found that the role of political connection is conditioned by the level of entry 
costs in the two-step system GMM approach. As such, the results from the fixed-effect 
models might be subject to the problem of endogeneity. Bearing that in mind, the 
interpretation of the findings from the fixed-effect baseline models should be made 
 
26 This index is the NERI Index.  
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carefully. In addition, this chapter has also obtained different results to support or 
inadequately confirm the separate hypotheses associated with the role of each type of 
political connection during institutional development. Overall, the regional legal system 
and the anti-corruption campaign are conducive to the resource-providing role of former 
or current officials and individuals connected to the government, whilst the regional legal 
system facilitates the role of lecturers and cadres in state-owned academic 
universities/institutions, and mebers of industry associations. As a result, the findings show 
that the development of the legal system and anti-corruption institutions are key in 
influencing the role of political connection. Therefore, the findings from this chapter 
contribute to the dynamic role of political connection in emerging countries and answers 
the questions: “What role does political connection play during institutional development?”  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1. INTRODUCTION:  
This chapter presents the conclusion to the research thesis, and is structured as follows. 
The first part is a summary related to the main empirical evidence, while in the second the 
research contributions are presented. In the third section, the possible policy implications 
are discussed, and in the fourth section, the possible limitations and potential future 
research topics are discussed.  
7.2. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:  
The thesis has focused on two distinct empirical strands related to the subject of political 
connection and firm performance. The first analytical chapter investigated the impact of 
political connection and its interaction with state ownership on firm performance. Its main 
added value was the analysis, comparison and contrasting of the impacts of different types, 
strengths, and ratios of political connection on firm performance over a fixed time period 
from 2007 to 2016, thereby providing a consistent comparison. Contrary to previous 
studies which have examined the benefits of political connection on firm performance, the 
findings from the first empirical chapter 5 show that the effect of political connection on 
the performance of listed manufacturing companies is detrimental. In relation to the impact 
of different categories of political connection, a negative impact was found of the presence 
of the officials of government, military, court, procuracy and the members of the national 
or provincial congresses on the performance of listed companies. Moreover, another aim 
of the first empirical chapter was to establish the effects of strengths and concentrations of 
political connection on firm performance. The findings from this additional analysis 
revealed a decrease in firm performance when the strength of political connection is high. 
All these findings endorse the negative aspects of political connections inherent in boards 
of director. The potential for problems with bias, such as the endogeneity of political 
connection and other variables in the model, and unobservable firm, sectoral and year-
specific effects in the relationship between political connection and firm performance, were 
231 
 
addressed by using the dynamic panel GMM two-step system. This technique showed that 
the baseline regression outcomes did not suffer from possible endogeneity biases.  
Moreover, this chapter studied the effect of political connection on the performance of 
listed state-controlled and non-state-controlled manufacturing companies during the period 
of 2007 to 2016. In order to test for the varying effects, the interaction between political 
connection and the dummy variable of SOE was employed. The empirical evidence 
confirms that the effect of political connection can be influenced by ownership structure. 
In particular, it was found that the appointment of politically connected board directors was 
detrimental to the performance of state-controlled enterprises, whereas no evidence was 
found to confirm the role of political connection on the performance of privately-controlled 
ones. These findings obtained from the fixed-effect baseline models were not subject to the 
endogeneity bias in the two-step system GMM technique. Additional analysis was 
subsequently performed in order to find more specific effects of political connection; most 
of this further analysis emphasised the negative role of political connection.  
Finally, the second chapter explored the contingent role of political connection during 
regional institutional development. By merging the available data on institutional 
indicators with the selected sample data of listed companies, the findings from the second 
empirical chapter 6 suggest that the companies are better able to capitalise on political 
connection when the legal system and anti-corruption efforts are improved. Otherwise, it 
was noted that there is no contingent role of political connection coupled with reductions 
in entry barriers in new entrepreneurs’ market participation and better quality of business 
support services at the regional level. However, it is interesting that notwithstanding the 
unchanged results between the fixed-effect baseline models and two-step system GMM 
models in terms of the interactive effects of political connection, legal system, anti-
corruption efforts, and business support services on firm performance, the results on the 
interaction of political connection and entry costs do vary between the two approaches. In 
the two-step system GMM technique, the joint effect of political connection and regional 
entry costs is significantly positive, which indicates that a decrease in regional entry costs 
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results in resource-providing benefits of political connection. Therefore, more caution 
should be taken when interpreting how the aspect of regional entry costs enables or blocks 
such benefits. The additional analysis subsequently focused on gauging the joint impact of 
different types, strengths and ratios of political connection and institutional indicators on 
firm performance. From the analysis, only the role of the presence of officials of 
government, military, court, procuracy and members of the national or provincial 
congresses, is conditioned by improvements in the legal system and anti-corruption 
campaign at the regional level. Regarding other types of political connection, no 
interactions are shown with the institutional indicators. However, there is a negative sign 
related to the joint effect of political connection type II and business support services, 
indicating that the role of managers or members of various industry associations is of less 
value in provinces characterised by high quality of business support services.  
7.3. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS:  
The research makes several contributions to the literature on political connection. First, 
previous empirical literature has mainly attributed the perceived benefits and costs of 
politician-directors to the two potentially competing roles that directors are expected to 
overcome between two roles they play on the corporate board: the resource-providing role 
and the governance role (El Nayal et al., 2019; Hambrick et al., 2015). In light of this trade-
off, this study has sought to reconcile the ambiguity surrounding the value of politician-
directors. Most of the conclusions drawn in previous research on the influence of political 
connection on firm performance are related to its benefits, but a few studies estimate the 
costs of political connection (Shi et al., 2018; Tihanyi et al., 2019). In order to fulfill this 
gap, this study has stressed the governance-based costs related to the appointment of 
politically connected boards of director members. From the grabbing-hand viewpoint, 
politically connected directors pursue individual rent-seeking practices at the expense of 
firm value. Drawing on agency theory, there is a trade-off between the pursuit of their 
individual benefits and the interests of shareholders, and their responsibilities in relation to 
the guardian of shareholder interests does not exist.  
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Regarding the second aim of Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that the impact of political 
connection could differ greatly between state-controlled and non-state-controlled 
enterprises. In the light of this finding, the relevance of considering ownership 
configuration as part of the analysis of the role of political connection is emphasised. 
Accordingly, this study extends the inconclusive findings of previous research on emerging 
countries, and the interplay between political connection and ownership configuration, by 
providing the insights into the substitution view between political connection and state 
ownership. Drawing on this perspective, the substitution effect between those two forms 
of state involvement results in the competitive advantage produced by political ties to be 
dampened in state-controlled enterprises (Firth et al., 2013; Wang, 2015; Wu et al., 2012). 
Unlike previous studies (Wang, 2015; Wu et al., 2012), this study has shown no influence 
of political connection on the performance of non-state-controlled enterprises, which 
demonstrates the harmful role of political connection in SOEs, and its trivial role in non-
SOEs.  
In relation to the role of political connection during regional institutional development 
discussed in the second empirical chapter 6, this study contributes to the literature on the 
contingent value of political connection across regional institutional heterogeneities. 
Unlike previous studies, which have demonstrated that the beneficial effects of political 
connection are weakened in high-quality institutional environments and vice versus, this 
study offers a different standpoint, that political connectedness gives resource-provisionary 
benefits in such environments. With regard to the agency cost-related role of the politically 
connected directors discussed in empirical Chapter 5, it has been demonstrated that 
institutional development is conducive to the resource-providing role of political 
connection. In other words, it is argued that institutional development, namely anti-
corruption efforts and improved legal systems, facilitates the resource-providing facet of 
political connection to the business status of the companies.      
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7.4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS:  
With regard to policy recommendations, the results of the study suggest that politically 
connected board of directors and supervisory board members are, on average, ineffective 
and do not care about the interests of shareholders as well. Therefore, strong evidence is 
provided that market investors expect policies from the government to curb the corrupt or 
individual rent-seeking actions from the politically connected board directors and 
supervisory board members. Second, Fan et al. (2007), Boubakri et al. (2008) and 
Domadenik et al. (2015) suggest that policymakers should strengthen and improve the 
institutional environment of companies towards a more market-oriented one, with more 
stringent legal enforcement and greater investor protection, which may help companies to 
avoid dependence upon political connections to the detriment of their performance. In 
addition, policymakers are also recommended to further regulate and develop the financial 
industry to encourage intermediaries (e.g., financial analysts) to act as effective external 
monitors. Finally, the anti-corruption campaign should be further promoted as a warning 
sign for the corrupt politically connected board of directors and supervisory board members 
in the future (OECD, 2013). Recommendations for better developed quality of legal system 
and local anti-corruption efforts to curb the corrupt practices of politically connected 
directors have been empirically corroborated in Chapter 6. The additional policy 
recommendations revolve around the speeding up of the privatisation process, with the 
purpose of reducing state ownership. It is possible that the process will help state-owned 
enterprises to reduce administrative burdens and to open up ownership opportunities for 
other shareholders, which in turn will help to improve the corporate governance efficiency, 
with wider participation of well-qualified board directors (La Porta et al., 2000; Tu et al., 
2013) 
7.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH: 
Although this thesis has contributed to the knowledge and made important findings and 
recommendations for policymakers, it does have some shortcomings. The first limitation 
is the sample size, which only includes manufacturing companies. The first rationale for 
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choosing a sample of manufacturing companies was the greater availability of data on 
corporate governance in this sector, while the second was because of the political influence 
occurring in the manufacturing industry and its long developmental history in the business 
environment since the initiation of “Doi Moi” economic reform in 1990 (Perkins and Anh, 
2009). Compared to other industries, many owners of large manufacturing companies were 
the officials of government or have relatives working in governmental agencies at the 
national or provincial level (Markussen & Tarp, 2014; OECD, 2013). Therefore, many 
previous studies in Vietnam have focused on the manufacturing industry to evaluate the 
effect of political connection by using the survey samples based on Official General 
Statistics of the state-owned and non-state-owned manufacturing firms (Rand, 2017; 
Markussen & Tarp, 2014; Malesky & Taussig, 2009). Therefore, this study also 
concentrates on this sector to examine the effect of political connection on company 
performance, but based on the different angle of corporate governance. However, future 
studies should include more companies in other industries over a longer research period to 
establish a more specific performance effect of political connection. Increasing the size of 
the research sample is likely to allow prediction of the effects of each type of political 
connection upon firm performance at a greater level of accuracy, which this study fails to 
obtain.  
Secondly, the conclusions on the performance effect of politically connected board of 
directors or supervisory board members do not explain why companies recruit them. Future 
studies that examine the determinants of the presence of politically connected board 
directors or supervisory board members would be of interest. Third, although the study 
uses two-step system GMM to resolve the problem of endogeneity based on the internal 
instruments, it fails to find better external instruments to control for this issue. Therefore, 
future research should choose effective external instrumental variables to resolve the issue 
of endogeneity. Moreover, previous studies on other emerging countries have often 
employed the exogenous events, such as the anti-corruption campaign in China (Liu et al., 
2016; Shi et al., 2018); the death of President Suharto in Indonesia (Leuz & Oberholzer-
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Gee, 2006); and the sudden deaths of politicians in many countries (Faccio & Parsley, 
2009). In particular, these exogenous shocks serve as a natural experiment and enable us 
to investigate the overall value effect of politically connected directors compared with that 
of non-politically connected ones. These shocks offer a unique opportunity to examine the 
value of politically connected directors mostly free from endogeneity concerns (Liu et al., 
2016; Shi et al., 2018). However, in Vietnam there existed the ambiguous presence of an 
anti-corruption campaign by government until the end year of 2016 and the first year of 
2017; and at which time the Communist-Party general secretary of Nguyen Phu Trong in 
Vietnamese government conducted a large-scale anti-corruption strategy in Vietnam. 
Therefore, future studies could utilise this event as an exogenous experiment to evaluate 
the performance effect of politically connected board of directors or supervisory board 
members.  
The fourth limitation is associated with the measurement proxies of political connection. 
Three different measurements of political connection are employed: a dummy 
measurement to capture the presence of political connection; the strength of political 
connection to identify the political power linked to the highly centralised political system 
in Vietnam that the firm possesses, and the ratio of politically connected executives/non-
executives on the board to calculate the concentration of political connection. Despite much 
progress in improving measurement scales, gauging the nature and concept of political 
connection remains limited in current studies because the various dimensions of political 
connection are difficult to disentangle (Yizhong et al., 2019). For instance, most previous 
studies are based upon the government background of executives/non-executives (Yang et 
al., 2015); whether firms make campaign contributions (Claessens et al., 2008); whether 
corporate executives have personal relationships with politicans (Coulomb & Sangnier, 
2014); or whether the firm is active in lobbying (Brown, 2016) to detect the presence of 
political connection, which may provide scant evidence for its measurement proxies. The 
various dimensions of political connection are often overlooked, such as the friends and 
the relatives of executives/non-executives who have working experience in governmental 
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agencies (Markussen & Tarp, 2014), government officials’ corporate site visits (Yizhong 
et al., 2019), and the geographic distance of a firm’s headquarters from the capital city of 
the state in whifh they are located (Pantzalis & Park, 2014). As a result, future studies could 
develop the literature by devising more advanced measurement scales of political 
connection. Furthermore, advanced measurement of the strength of political connection in 
the future should include another determinant, namely the tenure of CEOs, chairmen, and 
other board directors (Chen et al., 2017).  
7.6. DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH:  
The literature on political connection has been developing extensively into many new areas 
of research. Some studies have been centered on the integration of corporate social and 
corporate political strategies (Du et al., 2019). Drawing on social exchange theory as a 
theoretical basis for elucidating the business-government relationship in emerging 
countries as an ongoing social exchange, Du et al. (2019) ascertain that in order to cultivate 
effective relationships with the government and protect access to government resources, 
politically connected companies will need to pay back resources. Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is one of the efficient strategies for companies to respond to 
government resources provision by mitigating their administrative burdens of salient social 
issues. As a result, the performance implications of political networks can be reinforced 
when companies conduct the simultaneous CSR practices. On the contrary, the 
effectiveness of engaging with CSR by companies can also be improved if they have 
political connections. Such engagement improves firm performance through the underlying 
process of obtaining sociopolitical legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). In doing so, companies 
are able to procure the positive responses of stakeholders. It is highly likely that politically 
connected companies achieve a higher degree of effectiveness from their commitment to 
engage in CSR activities because they have a high level of awareness of social issues and 
can better grasp the key expectations of government than companies lacking such 
connections; in response, they can enhance their sociopolitical legitimacy (Du et al., 2019). 
Although strategic corporate social responsibility and corporate political activity have been 
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two parallel strands of nonmarket strategy research, they have developed largely in 
isolation (Mellahi et al., 2016). Along with this, little empirical exploration of interactions 
between the social and political facets of firm strategies has been made (Frynas & Stephens, 
2015; Hadani & Coombes, 2015). The study of Du et al. (2019) was among the first to 
investigate the two practices in combination with consideration of their simultaneous 
impacts on firm performance. However, Du et al. (2019)’s findings were constrained by 
only referring to one specific emerging economy, China, so future research could continue 
to analyse whether the complementarity between companies’ CSR activities and political 
connections remains consistent in other similar contexts, such as Vietnam. Increasing 
attention is being paid to the importance of social issues in Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
The country has undergone economic development at an extremely rapid level, but has also 
experienced the issues of waste and water pollution, poor labour conditions and human 
rights abuses (M. Nguyen et al., 2018). In tandem with the environmental and social 
pressures, the government also exerts its policymaking influence over legislation and 
standards. In this regard, the state has enacted all-inclusive environmental protection laws, 
together with state policies and statutes, in general to target the safeguarding of employees 
from abuses (Ortmann, 2017). To expand the findings of Du et al. (2019), therefore, more 
research might be needed to examine the possible joint effect of establishing political 
connections and conducting the simultaneous practice of corporate social responsibility on 
the operations of Vietnamese companies under the theoretical social exchange framework.    
In addition to firm’s financial performance, another new area of research could focus on 
other types of firm performance. Previous studies analysing the performance impact of 
political connection have often deployed firm financial performance, namely return on total 
assets, return on equity, and sales on total assets because of the availability of data on these 
financial indicators. This should encourage further critical studies in relation to the impact 
of political connection on other types of firm performance, for example innovative 
performance (Krammer and Jiménez, 2019). The impact of political connection on firm 
innovation remains inconclusive and relatively unexplored (Su et al., 2019). Unlike 
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developed economies, in the context of emerging countries characterised by uncertainty in 
the business environment and a lack of effective legal systems, there is limited literature 
on understanding how political connection drives or hinders innovation in emerging and 
less-developed markets (Kotabe et al., 2017). More investigation to fill this research gap 
would provide fresh findings on the perceived impact of political ties on firm innovation 
in the fast-developing, yet little studied economies, such as Vietnam. One barely explored 
current research concerns examination of the driving forces of political connection in 
relation to firms’ decisions to enter exports markets and their consequent export 
performance (Sharma et al., 2020). It is plausible that political connection, as an intangible 
relational resource, may provide a more favourable operational environment for firms 
(Peng & Luo, 2000; Ridge et al., 2016). Thanks to political support, exporting companies 
with political ties might be more likely to increase global competition by setting low export 
prices compared to their competitors in other countries and consequently stay in control of 
their production and operational expenses in order to make a profit (Sharma et al., 2020).  
Finally, although most research revolves around four institutional indicators, the legal 
system, local anti-corruption efforts, entry costs and business support services, this study 
has not established how political connection and other institutional proxies interactively 
affect firm performance. This results in a lack of understanding of the dynamic role of 
political connection in the development of these institutional indicators. In line with this 
lack of exploration, and the paucity of empirical evidence on the joint effect of political 
connection and the remaining institutional indicators in the Provincial Competitiveness 
Index, this could be an area of analysis in future studies.  
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APPENDIX:  
THE DATA APPENDIX IN EMPIRICAL CHAPTER 6:  
Table 5-11: Multicollinearity Test using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Model Multicollinearity 
Test (VIF) 
 
Modified Wald Test 
for Groupwise 
Heteroscedasticity 
Wooldridge Test 
for 
Autocorrelation in 
Panel Data 
Model 5-1 
(Polcon) 
1.21 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 5-5 
(Polcon1) 
1.21 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 5-6 
(Polcon2) 
1.21 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 5-7 
(Polcon3) 
1.21 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 5-8 
(Polcon4) 
1.21 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 5-9 
(PCstrength) 
1.21 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 5-10 
(Ratio of Polcon) 
1.20 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table 5-12: Results of Specification Tests: 
Specification Test Model 5-
1 
(Polcon) 
Model 5-5 
(Polcon1) 
Model 5-6 
(Polcon2) 
Model 5-7 
(Polcon3) 
Model 5-8 
(Polcon4) 
Model 5-9 
(PCstrength) 
Model 5-10 
(Ratio of 
Polcon) 
Hausman test for fixed 
versus random effects 
model 
0.0003 0.0002 0.0021 
 
0.0021   0.0029 0.0001   0.0015 
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(If<=0.05=> Fixed 
Effects) 
Breusch-Pagan LM 
test for random effects 
versus OLS  
(if<=0.05=>use 
Random Effects) 
- - - - - - - 
F-test for fixed effects 
versus OLS 
(if Prob<=0.05=>use 
Fixed Effects) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Testparm (Testing for 
Time-Fixed Effects) 
(if<=0.05=>time fixed-
effects needed) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Decision Time and 
Firm 
Fixed-
Effects 
Time and 
Firm 
Fixed-
Effects 
 
Time and 
Firm Fixed-
Effects 
Time and 
Firm 
Fixed-
Effects 
Time and 
Firm 
Fixed-
Effects 
Time Fixed-
Effects 
Time 
Fixed-
Effects 
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Models Multicollinearity 
Test (VIF) 
 
Modified Wald 
Test for Groupwise 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Wooldridge Test 
for 
Autocorrelation in 
Panel Data 
Model 5-11 
(the interaction 
of political 
connection and 
SOE) 
1.82 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 5-12 
(the interaction 
of political 
connection 
type I and 
SOE) 
1.74 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 5-13 
(the interaction 
of political 
connection 
type II and 
SOE) 
1.41 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 5-14 
(the interaction 
of political 
connection 
type III and 
SOE) 
1.41 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 5-15 
(the interaction 
of political 
connection 
type IV and 
SOE) 
2.10 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 5-16 
(the interaction 
of strength of 
political 
connection and 
SOE) 
1.47 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 5-17 
(the interaction 
of ratio of 
political 
connection and 
SOE) 
1.59 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
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Table 5-14: Results of Specification Tests: 
Models Hausman test for 
fixed versus 
random effects 
model 
(If<=0.05=> Fixed 
Effects) 
Breusch-Pagan 
LM test for 
random effects 
versus OLS 
(if<=0.05=>use 
Random Effects) 
F-test for fixed 
effects versus OLS 
(if 
Prob<=0.05=>use 
Fixed Effects) 
Testparm (Testing 
for Time-Fixed 
Effects) 
(if<=0.05=>time 
fixed-effects 
needed) 
Decision 
5-11 (the 
interaction 
of political 
connection 
and SOE) 
0.0006 - 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
5-12 (the 
interaction 
of political 
connection 
type I and 
SOE) 
  0.0007 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
5-13 (the 
interaction 
of political 
connection 
type II and 
SOE) 
0.0018 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
5-14 (the 
interaction 
of political 
connection 
type III and 
SOE) 
  0.0010 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
5-15 (the 
interaction 
of political 
connection 
type IV and 
SOE) 
0.0007 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
5-16 (the 
interaction 
of strength 
of political 
connection 
and SOE) 
0.0004 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
5-17 (the 
interaction 
of ratio of 
political 
connection 
and SOE) 
0.0009 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
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Models Multicollinearity 
Test (VIF) 
 
Modified Wald 
Test for Groupwise 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Wooldridge Test 
for 
Autocorrelation in 
Panel Data 
Model 6-1 (the interaction 
of polcon and legal system) 
1.58 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-2 (the interaction 
of polcon and corruption) 
1.52 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-3 (the interaction 
of polcon and entry costs) 
1.56 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-4 (the interaction 
of polcon and business 
support service) 
1.63 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-9 (the interaction 
of polcon1 and legal 
system) 
  1.47 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-10 (the interaction 
of polcon2 and legal 
system) 
1.24 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-11 (the interaction 
of polcon3 and legal 
system) 
1.22 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-12 (the interaction 
of polcon4 and legal 
system) 
1.25 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-13 (the interaction 
of PCstrength and legal 
system) 
  1.22 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-14 (the interaction 
of ratio of polcon and legal 
system) 
  1.21 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-15 (the interaction 
of polcon1 and corruption) 
1.46 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-16 (the interaction 
of polcon2 and corruption) 
1.27 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-17 (the interaction 
of polcon3 and corruption) 
1.24 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-18 (the interaction 
of polcon4 and corruption) 
1.27 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-19 (the interaction 
of PCstrength and 
corruption) 
1.24 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-20 (the interaction 
of ratio of polcon and 
corruption) 
1.23 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-21 (the interaction 
of polcon1 and business 
support service) 
1.56 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-22 (the interaction 
of polcon2 and business 
support service) 
1.31 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-23 (the interaction 
of Polcon3 and business 
support service) 
1.29 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-24 (the interaction 
of polcon4 and business 
support service) 
1.33 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-25 (the interaction 
of PCstrength and business 
servicesupport) 
1.30 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
278 
 
 
 
 Table 
7-12: 
Specification Tests 
Models Hausman test for 
fixed versus 
random effects 
model 
(If<=0.05=> Fixed 
Effects) 
Breusch-Pagan 
LM test for 
random effects 
versus OLS 
(if<=0.05=>use 
Random Effects) 
F-test for fixed 
effects versus OLS 
(if 
Prob<=0.05=>use 
Fixed Effects) 
Testparm (Testing 
for Time-Fixed 
Effects) 
(if<=0.05=>time 
fixed-effects 
needed) 
Decision 
Model 6-1 (the 
interaction of 
polcon and 
legal system) 
0.0216 - 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-2 (the 
interaction of 
polcon and 
corruption) 
0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-3 (the 
interaction of 
polcon and 
entry costs) 
  0.0251 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-4 (the 
interaction of 
polcon and 
business 
support service) 
0.0011 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-9 (the 
interaction of 
polcon1 and 
legal system) 
 0.0094 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-10 
(the interaction 
of polcon2 and 
legal system) 
0.0400 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-11 
(the interaction 
of polcon3 and 
legal system) 
0.0241 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-12 (the 
interaction of 
polcon4 and 
legal system) 
0.0502 0.0000 - - Random Effects 
Model 6-13 (the 
interaction of 
0.0078 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-26 (the interaction 
of ratio of polcon and 
business support service) 
1.29 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-27 (the interaction 
of polcon1 and entrycosts) 
1.23 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-28 (the interaction 
of polcon2 and entrycosts) 
1.23 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-29 (the interaction 
of polcon3 and entrycosts) 
1.22 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-30 (the interaction 
of polcon4 and entrycosts) 
1.25 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-31 (the interaction 
of PCstrength and 
entrycosts) 
1.22 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Model 6-32 (the interaction 
of ratio of polcon and 
entrycosts) 
  1.21 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
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PCstrength and 
legal system) 
Model 6-14 (the 
interaction of 
ratio of polcon 
and legal 
system) 
 
0.0483 
- 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-15 (the 
interaction of 
polcon1 and 
corruption) 
0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-16 (the 
interaction of 
polcon2 and 
corruption) 
  0.0001 
 
- 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-17 (the 
interaction of 
polcon3 and 
corruption) 
0.0001 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-18 (the 
interaction of 
Polcon4 and 
corruption) 
0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-19 (the 
interaction of 
PCstrength and 
corruption) 
 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-20 (the 
interaction of 
ratio of polcon 
and corruption) 
0.0001 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-21 (the 
interaction of 
polcon1 and 
business 
support service) 
0.0004 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-22 (the 
interaction of 
polcon2 and 
business 
support service) 
0.0064 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-23 (the 
interaction of 
Polcon3 and 
business 
support service) 
0.0025 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-24 (the 
interaction of 
polcon4 and 
business 
support service) 
0.0007 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-25 (the 
interaction of 
PCstrength and 
business 
support service) 
0.0004 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-26 (the 
interaction of 
ratio of polcon 
and business 
support service) 
  0.0020   - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
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Model 6-27 (the 
interaction of 
polcon1 and 
entrycosts) 
0.0141 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-28 (the 
interaction of 
polcon2 and 
entrycosts) 
0.0257 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-29 (the 
interaction of 
polcon3 and 
entrycosts) 
0.0540 0.0000 - - Random Effects 
Model 6-30 (the 
interaction of 
polcon4 and 
entrycosts) 
0.0558 0.0000 - - Random Effects 
Model 6-31 (the 
interaction of 
PCstrength and 
entrycosts) 
0.0106 - 0.0000 0.0000 Time and Firm 
Fixed Effects 
Model 6-32 (the 
interaction of 
rattio of polcon 
and entrycosts) 
  0.0672 0.0000 - - Random Effects 
 
